Brown v. Brown

• Decision Date: 07 April 1885
• Docket Number: 11,928
• Citation: 101 Ind. 340
• Parties: Brown et al. v. Brown
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

101 Ind. 340

Brown et al. v. Brown

No. 11,928

Supreme Court of Indiana

April 7, 1885

From the Hendricks Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.

T. J Cofer, N. M. Taylor and J. H. Johnson, for appellants.

L. M Campbell, for appellee.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

The material facts stated in the first paragraph of appellants' complaint are these: In May, 1873, Preston Brown asked and obtained an order of the Hendricks Circuit Court for the adoption of Edgar Boyd, and, in the same order, it was directed that the name of the child be changed to Edgar B. Brown. Preston Brown, the adoptive father, died in August, 1880, the owner of real and personal property, leaving no widow or natural children. The appellants are his brothers and sisters, and claim the property as his heirs. In April, 1883, they gave notice that they disaffirmed the proceedings adopting the appellee, on the ground that Preston Brown was of unsound mind at the time the proceedings were had.

The second paragraph of the complaint is essentially the same as the first, except that it undertakes to charge fraud on the part of the appellee. The charge is embodied in this language:

"Plaintiffs further say that the defendant had lived with said Preston Brown for several years immediately before, and was living with him at the time, the said pretended adoption was made, and that he well knew that the said Preston Brown was then a person of unsound mind; that at the time of said adoption said defendant was eighteen years of age, and knew that said Preston Brown was a person of unsound mind, and that so knowing, and for the purpose of becoming the heir of said Preston Brown, and securing the property hereinbefore mentioned before said adoption was made, he gave his consent to said adoption, and permitted said adoption to be made."

In our opinion, the two paragraphs are substantially the same, for the second does not contain a valid charge of fraud. The silence of the minor did not operate as a fraud upon the court. It is by no means every wrongful act of a litigant that will authorize the overthrow of a judgment. It is quite well settled that fraud will vitiate a judgment only when it is affirmatively shown that it was practiced upon the court. Pomeroy Eq. Jur., section 919; Freeman Judg., section 492; Bigelow Fraud, 170.

It is not necessary to inquire, or decide, what acts will constitute a fraud upon the court, for it does not appear that any fraudulent act at all was done. No obstacle to a full and free investigation was interposed, no deception was practiced, no artifices were resorted to, nor was anything done that misled either the court or the petitioner. The sum and substance of the averment is that the infant remained passive in the hands of the court. The court had ample authority to make a full and complete investigation, and, in the absence of averments to the contrary, we must presume that this investigation was made, and that the court satisfied itself that the petitioner was a proper person to adopt Edgar Boyd. The child has, in such cases as this, no part in the proceeding; the whole matter rests with the court, and it is for the court to make such an investigation as it deems proper. It can not be justly said that the silence of the child can operate to its prejudice, for it is the ward of the court, and the court is charged with the duty of making due inquiry before rendering a judgment consigning it to an adoptive father.

The judgment of the court fixes the legal status both of the adoptive parent and the child. Paul v Davis, 100 Ind. 422; Humphries v. Davis, 100...