Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale

• Decision Date: 19 February 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. 89-5839,89-6272,s. 89-5839
• Citation: 923 F.2d 1474
• Parties: 55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 211, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,562 Mathas BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a municipality, and Constance W. Hoffman, in her official capacity as City Manager of the City of Fort Lauderdale, Defendants-Appellees. Ron Cochran, in his official capacity as Police Chief of the City of Fort Lauderdale, Police Department, Defendant. Mathas BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a municipality, Constance W. Hoffman, in her official capacity as City Manager of the City of Fort Lauderdale, and Ron Cochran, in his official capacity as former Police Chief of the City of Fort Lauderdale Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1474

923 F.2d 1474

55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 211,

55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,562

Mathas BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a municipality, and Constance W.

Hoffman, in her official capacity as City Manager

of the City of Fort Lauderdale,

Defendants-Appellees.

Ron Cochran, in his official capacity as Police Chief of the

City of Fort Lauderdale, Police Department, Defendant.

Mathas BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE, a municipality, Constance W.

Hoffman, in her official capacity as City Manager of the

City of Fort Lauderdale, and Ron Cochran, in his official

capacity as former Police Chief of the City of Fort

Lauderdale Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 89-5839, 89-6272.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Feb. 19, 1991.

Mathas Brown, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

Lindsey A. Payne, Asst. City Atty., Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for defendants-appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before CLARK, Circuit Judge, HILL ^*, and COFFIN ^**, Senior Circuit Judges.

COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge:

Appellant Mathas Brown brought this lawsuit pro se under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981 and 1983 claiming that he was fired from his job as a police officer for the City of Fort Lauderdale because he is black. He sued the City, the police chief and the city manager under each statute, but the district court in two separate orders dismissed all of his claims. The court held that qualified immunity protected the individual defendants from liability under Sec. 1983 and that, after Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), a racially motivated discharge is not actionable under Sec. 1981. The court further held that the complaint failed to allege a city policy of discrimination against blacks.

I. Background

In reviewing the district court's decision to end this case at the pleading stage, we must give all possible breadth to the plaintiff's articulation of his claims. We take the material allegations of the complaint as true, and we construe those allegations liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir.1985). This standard requires us to reverse the dismissal " 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' " Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

We have concluded that Brown's allegations, when viewed in this benevolent light, are sufficient to withstand defendants' motions to dismiss. ¹ Before discussing in detail the specific claims, we shall summarize both the circumstances surrounding Brown's termination and the district court's rationale for dismissing all claims.

A. Facts

We draw the following statement of facts from plaintiff's voluminous 31-page complaint and the exhaustive set of documents attached to it as exhibits.

On June 19, 1986, approximately five and one-half years after plaintiff Brown joined the Fort Lauderdale Police Force, Chief Ron Cochran notified him by letter that he was being dismissed "because of deficiencies in performance and/or conduct." ² The letter specifically referred to a series of Employee Performance Rating Reports which, beginning in December 1981, rated Brown as "overall satisfactory" until a November 1985 report rated him as "marginal" with less-than-satisfactory ratings in twelve of sixteen categories. ³ Specific deficiencies noted were quality of work, attendance and self-expression. The letter stated that a follow-up review of Brown's performance, conducted 90 days after the November 1985 evaluation, similarly led to an unsatisfactory rating. In addition, the chief referred to Brown's erratic attendance at a required Report Improvement Course in May 1986 and a disciplinary record containing two written reprimands and a counseling form.

On July 3, Brown received a letter from City Manager Constance Hoffman, the official who technically had the authority to hire and fire all city employees. She confirmed Brown's dismissal, stating that "I have reviewed the circumstances surrounding this matter and I concur with Chief Cochran's decision."

