Brown v. Caldwell School Dist. No. 132

Decision Date21 June 1995
Docket NumberNo. 20856,20856
CitationBrown v. Caldwell School Dist. No. 132, 898 P.2d 43, 127 Idaho 112 (Idaho 1995)
Parties, 101 Ed. Law Rep. 1167 Deborah BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALDWELL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 132, Defendant-Respondent. Boise, January 1995 Term
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Stoel, Rives, Boley, Jones & Grey, Boise, for appellant. Kathleen P. Brooks, argued.

Quane Smith Howard & Hull, Boise, for respondent. Brian K. Julian, argued.

TROUT, Justice.

The action giving rise to this appeal was initiated by the appellant, Deborah Brown, following a decision by the Caldwell School District (the District) not to reemploy her for the 1991-92 school year.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Brown was employed by the District during the 1990-91 school year as a fifth grade teacher at its Washington School. This was her first year of teaching. She was hired by the District shortly before school started in September of 1990, and did not actually sign a formal contract of employment until the middle of that month.

On October 8, 1990, the principal of Washington School, Dennis Keogh, evaluated Brown's performance. Although some areas were identified as needing improvement, her overall performance was rated as "satisfactory." On December 11, 1990, assistant superintendent Tom Moore sent Brown a letter informing her that her name would appear on a tentative 1991-92 roster, filling a position as fifth grade teacher at the District's Lincoln School. On December 21, Brown received a second letter from Moore along with a copy of the tentative roster on which her name appeared. The second letter stated that the roster was "tentative" only in the sense that some teachers listed might choose to retire or seek another position. Brown advised District personnel that she intended to remain with the District.

On February 6, 1991, Keogh conducted a second evaluation of Brown's performance. Although her performance was again labeled "satisfactory," her ratings on this evaluation were higher than those on the first. However, at a meeting of the District's board of trustees (the Board), Keogh recommended that Brown not be reemployed. The Board followed the recommendation and sent Brown a letter to that effect on May 22, 1991. This letter stated that the Board's decision was based on the "belief that the school district's interest would be best served by not continuing a contract relationship with you."

On May 30, 1991, Brown requested an informal review of the Board's decision pursuant to I.C. § 33-514. The review was held on June 4, 1991, but no specific substantive reasons for the Board's decision were revealed to Brown. On June 17, the Board reaffirmed its decision not to reemploy Brown. Brown subsequently brought this action alleging that the District had violated I.C. § 33-514, breached an alleged employment contract for the 1991-92 school year, and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The District made a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the district court. In ruling on the motion, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that I.C. § 33-514 was not violated, that no contract was formed relating to Brown's employment during the 1991-92 school year, and that the District did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

II. COMPLIANCE WITH I.C. § 33-514

There are two categories of public school teachers in Idaho: those with "renewable contract" status and those with "annual contract" status. Renewable contract teachers are those who have served three or more consecutive years in the same school district and who are entitled to "automatic renewal" of their employment contracts. I.C. § 33-515. Annual contract teachers are those who have served less than three years in the same district. This latter group of teachers is notified on an annual basis whether they will be reemployed for the ensuing year. I.C. § 33-514. Brown was an annual contract teacher who was not reemployed following her first year of teaching. On appeal she argues that the District violated I.C. § 33-514 for two separate reasons.

A. Whether Brown's Performance was "Unsatisfactory" Within the Meaning of I.C. § 33-514

Section 33-514 of the Idaho Code requires a school district which elects not to reemploy an annual contract teacher on the basis of unsatisfactory performance to first place that teacher on probation. 1 Gunter v. Board of Trustees, Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 123 Idaho 910, 854 P.2d 253 (1993). Brown argues that although her work was formally evaluated as "satisfactory," the decision not to reemploy her was actually based on the fact that the District found her performance unsatisfactory. Therefore, Brown contends she should have been placed on probation. The district court granted the District's motion for summary judgment on this issue, finding the record "devoid of any evidence that [Brown's] work was unsatisfactory."

When considering an appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as that used by the district court in passing on the motion. Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 610, 850 P.2d 749, 761 (1993). This standard requires the district court, and this Court on appeal, to construe liberally the facts in favor of the non-moving party and determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 179, 731 P.2d 171, 174 (1987).

We, like the district court, do not interpret I.C. § 33-514 to require probation every time an annual contract teacher is not reemployed. There are circumstances unrelated to performance deficiencies which would allow a school board to make a decision not to reemploy without implicating the statutory probation requirement. However, contrary to the district court's conclusion, there is evidence in the record, apart from the mere fact that she was not reemployed, from which reasonable minds might conclude that Brown was not reemployed because the District found her performance unsatisfactory.

The Board relies primarily on its principals' recommendations in determining whether to reemploy annual contract teachers. In this case, principal Keogh testified that current performance is one of the criteria on which he bases his recommendations. There is evidence that Keogh had concerns about Brown's communication skills. Further, in making his recommendation to the Board, Keogh stated that although Brown's work was "satisfactory," he felt that he could hire someone better. He also told the Board that he would not want his own children in her class.

The District argues that the fact it believed it could hire someone better than Brown does not necessarily mean that Brown's work was unsatisfactory. We agree. However, if a performance deficiency in a teacher is such that it affects whether he or she will be reemployed, I.C. § 33-514 requires that that teacher be placed on probation. Reasonable minds could conclude that there is something wrong with a teacher's performance when she is not reemployed due to the possibility of employing a better teacher. This deficiency appears more serious when a principal has identified performance-related concerns and has even stated that he would not want his own children to be taught by that teacher. We hold that this evidence is sufficient at least to raise a factual question as to whether the District's decision was based on deficient or unsatisfactory performance. 2 Therefore, the order of the district court granting summary judgment on this issue is reversed.

B. Whether the Statement of Reasons Provided by the District for its Decision not to Reemploy Brown was Insufficient

Section 33-514 of the Idaho Code also provides that:

each [annual contract teacher] shall be given notice, in writing, whether he or she will be reemployed for the next ensuing year.... If the board of trustees has decided not to reemploy the certificated employee, then the notice must contain a statement of reasons for such decision and the employee shall, upon request, be given the opportunity for an informal review of such decision by the board of trustees. 3

Brown contends that § 33-514 requires an accurate statement providing specific reasons for a decision not to reemploy. According to Brown, the statement's purpose is to pinpoint the problem leading to the adverse decision and to enable a teacher to respond to the charge. In this case, the District sent Brown a letter stating that its decision not to reemploy her "was based on the Board's belief that the school district's interest would be best served by not continuing a contract relationship with you." Since this "reason" was meaningless, Brown contends that the District violated § 33-514. The district court, on the other hand, concluded that the statement's purpose is simply to allow the teacher to make an informed decision about whether to request an informal review. According to the district court, the question of the adequacy of a statement of reasons loses all importance where review is actually sought.

A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be rendered superfluous or insignificant. Norton v. Department of Employment, 94 Idaho 924, 928, 500 P.2d 825, 829 (1972) (citations omitted). Further, we do not presume that the legislature performed an idle act by enacting a meaningless provision. Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 P.2d 27, 31 (1990) (citations omitted). Applying these rules of construction to I.C. § 33-514, it appears that the requirement of a statement of reasons was included to provide a teacher with the means to develop a meaningful response to an adverse decision by a board of trustees. It is clear that a teacher cannot dispute the reasons for an adverse decision when that teacher is not given notice of what those reasons are. In this scenario, the informal...

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