Brown v. City of Hous.
| Decision Date | 15 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-17-1749 |
| Parties | ALFRED DEWAYNE BROWN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS, et al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Harris County asks this court to reconsider its ruling denying the County's motion to dismiss Alfred Dewayne Brown's § 1983 claims based on a municipal-liability theory. For the reasons stated below, the County's motion for reconsideration is denied.
Brown sued the City of Houston, Harris County, current Harris County District Attorney Kim Ogg, and Houston Police Department Detective Breck McDaniel and Officers Tim Bloyd and D.L. Robertson, asserting § 1983 claims. Brown alleged constitutional violations in his prosecution and conviction, including egregious Brady violations, for capital murder. He seeks damages for the 12 years he spent in prison, on death row.
The defendants moved to dismiss. After extensive briefing and oral argument, the court issued its ruling in December 2017. (Docket Entry No. 39). The parties are familiar with the facts of this case, which are detailed in that opinion and need not be repeated here.
In its December 2017 Memorandum and Opinion, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss as to Harris County and Kim Ogg. (Docket Entry No. 39 at 43). The court determined that Brown alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against Harris County for unconstitutional policies, practices, or customs. The court dismissed, with prejudice, Brown's claim against Harris County for failure to train its employees in Brady obligations. The court also dismissed, without prejudice and with leave to amend, Brown's claim against the County based on the conduct of Harris County prosecutor Daniel Rizzo.
Harris County moves the court to reconsider the denial of the motion to dismiss Brown's claim for unconstitutional policies, practices, or customs. (Docket Entry No. 46). Harris County makes three arguments: (1) the County cannot be liable for the decisions of an independently elected district attorney; (2) the County is an improper party; and (3) Brown does not have standing to sue the County for the actions of a district attorney acting in an official, prosecutorial capacity. Brown's response argues that the County is rehashing the arguments the court heard, considered, and rejected. (Docket Entry No. 52).
"Rule 54(b) allows parties to seek reconsideration of interlocutory orders and authorizes the district court to 'revise[] at any time' 'any order or other decision . . . [that] does not end the action.'" Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)) (per curiam). Brown notes that courts in this district have routinely applied a Rule 59(e) analysis to motions to reconsider interlocutory orders. But the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Austin makes clear that Rule 54(b) and Rule 59(e) require distinct analyses. Id. (); see also Int'l Corrugated & Packing Supplies, Inc. v. Lear Corp., 694 Fed. App'x 364 (5th Cir. 2017) ( ).
"Under Rule 54(b), 'the trial court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law.'" Austin, 864 F.3d at 336 (quoting Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990)). In contrast, the stricter Rule 59(e) applies only to the reconsideration of final judgments. The Fifth Circuit, adopting language from the D.C. Circuit, contrasted Rule 54(b) with Rule 59(e):
Rule 59(e), understandably, sets a high threshold for parties to raise a new argument for the first time after judgment has already been entered. . . . In contrast, Rule 54(b)'s approach to the interlocutory presentation of new arguments as the case evolves can be more flexible, reflecting the 'inherent power of the rendering district court to afford such relief from interlocutory judgments as justice requires.'
Id. (quoting Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Because the County moves the court to reconsider the denial of its motion to dismiss—an interlocutory order that "adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties [and] does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties"—the analysis is under Rule 54(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). "It is within the discretion of the court whether to grant a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order." Deeds v. Whirlpool, No. Civ. A. H-15-2208, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127461, at *31 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2017).
Harris County argues that this court failed to follow its rulings in similar prior cases whenit found that Brown alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for § 1983 municipal liability against the County. The court disagrees.
The County first argues that the decision is inconsistent with this court's prior opinion in Bellamy v. Harris County, CV H-16-02925, 2017 WL 2080157 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 2017). According to Harris County, Bellamy precludes the arguments Brown raises to state a municipal-liability claim. Brown responds that Bellamy is factually and legally distinguishable.
In Bellamy, the plaintiffs alleged that police officers searched their car during a traffic stop and falsely claimed to find drugs and drug paraphernalia. Based on that search, Bellamy was arrested, detained, and charged with a criminal offense. The plaintiffs alleged that the District Attorney's office engaged in improper plea-bargaining tactics, including lying about the existence of inculpatory evidence to manipulate Bellamy into pleading guilty. The plaintiffs sued both District Attorney Devon Anderson and Harris County under § 1983. The court dismissed the claim against District Attorney Anderson based on the absolute prosecutorial immunity. The court rejected the plaintiffs' characterization of Anderson's actions as "administrative," finding that the complaint instead alleged "that District Attorney Anderson herself was the one who took various improper actions." Bellamy, 2017 WL 2080157, at *2 (emphasis added). The Bellamy plaintiffs asserted claims against Anderson for her individual actions, but they did not assert Monell claims against the County. The court noted that "[t]here is only a brief and nonspecific allegation that 'Harris County engaged in a wide-spread custom or practice' of various rights violations and that District Attorney Anderson implemented that policy.'" Id. The Bellamy plaintiffs conclusorily alleged a general County policy, but it was based on a single incident. The complaint did not assert a claim, must less sufficient facts, for Monell liability against the County, instead asserting claims only againstAnderson. By contrast, Brown alleged extensive facts describing the County-wide "do whatever it takes" to convict policy, practice, or custom, and he alleged facts showing the County's adoption and implementation with deliberate indifference to constitutional violations.
The County also points to the court's application in Bellamy of the Supreme Court decision in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009), as foreclosing Brown's claims. In Van de Kamp, the Supreme Court considered "whether [prosecutorial] immunity extends to claims that the prosecution failed to disclose impeachment material . . . due to: (1) a failure to properly train prosecutors, (2) a failure to properly supervise prosecutors, or (3) a failure to establish an information system containing potential impeachment material about informants." Id. at 339. The plaintiff in Van de Kamp sued under § 1983 after he was convicted based in part on false testimony from a jailhouse informant. The plaintiff sued the former Los Angeles County district attorney and the chief deputy district attorney under § 1983 for failing to communicate relevant information to his defense attorney, failing to adequately train or supervise the prosecutors on the case, and failing to establish an information system about informants. Unlike Brown, the plaintiff in Van de Kamp did not allege municipal liability under Monell. The Supreme Court's analysis focused instead on the liability of a supervising prosecutor for the actions of the trial prosecutor and for a general failure to train prosecutors in Giglio obligations. The issue in Van de Kamp, which this court discussed in Bellamy, was the potential contradiction in finding a trial prosecutor absolutely immune while simultaneously holding liable the supervisor who failed to supervise or train that prosecutor. Similar facts are not present here.
Harris County next argues that George v. Harris County, No. H-10-3235, 2012 WL 2744332 (S.D. Tex. July 9, 2012), is inconsistent with allowing Brown's municipal-liability claims againstHarris County. In George, the plaintiff sued two Texas counties and several prosecutors in those counties, alleging state and federal law violations. There, as here, the court found the individual prosecutors absolutely immune for actions taken in the scope of their prosecutorial duties. Id. at *14. The court rejected George's attempt to hold Harris County liable for the prosecutors' actions and for the actions or failures of the juvenile court, which operated as an agent of the State of Texas, noting that a County...
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