Brown v. Brown

• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: LAVINE, J.
• Citation: Brown v. Brown, 199 Conn. App. 134, 235 A.3d 555 (Conn. App. 2020)
• Decision Date: 21 July 2020
• Docket Number: AC 42576
• Parties: Jessica BROWN v. Brett BROWN

199 Conn.App. 134

235 A.3d 555

Jessica BROWN

v.Brett BROWN

AC 42576

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 02, 2020

Officially released July 21, 2020

Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, with whom, on the brief, were Wendy Dunne DiChristina and Peter M. Bryniczka, Greenwich, for the appellant-cross appellee (plaintiff).

Leslie I. Jennings, for the appellee-cross appellant (defendant).

Lavine, Moll and Devlin, Js.

LAVINE, J.

This appeal concerns the judgment rendered by the trial court when it adjudicated two postdissolution motions filed by the defendant, Brett Brown. The plaintiff, Jessica Brown,¹ appeals from the decision of the court ordering her to reimburse the defendant certain unallocated alimony and child support (unallocated support), claiming that the court misinterpreted the parties’ separation agreement. The defendant cross appeals from the court's denial of his motion for modification of child support. We agree with the plaintiff's claim but reject the defendant's claim. We, therefore, reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment with respect to its order to the plaintiff to reimburse the defendant unallocated support and affirm the trial court's judgment with respect to its denial of the defendant's motion to modify child support.

The following procedural history is relevant to our resolution of the parties’ appeals. The parties were married in August, 2000, and together had three children, who were minors on February 26, 2013, when the court, Schofield, J. , rendered judgment dissolving their marriage.² The judgment of dissolution incorporated the parties’ separation agreement (agreement) by reference. Paragraph 4.1 of the agreement obligated the defendant to pay the plaintiff unallocated support "during his lifetime, until her death or remarriage, or February 28, 2017, whichever event shall first occur ...." The plaintiff remarried on August 8, 2015, automatically terminating the defendant's unallocated support obligation.³ On October 19, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion to "fix" child support in accordance with paragraph 5.1 of the agreement, following the termination of unallocated support.⁴ On June 20, 2016, the parties stipulated to the defendant's monthly child support obligation, which the court, Tindill, J. , entered as an order of the court.⁵ In July, 2016, Judge Tindill accepted the parties’ stipulation as to the amount of the defendant's child support arrearage, which the defendant paid.⁶ See footnote 4 of this opinion.

On October 24, 2016, the defendant filed a motion in which he sought to have the court order the plaintiff to reimburse him for what he claimed was his overpayment of unallocated support in 2015. On January 9, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to modify his child support obligation on the basis of a substantial change in circumstances due to the loss of his employment. The plaintiff opposed both of the defendant's motions. The parties appeared before the court, Heller, J. , to argue the defendant's motions on September 11, 2018.

On January 30, 2019, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it granted the defendant's motion for reimbursement of unallocated support and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant $81,358.40. The court, however, denied the defendant's motion to modify child support.

The present appeal and the present cross appeal followed.⁷

We begin with the standard of review applicable to postdissolution matters. An appellate court "will not disturb trial court orders unless the trial court abused its legal discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis in the facts. ... As has often been explained, the foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal facts significant to a domestic relations case. ... In determining whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action. ... Notwithstanding the great deference accorded the trial court in dissolution proceedings, a trial court's ruling ... may be reversed if, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court applies the wrong standard of law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gabriel v. Gabriel , 324 Conn. 324, 336, 152 A.3d 1230 (2016).

