Brown v. City of Hous.
| Decision Date | 11 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. H-17-1749 |
| Parties | Alfred Dewayne BROWN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Kristen Lin Beightol, Catharine Elizabeth Edwards, Edwards Kirby LLP, Raleigh, NC, Charles Dunham Biles, Fox Rothschild LLP, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.
Henry Neef Carnaby, Christy L. Martin, City of Houston Attorney Legal Department, Jennifer F. Callan, Harris County Attorney's Office, Defensive Litigation, Houston, TX, for Defendant City of Houston, Texas.
Seth Barrett Hopkins, Patrick Edward Nagorski, Stanley Michael Clark, Suzanne Bradley, Harris County Attorney's Office, Celena Cavazos Vinson, Thompson Horton LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant Texas Harris County.
Henry Neef Carnaby, Christy L. Martin, City of Houston Attorney Legal Department, Jennifer F. Callan, Harris County Attorney's Office, Defensive Litigation, Camela June Sandmann, City of Houston, