Brown v. Chater

Citation87 F.3d 963
Decision Date20 June 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-3735,95-3735
Parties, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 15263B Celestine BROWN, Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Julie A. Frank, Omaha, NE, argued, for appellant.

Sara Beth Donovan, Omaha, NE, argued, for appellee.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Celestine Brown appeals the district court's 1 judgment affirming the denial of her application for Social Security disability benefits. We affirm.

I.

Celestine Brown is a forty-six-year-old woman with a high school degree. After completing cosmetology school and two years of college, she worked as a preschool teacher and as a telephone operator. On December 15, 1992, Brown filed applications for Social Security disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, alleging a disability onset date of October 20, 1989. Brown claimed that she was unable to work due to headaches; depression; fatigue; vision problems; muscle spasms; dizziness; swelling in her leg, ankle, feet, and hand; and pain in her neck, back, and shoulder. The Social Security Administration denied her applications initially and upon reconsideration. After conducting a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), found that Brown did not suffer from a disability as defined in the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Brown's request for review and the district court affirmed. In this appeal, Brown alleges that the ALJ improperly disregarded her subjective complaints of pain and failed to adequately develop the record.

II.

We will uphold the ALJ's decision to deny benefits if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Baumgarten v. Chater, 75 F.3d 366, 368 (8th Cir.1996). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind would find as adequate to support the ALJ's conclusion. Id. The ALJ, after following the five-step process set out in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920, concluded that Brown did have medically determinable impairments including cervical and lumbar strains, dysthymia, major depression, and dependent personality disorder. He found, however, that the evidence failed to establish that the impairments were, singly or in combination, severe enough to constitute a disability under the Act. The ALJ concluded that Brown would be incapable of performing occupations that require lifting of more than twenty pounds or those occupations that require frequent lifting and carrying of items weighing more than ten pounds. He found, however, that Brown could return to her past relevant work as a telephone operator. After reviewing the record, we find there was sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's determinations.

Brown claims that her pain started after she fell down a flight of stairs on July 9, 1988, and that it was compounded by several automobile accidents occurring between 1989 and 1992. There is little objective medical evidence in the record that would support Brown's claim that her impairments are disabling. First, all of the tests conducted on Brown, including an arthrogram, X-rays of the neck and back, and a myelogram of the cervical and lumbar region, were normal.

In addition, Dr. Michael O'Neil, who examined Brown on December 18, 1989, noted that Brown's "symptoms of left shoulder pain and left neck pain are very generalized and not consistent with a cervical disc syndrome or a single nerve root injury or an injury to the soft tissues of the left shoulder." Dr. O'Neil could find no explanation for Brown's physical symptoms and believed that Brown would not have any permanent impairment as a result of the injury.

Diane Ratigan, a physical therapist, evaluated Brown on June 7, 1990. Ms. Ratigan believed that Brown was "capable of performing most aspects of her job," but noted that Brown's ability to perform her past work for more than 20 minutes at one time was limited by her pain. Although Ms. Ratigan's statement may lend support to a finding of disability, the ALJ was permitted to discredit the statement because the conclusion appeared to rest solely on Brown's complaints of pain. See Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir.1993) (conclusory statement of disability based on claimant's subjective complaints of pain entitled to little weight when unsupported by objective medical evidence).

On June 28, 1990, Dr. James Rogers performed a vocational evaluation. He noted the absence of functional restrictions placed upon Brown by her treating physicians. Based on Ms. Ratigan's report, however, Dr. Rogers did not believe that Brown could return to her former job at the time of the evaluation. Nevertheless, he stated that Brown could return to her previous work if she could get her pain under control.

In an examination performed following an automobile accident in March 1991, Dr. R. Schuyler Gooding stated that "although this patient may continue to have some discomfort in her neck and in her lower back, she is employable, and capable of holding down a job." In further support of the ALJ's finding of no disability, Dr. Gooding concluded that Brown did not appear to be in any significant distress during an examination conducted on March 15, 1993. Dr. Gooding "continue[d] to be of the impression that this patient can return to the work force." His report reflects that he "advised [Brown] that she will probably always experience some variable discomfort involving her neck and her lower back in view of the fact that she is not getting younger and that she is slightly overweight."

Moreover, Dr. William Johnson, who treated Brown from October 1, 1988, through October 2, 1990, and from December 30, 1991, through August 3, 1992, recommended conservative treatment for Brown's neck, arm, and shoulder pain, including medication, exercise, and physical therapy. In Brown's final visit on August 3, 1992, Dr. Johnson concluded that Brown had intermittent symptoms in her neck, left shoulder, and back. According to Dr. Johnson, Brown's examination failed to reveal more than mild limitation of motion and mild spasm. Finally, after performing a psychological evaluation...

To continue reading

Request your trial
421 cases
  • Englerth v. Colvin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • September 29, 2016
    ...each Polaski factor as long as the analytical framework is recognized and considered."); Strongson, 361 F.3d at 1072; Brown v. Chater, 87 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 1996). In any case, "[t]he credibility of a claimant's subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide, not the courts." ......
  • Johnston v. Colvin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • September 30, 2016
    ...each Polaski factor as long as theanalytical framework is recognized and considered."); Strongson, 361 F.3d at 1072; Brown v. Chater, 87 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 1996). In any case, "[t]he credibility of a claimant's subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide, not the courts." P......
  • Frieden v. Colvin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • September 11, 2015
    ...each Polaski factor as long as the analytical framework is recognized and considered."); Strongson, 361 F.3d at 1072; Brown v. Chater, 87 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 1996). In any case, "[t]he credibility of a claimant's subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide, not the courts." ......
  • Stephens v. Astrue
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • May 14, 2012
    ...each Polaski factor as long as the analytical framework is recognized and considered."); Strongson, 361 F.3d at 1072; Brown v. Chater, 87 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 1996). In any case, "[t]he credibility of a claimant's subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide, not the courts." ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
5 books & journal articles
  • Case survey
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Bohr's Social Security Issues Annotated - Volume I
    • May 4, 2015
    ...a claimant should not be required to corroborate his or her psychiatric impairments with objective evidence. Id. But see Brown v. Chater , 87 F.3d 963, 964 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that an ALJ was permitted to discredit the statement of a physical therapist which was based solely on the cla......
  • Assessment of disability issues
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Social Security Issues Annotated. Vol. II - 2014 Contents
    • August 3, 2014
    ...the claimant’s complaints of pain, in part, due to the lack of objective medical evidence to support her complaints); Brown v. Chater , 87 F.3d 963, 964 (8 th Cir. 1996) (stating that an ALJ was permitted to discredit the statement of a physical therapist which was based solely on the claim......
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Bohr's Social Security Issues Annotated - Volume II
    • May 4, 2015
    ...Cir. 1997), §§ 212.1, 212.2, 212.10, 212.11, 318.1 Brown v. Callahan, 979 F. Supp. 1357, 1362-63 (D. Kan. 1997), § 603.8 Brown v. Chater , 87 F.3d 963, 964 (8th Cir. 1996), §§ 203.11, 204.5, 205.5 Brown v. Chater , 106 F.3d 413 (Table), No. 96-6177 (10th Cir. Jan. 24, 1997), § 1203.14 Brown......
  • Assessment of disability issues
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Social Security Issues Annotated. Vol. I - 2014 Contents
    • August 2, 2014
    ...a claimant should not be required to corroborate his or her psychiatric impairments with objective evidence. Id. But see Brown v. Chater , 87 F.3d 963, 964 (8 th Cir. 1996) (finding that an ALJ was permitted to discredit the statement of a physical therapist which was based solely on the cl......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT