Brown v. Brown

• Decision Date: 10 February 2012
• Docket Number: 2100205.
• Parties: A.J. BROWN v. Emily BROWN.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

90 So.3d 716

A.J. BROWN

v.Emily BROWN.

2100205.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Sept. 16, 2011.

Opinion on Denial of Rehearing Dec. 16, 2011.

Certiorari Denied February 10, 2012

Alabama Supreme Court 1110389.

John F. Porter III, Scottsboro, for appellant.

Jack Livingston and Daryl R. Eustace of Jack Livingston, P.C., Scottsboro; and L. Jayson Carroll, Rainsville, for appellee.

BRYAN, Judge.

A.J. Brown (“A.J.”) appeals from a judgment canceling two deeds executed by Robert Barry Brown (“R.B.”) on July 21, 2006, on the ground that they had resulted from A.J.'s exercising undue influence over R.B. We dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the judgment of the trial court.¹

R.B. and Emily Brown (“Emily”) married in 1952 and had four children; A.J. is the youngest of those four children. On March 12, 2006, R.B. suffered a stroke. On March 28, 2006, the DeKalb Probate Court appointed A.J. and one of his siblings, Robert Donald Brown, to serve as temporary conservators and guardians for R.B.; however, the last extension of their appointments expired on May 26, 2006, and their appointments were not extended beyond that date. On July 21, 2006, R.B. executed two deeds conveying land to A.J.; one of the deeds was a warranty deed and the other was a quitclaim deed. On July 25, 2006, an attorney was appointed to serve as conservator and guardian for R.B. On August 7, 2006, R.B. executed a deed conveying property to Emily.

On August 29, 2006, Emily sued A.J. and R.B. in the DeKalb Circuit Court. In her complaint, as amended, Emily stated claims seeking the cancellation of the two July 21, 2006, deeds conveying property from R.B. to A.J. and claims seeking damages from A.J. based on various theories. Her claims seeking cancellation of the July 21, 2006, deeds asserted that the deeds were due to be canceled on the grounds (1) that they purported to convey, without her consent, property in which she owned a homestead interest; (2) that they had resulted from A.J.'s exercising undue influence over R.B.; and (3) that they were executed by R.B. when he lacked the requisite mental competency.

R.B., who was represented by his conservator and guardian, and A.J. filed separate answers denying the allegations of Emily's complaint. In addition, they jointly filed a counterclaim stating a claim seeking the cancellation of the August 7, 2006, deed conveying property from R.B. to Emily and claims seeking damages from Emily based on various theories.

R.B. died on October 12, 2007, and the DeKalb Probate Court appointed a special administrator of his estate. The special administrator moved to substitute R.B.'s estate as a party in this action, and the trial court granted that motion. On March 13, 2008, the special administrator moved for a summary judgment with respect to R.B.'s claim seeking the cancellation of the August 7, 2006, deed conveying property from R.B. to Emily. Although the record does not appear to contain a pleading in which the special administrator asserted a claim seeking the cancellation of the two July 21, 2006, deeds conveying property from R.B. to A.J., the record contains a motion that was filed by the special administrator on April 2, 2008, seeking a summary judgment with respect to such a claim. On May 23, 2008, the trial court entered an order granting the special administrator's summary-judgment motion with respect to his claim seeking the cancellation of the August 7, 2006, deed on the ground that R.B. was represented by a conservator and guardian on that date and, therefore, lacked the power to execute the August 7, 2006, deed. However, the May 23, 2008, order denied the special administrator's summary-judgment motion with respect to his claim seeking the cancellation of the two July 21, 2006, deeds because the trial court concluded that R.B. was not represented by a conservator and guardian on the date he executed those deeds and that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether R.B. was mentally competent when he executed those deeds.

Subsequently, Emily was appointed executrix of R.B.'s estate, and his estate was realigned as a plaintiff. A.J. then moved for a judgment on the pleadings with respect to R.B.'s estate on the ground that R.B.'s estate had not pleaded any claims against A.J., and the trial court granted that motion.

On July 2, 2009, the trial court bifurcated the remaining claims for trial. The trial court ordered that Emily's claims seeking cancellation of the two July 21, 2006, deeds conveying property from R.B. to A.J. would be tried by the trial court sitting without a jury and that, after those claims were adjudicated, all other pending claims would be tried by a jury.

