Brown v. Brown

Decision Date18 December 1974
Docket NumberNo. 1837-A,1837-A
Citation329 A.2d 200,114 R.I. 117
PartiesJoe Lucius BROWN v. Cora BROWN. ppeal.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

JOSLIN, Justice.

In this divorce proceeding an order was entered by the Family Court, pendente lite, granting custody of the minor children of the parties to the wife and ordering the husband to pay $50 weekly for their support. The husband now appeals from a later decree granting the wife's motion to adjudge him in contempt for failing to make the required payments during the 5 weeks following the entry of the support order, and ordering him either to pay the arrearages of $250 within 1 week or to present himself to the Family Court for sentencing to the Adult Correctional Institutions.

The husband first challenges the basis for the contempt order, contending that his noncompliance with the earlier support order was due to his inability to pay and was not a deliberate or willful defiance of the court's authority.

We recognize the validity of the legal principle which the husband asserts. Town of Lincoln v. Cournoyer, 102 R.I. 512, 516, 232 A.2d 124, 126 (1967). We question, however, whether this factual context permits its application. Here, just 5 weeks before the wife filed her motion to adjudge the husband in contempt, the Family Court made due inquiry into the husband's financial ability to meet the children's needs and concluded that a weekly support order of $50 was reasonable.

While the husband may have questioned that order, he did not seek its review. Instead, he ignored it, thereby inviting the wife either to sue thereon as if on a judgment, or to enforce payment through contempt proceedings. Shaw v. Shaw, 81 R.I. 487, 490-491, 104 A.2d 754, 756 (1954). She elected the latter and, in the proceedings which followed, established a prima facie case for an adjudication in contempt by producing the original support order and proof of nonpayment. The valiity of the support order was therefore not in issue. See Pires v. Pires, 102 R.I. 23, 26, 227 A.2d 477, 478-479 (1967). Whether the husband's noncompliance was justifiable was a factual question on which the husband had the burden of proof. See Capwell v. Capwell, 21 R.I. 101, 41 A. 1005 (1898); Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 591, 607 (1957).

The trial justice properly held the husband to that burden, and gave him full opportunity to explain why the required payments had not been made. Whether the husband was guilty of contempt was addressed to the trial justice's discretion, Shaw v. Shaw, supra 81 R.I. at 491, 104 A.2d at 756, and he found that the husband had not justified his conduct. That finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed absent a showing by the husband that it was based upon an oversight or misconception of material evidence on a controlling issue, or was otherwise clearly wrong. The husband has not satisfied that burden, and we therefore conclude that the trial justice did not err in adjudging him in contempt.

The husband contends secondly that he was financially unable to pay the $250 in support arrearages within the 1 week allotted, and that therefore to make imprisonment the penalty for his failure to do so was to deny him a fair and reasonable opportunity to purge himself of contempt.

Although the question presented appears to be a novel one in this jurisdiction, the parties have not assisted us with citation to authorities elsewhere. Nonetheless, there are some applicable principles so well settled that undoubtedly both parties would accept them. One is that contempt proceedings arising out of noncompliance with alimony or support orders, although to a limited extent designed to preserve the integrity of court decrees, Ciallella v. Ciallella, 81 R.I. 320, 326, 103 A.2d 77, 80 (1954), are primarily intended to coerce the husband to make good his defaults under such orders. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 53 R.I. 326, 329, 166 A. 686, 688 (1933); Mowry v. Bliss, 28 R.I. 114, 65 A. 616 (1907). Another is that the terms of an order imposing a compensatory fine must...

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13 cases
  • Pontbriant v. Pontbriand
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • March 29, 1993
    ...proceedings a respondent can raise the question of his lack of willfulness and his inability to pay. Id. (citing Brown v. Brown, 114 R.I. 117, 120, 329 A.2d 200, 201 (1974)). Whether a party is willful in his disobedience is a question of fact. Borozny v. Paine, 122 R.I. 701, 707, 411 A.2d ......
  • Hartt v. Hartt
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1979
    ...party will not be permitted to urge in defense of his alleged misconduct that the court erred in entering the order. 6 Brown v. Brown, 114 R.I. 117, 329 A.2d 200 (1974); Dupras v. Dupras, 103 R.I. 239, 236 A.2d 260 (1967); Ciallella v. Ciallella, 81 R.I. 320, 103 A.2d 77 (1954); McAuslan v.......
  • Southern Union Company v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, C.A. No. PC 07-2056 (R.I. Super 7/13/2007), C.A. No. PC 07-2056
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • July 13, 2007
    ... ... Department of Env. Mgt. , 553 A.2d 541, 544 (R.I. 1989). It is fundamental that statutory language "should not be viewed in isolation." In re Brown , 903 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I. 2006) (citations omitted). In sum, "[w]hen performing [the] duty of statutory interpretation, this Court `consider[s] the ... ...
  • Britt v. Britt
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • March 15, 1978
    ...decrees, are primarily intended to coerce the contumacious party to make good his or her defaults under such orders. Brown v. Brown, 114 R.I. 117, 329 A.2d 200 (1974). Although contempt matters are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, this court will review the terms of an ......
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