Brown challenges the validity of many of the reasons given by the chief for his discharge. First, he claims that the November 1985 performance report rating him as unsatisfactory was completed by an officer who had supervised his work for less than two months and was prejudiced against blacks, and, more importantly, that the 90-day follow-up evaluation never occurred. ⁴ Second, he claims that the quality of his work was unfairly criticized. On the issue of "self-expression," for example, Brown submitted as an exhibit to his complaint a memorandum from the coordinator of a writing program he had been required to attend in 1984. The coordinator reported that Brown had written a short, one-page report "which really did not indicate any particular trouble areas." In addition, she noted that Brown "has been most cordial and cooperative, and is very willing to try to improve himself."

Third, Brown claims the chief unfairly implied that he has unsatisfactory work habits by referring to his poor attendance at the improvement course. When first notified about the course, Brown had requested that he be allowed to attend a later session for health reasons. Brown explained in a letter to Cochran, which was attached to the complaint, that he was in the midst of an intensive exercise program as treatment for a back injury suffered in an on-the-job car accident, and wished to devote as much time as possible to that program until the date of his next doctor's appointment in two months. The chief denied the request for a delay without explanation. In his complaint, Brown states that he missed ten of the twenty-four class hours because of "doctor appointments, physical therapy appointments, and periodic excruciating pain" in his back.

Moreover, Brown claims that white police officers regularly are allowed to miss work for the treatment of injuries, and he listed in his complaint the names of seven officers, including one who allegedly left the scene of an accident in which he was involved. That officer is still employed by the department.

Fourth, Brown attributes his disciplinary notices largely to the widespread racial prejudice he believes exists within the police department. For example, a counseling slip was placed in his record following an incident in which both he and another officer responded to a domestic disturbance. In a written statement submitted to the police department following the incident, Brown reported that, consistent with usual practice, he had asked the other officer, Mastrangelo, to handle the call once Brown discovered that he knew the couple involved. Brown's statement reports that he remained with Mastrangelo as back-up until the dispute was resolved, and that he had checked for a weapon before Mastrangelo arrived on the scene. Mastrangelo's statement, however, indicates that Brown had not checked for a weapon, despite reports that the husband was armed, and that Brown had left him unprotected, staying far to the rear while Mastrangelo handled the incident. Brown alleges that his sergeant placed a counseling form concerning this incident in his file, but not in Mastrangelo's, and that Mastrangelo's version of the incident was accepted simply because he is white.

Brown claims that several other incidents also led unfairly to blemishes on his record. He once received a written reprimand for leaving his shift early, a customary practice, but a white officer who signed off duty just ahead of him on the same day was not similarly criticized. On another occasion, an internal investigation into a suspect's complaint that Brown mishandled the suspect's property resulted in a finding in favor of Brown, but a counseling form stemming from the incident nevertheless was placed in his file. Yet another time Brown received a counseling slip as a result of an incident in which Officer Mastrangelo asked him to enter a bar "to see if anyone would call [him] a Nigger." Brown refused and left the scene. He reported the incident to supervisors, who took no action against Mastrangelo. Brown, however, was censored in his annual performance rating report for "publicly enter[ing] into a verbal altercation with another Officer regarding a request."

In sum, Brown claims that the reasons given for his termination were without merit, and that racial discrimination provided the real basis for his discharge. ⁵

B. The District Court's Opinions

The district court dismissed the City of Fort Lauderdale from the case on the ground that Brown failed to allege a citywide policy or custom of discrimination, a necessary element of a civil rights claim against a municipality. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The court dismissed the Sec. 1983 claims against both Cochran and Hoffman based on qualified immunity. It stated merely that the defendants were entitled to immunity because Brown had failed to allege facts demonstrating that the constitutional right allegedly infringed was clearly established at the time of their conduct or that the defendants knew or should have known that their conduct violated a constitutional norm.

The court dismissed the Sec. 1981 claim against Hoffman without explanation, but initially held that Brown's claim against the chief under Sec. 1981 was sufficiently developed to withstand a motion to dismiss. In rejecting dismissal on this claim, the court stated Plaintiff has made allegations of discriminatory acts by various police officers and supervisory personnel who disciplined plaintiff because he was black, whereas white police officers were not disciplined for the same actions. Specif...