Brown v. City of Oneonta

Decision Date03 January 1996
Docket NumberNo. 93-CV-349.,93-CV-349.
Citation911 F. Supp. 580
PartiesRicky BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ONEONTA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

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Whiteman, Osterman & Hanna, Albany, New York (D. Scott Bassinson, of counsel), for plaintiffs.

Rowley, Forrest, O'Donnell & Hite, P.C., Albany, New York (Brian J. O'Donnell, of counsel), for defendant Hartmark.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, New York (Robert A. Siegfried, Asst. Attorney General, of counsel), for state defendants.

Dreyer, Boyajian & Tuttle, Albany, New York (James B. Tuttle, of counsel), for Oneonta defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

McAVOY, Chief Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

In the early morning of September 4, 1992, a 77-year old woman, was allegedly attacked while staying as a guest in the home of a friend outside the City of Oneonta. Based upon the woman's account of the assault, the police suspected the assailant to be a young black male. The New York State Police supervised the investigation, and using dogs, traced the assailant's path to a wooded area at the base of the State University of New York's Oneonta campus (SUCO).

Later on September 4th, Sgt. Shedlock of the Oneonta Police Department contacted Merritt Hunt, a lieutenant with the SUCO Public Safety Office (PSO). Sgt. Shedlock asked Lt. Hunt if SUCO could provide information on black male students to the State Police for purposes of the investigation. Lt. Hunt contacted the Assistant Director of Housing for SUCO who told him such information could be provided. Lt. Hunt also asked John Edmondson, the Director of PSO, to contact Eric Wilson, the Director of the SUCO Computer Center in order to get the information.

On September 4, 1992, Dr. Leif Hartmark, the Vice President of Administration for SUCO, was assigned to be the "Officer of the Day," the person with authority to act on behalf of SUCO's president in his absence. Dr. Hartmark was first alerted of the assault, in his official capacity, at approximately 2:00 pm on September 4, 1992. Between 3:00 and 3:30 pm Hartmark met with Eric Wilson who informed Hartmark that Lt. Hunt had contacted Wilson requesting a list of all the black male students at SUCO in connection with an official police investigation of an assault in the Town of Oneonta. Allegedly, Wilson emphasized in this meeting that the State Police needed the information by 4:00 pm that day. Wilson allegedly informed Hartmark that SUCO's Public Safety Chief, John Edmondson, was fully informed of the situation and fully authorized release of the list. Although, Dr. Hartmark tried to personally contact Chief Edmondson regarding this matter, he was unable to reach him. Dr. Hartmark also tried to contact Francis Daley, the Vice President of Student Affairs, but was unsuccessful. At approximately 3:30 pm, Dr. Hartmark approved the compilation and release of this list, under his power as Officer of the Day, to SUCO's Office of Public Safety with the understanding that the Officer would release the list to the State Police for use in connection with the assault investigation. As Dr. Hartmark admits, he had no knowledge of how the information would be used by the State Police.

The list generated by the SUCO Computer Center was given to the PSO and was subsequently delivered to defendant Karl Chandler, a State Police investigator. After obtaining this list, the law enforcement officers questioned those individuals on the list in the dorms and at other locations on campus. Law enforcement officials also questioned a number of black persons in and around Oneonta who were not students at SUCO.

On the prior motions, the Court (1) denied defendant Hartmark's and the State defendants' motion to dismiss the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Rights Act (FERPA) claims against defendants Hartmark, Hunt, and Wilson, and held that they were not entitled to qualified immunity; (2) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 based on the alleged violations of FERPA; (3) denied the State defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; (4) granted summary judgment dismissing all Fourth Amendment claims as against all defendants; (5) dismissed with leave to replead the equal protection claims; (6) dismissed with leave to replead all 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims as against all defendants; (7) dismissed all conspiracy claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 based on the alleged Fourth Amendment and equal protection claims; (8) dismissed all FERPA claims alleged against the State police and Oneonta law enforcement officials; (9) dismissed all claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (10) dismissed the pendent state law claims brought under New York Civil Rights Law § 40-c and New York Personal Privacy Protection Law §§ 91-99.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which has added 27 new named parties who have asserted Fourth Amendment claims and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in addition to the claims remaining from the previous motions. In addition, the amended complaint added new defendants from the Otsego County Sheriffs department. Finally, plaintiffs repleaded the equal protection and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims.

Of the motions now before the Court, (1) the defendant Leif Hartmark has moved for an order dismissing plaintiffs' equal protection claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), or an order declaring that the claim is barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity; (2) the city of Oneonta defendants have moved pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and/or 56 claiming that a) certain claims are barred by the law of the case pursuant to this Court's previous decisions, b) the Fourth Amendment claims are insufficiently pleaded, c) plaintiffs' equal protection, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, and Title VI claims fail to state a claim, d) the conspiracy claim against the Oneonta police officers should be dismissed, e) the individual Oneonta officers are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and f) all claims against the city of Oneonta should be dismissed; (3) the New York State defendants have moved pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and/or 56 for substantially the same relief as the Oneonta defendants.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Law Of The Case

Defendants allege that plaintiffs have repleaded and have sought to relitigate claims that were dismissed by this Court's decisions on the previous motions in this case. It is the defendants' contention that the "law of the case" doctrine should be applied to the present motions and prevent reconsideration by this Court of issues upon which it has already decided.

"The law of the case doctrine `posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case'" DiLaura v. Power Authority of N.Y., 982 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir.1992) (citations omitted). Reconsideration of a prior decision is discretionary, and the factors that generally compel reconsideration are "an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 820, 113 S.Ct. 67, 121 L.Ed.2d 34 (1992) (citation omitted). Moreover, the Court notes that the Local Rules provide a mechanism for seeking the reconsideration of a decision of this Court. See, L.R. 7.1(g). Accordingly, the Court is disinclined to reconsider a prior decision unless plaintiff has made a proper showing.

In this instance, plaintiffs have made no showing that the controlling law relevant to the issues presented has changed, that new evidence has been uncovered, or that justice plainly warrants reconsideration. Thus, the Court reaffirms its prior holdings with respect to this case as to the issues that the parties may seek to relitigate. In particular, the Court will not revisit its (1) denial of defendant Hartmark's and the State defendants' motion to dismiss the Federal Education and Privacy Rights Act (FERPA) claims against defendants Hartmark, Hunt, and Wilson, and holding that they were not entitled to qualified immunity; (2) denial of the law enforcement defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of an alleged qualified immunity; (3) denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss the conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 based on the alleged violations of FERPA; (4) denial of the State defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; and (5) grant of defendants' summary judgment motion dismissing all Fourth Amendment claims as alleged by the then plaintiffs.

B. Standards On A Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To Rule 12(b)(6) Or For Summary Judgment Pursuant To Rule 56

On a dismissal motion for failure to state a claim the general rule is that the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint are deemed to be true and must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Dahlberg v. Becker, 748 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1984) cert. denied 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1845, 85 L.Ed.2d 144 (1985). A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff cannot in any way establish a set of facts to sustain her claim which would permit relief. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980); Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir.1986).

If on a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided for in Rule 56 ..." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion for summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings ... together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue...

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2 cases
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 19 d2 Novembro d2 1996
    ...forums, like State Supreme Court and the Federal courts (see, Brown v. City of Oneonta, 916 F.Supp. 176 [N.D.N.Y.], 911 F.Supp. 580 [N.D.N.Y.], 160 F.R.D. 18 [N.D.N.Y.]). Given the breadth of the Legislature's specific enactments providing mechanisms to enforce constitutionally guaranteed r......
  • Oliver v. Cuttler
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • 24 d6 Maio d6 1997
    ...establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, it is not enough to demonstrate the defendant's bad motive. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 911 F.Supp. 580, 588 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). The plaintiff must show the existence of a similarly situated non-minority group who has been treated differently......
1 books & journal articles
  • A cause of action for damages under the state constitution.
    • United States
    • Albany Law Review Vol. 60 No. 5, August 1997
    • 6 d3 Agosto d3 1997
    ...(1987). (176) See Reply Brief for Claimants-Appellants at 5, Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129 (N.Y. 1996). (177) See Brown v. Oneonta, 911 F. Supp. 580 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); College Cleared in Rights Case, Newsday (N.Y.), Feb. 17, 1997, at A18 (reporting that the federal appeals court gave qualif......

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