ITHE PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL

The plaintiff claims that the court erred by granting the defendant's motion for order, postjudgment, and ordering her to repay the defendant $81,358.40 of the unallocated support he paid her in 2015. The plaintiff claims that the court misinterpreted the agreement, failed to enforce its intended terms, and added terms to the agreement. We agree with the plaintiff and, therefore, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The agreement was incorporated by reference into the February 26, 2013 judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. Article IV of the agreement, titled Unallocated Alimony and Support, required the defendant to pay the plaintiff unallocated support pursuant to certain terms. The relevant paragraphs of article IV follow:

"4.1. Commencing as of the first day of March, 2013, the [defendant] shall pay to the [plaintiff], during his lifetime, until her death or remarriage, or February 28, 2017, whichever event shall first occur, the following percentages of the ’gross annual compensation ’ as hereinafter defined in any calendar year.⁸ ... [In a year in which the defendant earned up to $1 million, the plaintiff was entitled to 40 percent of gross annual compensation, not to exceed $400,000.]⁹

"4.2. All payments made from the [defendant's] base salary shall be made in cash and in equal monthly installments on the first day of each calendar month, in advance. All payments from the [defendant's] additional and/or incentive compensation shall be made by the [defendant ] to the [plaintiff ] within fifteen ... days of receipt of such payments by the [defendant].

"4.3. (a) ‘Gross annual compensation in any year ’ shall be defined to include any and all earnings of any nature whatsoever actually received by the [defendant] in the form of cash or cash equivalents, or which the [defendant] is entitled to receive, from any and all sources including in relation to the services rendered by the [defendant] by way of his past, current or future employment, including but not limited to salary and bonus ....¹⁰

"(c) The [defendant] shall take no action for the purpose of defeating the [plaintiff's] timely right to receive alimony and, in particular, shall take no action to reduce, divert, delay or defer income for the purpose of reducing, limiting or delaying the [defendant's] alimony obligation to the [plaintiff].

"4.4. The alimony payments pursuant to paragraph 4.1 hereof shall be non-modifiable as to duration by the parties or a court of competent jurisdiction and any decree of any court incorporating all or a portion of this [a]greement shall preclude such modification. The alimony payments pursuant to paragraph 4.1 shall otherwise be modifiable pursuant to [ General Statutes § 46b-86 (b) ].

"4.5. For each year in which the [defendant] is obligated to pay unallocated alimony and support to the [plaintiff], the [defendant] shall provide the [plaintiff] with his year-end [pay stub], W-2s, K-1s and 1099s and a copy of his federal tax return when filed with the taxing authority. In addition, the [defendant] shall provide the [plaintiff] evidence, including pay stub or distribution sheet, each time he receives any change in salary or bonus within seven ... days of receipt or filing. In addition, the [defendant] shall provide the [plaintiff] within seven ... days of his receipt, with all statements evidencing the award of restricted share units and stock options and any other deferred or incentive compensation, including but not limited to documentation reflecting when and under what circumstances the restrictions lapse and/or the options may be exercised.

"4.6. In the event the [defendant] changes employment and receives compensation incident thereto, in replacement of deferred or incentive compensation to which the [plaintiff] was entitled to share as income subject to the provisions of this Article IV, she shall be entitled to share in the replacement compensation to the extent she would have shared in the original deferred or incentive compensation.

"4.7. The [defendant ] shall take no action for the purpose of defeating the [plaintiff's ] timely right to receive unallocated alimony and support and, in particular, shall take no action to reduce, divert, delay or defer income for the purpose of reducing, limiting or delaying the [defendant's] unallocated alimony and support obligation to the [plaintiff] pursuant to this Article IV." (Emphasis added; footnotes added.)

In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the defendant had requested that it "order the plaintiff to reimburse him for the unallocated alimony and child support that he overpaid in 2015. According to the reconciliation prepared by [the defendant's] prior counsel in August, 2016, the defendant paid the plaintiff $288,309.51 in 2015, but he should have paid her $206,951.11.¹¹ The difference of $81,358.40 is largely due to the defendant's paying the plaintiff 40 percent of the bonuses and severance payments that he received in March and April, 2015 from RBS and [Jefferies, LLC]. The defendant made these payments a few months before the plaintiff remarried." (Footnote added and footnote omitted.) The court continued that, at oral argument on September 11, 2018, the defendant contended that he had overpaid unallocated support in 2015 because the plaintiff was only entitled to receive 40 percent of his gross annual compensation on a prorated basis (i.e., for seven months, not for the entire year), in view of her remarriage in August, 2015. The plaintiff countered that the agreement did not contain a provision for prorating unallocated support and, therefore, she had no...