Emily's claims seeking cancellation of the two July 21, 2006, deeds were tried in a bench trial on February 18 and 19, and April 27 and 28, 2010. In May 2010, Emily and A.J. each filed posttrial briefs. In addition to arguing that he was entitled to prevail on the merits with respect to Emily's claims seeking cancellation of the July 21, 2006, deeds, A.J. asserted in his posttrial brief that he was entitled to a judgment declaring that Emily had never owned any interest in the property that was the subject of one of the July 21, 2006, deeds, i.e., the quitclaim deed, because, he said, the evidence had established that (1) R.B. and Emily had executed two deeds, one on December 27, 2002, and the other on January 2, 2003, in which they had deeded to A.J. and his son, subject to life estates reserved by R.B. and Emily, the property that was the subject of the July 21, 2006, quitclaim deed and (2) that Emily had never owned an interest in that property and, therefore, could not reserve a life estate in it in the December 27, 2002, and January 2, 2003, deeds. Thus, A.J. argued, upon R.B.'s death on October 12, 2007, his life estate expired and A.J. and his son became the owners of the entire fee-simple interest in the property that was the subject of the July, 21, 2006, quitclaim deed regardless of whether the July 21, 2006, quitclaim deed was valid.

On August 12, 2010, the trial court entered a judgment adjudicating Emily's claims seeking cancellation of the July 21, 2006, deeds. In pertinent part, the August 12, 2010, judgment states:

“[R.B.] died on October 12, 2007. On March 12, 2006, he suffered a massive stroke that left him severely paralyzed. As a result of the stroke, he was initially hospitalized at Erlanger Medical Center in Chattanooga, Tennessee, later moved to Siskin Rehabilitation Center, and then to Standifer Place Nursing Home in Chattanooga, where he remained, except for a four-day stay with A.J. in May 2006, until September 28, 2006, at which time he returned to his home in DeKalb County, Alabama.

“[R.B.] accumulated substantial land holdings in DeKalb County during his lifetime, some by purchase and some by inheritance from his family. The deeds that the court is asked to set aside conveyed 1285 acres of farm land to A.J. valued at 1.5 to 2 million dollars. Other property remaining in [R.B.'s] name at the time of his death consisted of a cabin, two undeveloped lots, and a tract containing 114 acres. The marital residence located on 69–acre tract was conveyed by [R.B.] to [Emily], prior to his death.

“[R.B.] and [Emily] were married in 1952 and had four children: Cindy Brown Meadows, Robert Donald Brown, Chris Brown, and Arthur James Brown, a/k/a A.J. Over the years, [R.B.] and [Emily] Brown conveyed various tracts of property to their children, and they all lived on family property in close proximity to each other. [R.B.], also known as ‘Bear’ was a big man with a strong personality and was considered head of the Brown family. Ownership of land was important to him, and his use of the land was his and [Emily's] primary source of income for several years prior to the time of his stroke. This income consisted of selling fishing and hunting rights on the land, selling timber from the land, and receiving payments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture [ (‘the USDA’) ] by placing certain land into its farm and timber programs. [R.B. and Emily] sold a tract of land in 1992 for a substantial sum, using the proceeds to pay off a loan and to build the marital residence.

“The first basis asserted by [Emily] for setting aside the subject conveyances is that the lands conveyed by [R.B.] to A.J. were part of [R.B. and Emily's] homestead and could not be conveyed by [R.B.] without her assent. A.J. insists, however, that the homestead is limited to the marital residence and the 69–acre tract upon which it is located, a tract that is separate and apart from and not contiguous to the lands conveyed to him by [R.B.].

“[Emily] maintains that a [‘]homestead[’] is the home where a family resides and any adjoining or appurtenant land used for the family's comfort and sustenance. She points to the fact that a substantial portion of [R.B. and Emily's] annual income at the time of [R.B.'s] stroke came from USDA payments, and that the land that produced these payments is a portion of the land that was conveyed by [R.B.] to A.J. on July 21, 2006. Once these conveyances to A.J. occurred, the USDA payments went to him. [Emily] maintains that because the land conveyed to A.J. was used for the family's sustenance, it is part of the homestead.

“By statute, no conveyance of the homestead by a married person shall be valid without the voluntary signature and assent of the husband or wife. Section 6–10–3, Code of Alabama (1975). In construing the definition of [‘]homestead[’] as used in this statute, the Alabama Supreme Court has generally found it to be limited to property consisting of a home and land not exceeding in value $5,000 and 160 acres in area. See Sims v. Cox, 611 So.2d 339 (Ala.1992).

“Given the fact that the marital residence of [R.B. and Emily] and the 69–acre tract on which it is located far exceeds in value the $5,000 limitation, such residence and acreage being estimated to have a value of no...