Brown v. City of India
| Decision Date | 17 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:18-cv-03157-JRS-TAB,1:18-cv-03157-JRS-TAB |
| Parties | KEVIN BROWN, BEVERLY DIANNE BROWN, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, OFFICER EMILY PERKINS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
After a traffic-stop encounter with Officer Emily Perkins of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") turned sour, Plaintiffs Kevin Brown and Beverly Dianne Brown ("Dianne Brown") brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law claims against Perkins, the IMPD, and the City of Indianapolis. Defendants previously moved for summary judgment, (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 41), and the Court dismissed all claims except those against Perkins in her individual capacity, (Entry Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53). With leave of court, Perkins now moves for summary judgment on the remaining claims. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 55.) For the following reasons, Perkins's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of production. Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013). That initial burden consists of either "(1) showing that there is an absence of evidence supporting an essential element of the non-moving party's claim; or (2) presenting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim." Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 817 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Modrowski, 712 F.3d at 1169). If the moving party discharges its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who must present evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact on all essential elements of the case. See Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court must construe the facts and reasonable inferences arising from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
On October 14, 2016, at 9:18 p.m., Officer Emily Perkins was driving her police vehicle westbound on I-70. (Perkins Dep. Tr. 5:4, ECF No. 56-1; Probable Cause Aff., ECF No. 56-7.) At around mile marker 82, (id.), Officer Perkins says she noticed that the Browns' vehicle had quickly changed lanes many times without signaling, (Perkins Dep. Tr. 5:21-22, ECF No. 57-1). Officer Perkins activated the emergency lights on her patrol vehicle. (Probable Cause Aff., ECF No. 56-7.)
Mr. Brown, who was driving the Browns' car, noticed the emergency lights. (K. Brown Dep. Tr. 14:8-11, ECF No. 56-2.) But Mr. Brown assumed Officer Perkins was trying to pull someone else over because he "was not speeding . . . and had not doneanything wrong with respect to driving the car." (Id. at 14:3-9.) The police vehicle changed lanes, getting behind the Browns' vehicle. (Id. at 14:25.) Continuing to believe the lights were directed at someone else, Mr. Brown changed lanes again. (Id. at 15:1-4.) When the police car followed, Mr. Brown finally realized Officer Perkins was trying to get him to pull over. (Id. at 15:5-7.) Officer Perkins activated her car's siren. (Probable Cause Aff., ECF No. 56-7.) Mrs. Brown, who was sitting in the passenger seat, was confused why the officer was trying to stop them. (D. Brown Dep. Tr. 9:1-14, ECF No. 56-2.)
Mr. Brown began looking for a place on the highway where both his vehicle and the police car could safely pull over. (K. Brown Dep. Tr. 23:18-20, ECF No. 56-2.) Approaching the split where I-70 comes to I-65, Mr. Brown decided the area was unsafe because it was too dark and too close to overpasses—he chose to look for a safer place to stop, continuing in the lanes for the exits to downtown Indianapolis. (Id. 23:7-10.) He also considered stopping near the Meridian/Ohio exits but concluded that the area would be a "terrible place to stop." (Id. 23:11-20.) After a few minutes, Mr. Brown pulled over near mile marker 85, and Officer Perkins pulled over behind him. (Probable Cause Aff., ECF No. 56-7.) Officer Perkins and one of her supervisors later opined that this location was a dangerous place to pull over because it was on a curve in the highway and near a construction site. (Id.; Perkins Dep. Tr. 18:10-25, ECF No. 56-1; Hessong Dep. Tr. 8:13-18, ECF No. 56-8.)
After thirty to ninety seconds, Officer Perkins exited her car with her gun drawn. (K. Brown. Dep. Tr. 26:16-17, ECF No. 56-2.) Noticing this in his side mirror and not"want[ing] to get shot," Mr. Brown yelled out his window, (Id. 26:17-20.) Officer Perkins says she did not understand what Mr. Brown was yelling. (Perkins Dep. Tr. 11:21-24, ECF No. 56-1.) Officer Perkins continued, crouched and gun drawn, pointing her gun at the Browns through the driver's side window. (D. Brown Dep. Tr. 14:25-15:21, ECF No. 56-3.) Mr. Brown rolled down the window, and he discussed with Officer Perkins why he did not immediately yield. But every time Mr. Brown tried to explain that he was simply trying to find a safe place to pull over, Officer Perkins would talk over him and ask why he was fleeing. (Id. 46:10-13.) During the conversation, Officer Perkins "relax[ed] a little bit," although her gun was still pointed at the Browns. (D. Brown Dep. Tr. 14:25-15:4, ECF No. 56-3.) Eventually, she lowered her weapon to her side and took Mr. Brown's driver's license, registration, and bar card. (K. Brown Dep. Tr. 31:19-24, ECF No. 56-2.)
Officer Perkins returned to her vehicle, and Officers Cook and Disney arrived to assist. (Id. 29:7-8.) Officer Perkins approached the Browns' car again, directed Mr. Brown to exit, handcuffed him, and sat him at the guardrail. (Id. 30:10) She then went to the passenger's side, directed Mrs. Brown to exit, took the phone Mrs. Brown was trying to record the encounter with, threw it back into the Browns' car, handcuffed Mrs. Brown, and sat Mrs. Brown down at the guardrail about fifteen feet from her husband. (D. Brown Dep. Tr. 18:2-22, 28:3, ECF No. 56-3.) Mr. Brown says the handcuffs were overly tight but left no marks on his wrists. (K. Brown Dep. Tr. 37:6-16, ECF No. 56-2.) Mrs. Brown says Officer Perkins "conked" the handcuffs on her and overly tightened them, causing pain and leaving red marks on her wrists. (D. Brown Dep. Tr. 32:11-14, ECF No. 56-3.) Mrs. Brown says she was incredulous at how tight the cuffs were, (id. 32:16-17), but she did not say that she told Officer Perkins so.
After ten to fifteen minutes, (K. Brown Dep. Tr. 43:15-17, ECF No. 56-2), Sergeant Kinsey arrived and directed that the handcuffs be removed, (id. 43:5-10). Lieutenant Hessong then arrived, directed that Mr. Brown be handcuffed again, and told Mr. Brown he would be taken to Marion County lockup. The officers put Mr. Brown in Officer Cook's police vehicle, and Mr. Brown complained to Officer Cook that his handcuffs were too tight. (K. Brown Dep. Tr. 44:21-45:2, ECF No. 56-2.) Mrs. Brown was released, though she followed the police to the sheriff's department, where she stayed until Mr. Brown's release early the next morning.
Ultimately, Mr. Brown was charged with (1) resisting law enforcement, a felony; (2) resisting law enforcement, a misdemeanor; and (3) failing to signal for a turn or lane change, an infraction. (Am. Charging Information, ECF 57-5.) On October 10, 2017, Mr. Brown and the Marion County Prosecutor's Office entered into a traffic deferral agreement by which Mr. Brown admitted that he had failed to signal his lane changes and the charges would be dismissed in six months from the date of signing. (Deferral Agreement, ECF No. 57-6.)
The Browns subsequently sued Officer Perkins, the IMPD, and the City of Indianapolis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations arising from their encounter with Officer Perkins on October 14, 2016. They also brought several state-law tort claims. In the course of litigation, all claims apart from those against Perkins in her personal capacity were dismissed. (Entry Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 53.) Perkins now moves for summary judgment on the remaining claims. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 55.)
Plaintiffs bring excessive force, false arrest, confinement, and false imprisonment claims under § 1983. Perkins asserts qualified immunity as to each of these theories of liability.
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are immune from suit unless their conduct violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A right is clearly established if an officer has "fair notice" that the challenged conduct was unlawful. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). "Whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgment turns on whether the plaintiff has both (1) alleged that the official committed acts violating a clearly established right and (2) adduced 'evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as towhether the [official] in fact committed those acts.'" Balsewicz v. Pawlyk, 963 F.3d 650, 656 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
It is certainly clearly established that an officer who stops a vehicle to investigate a traffic infraction without reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment.1 See, e.g., ...
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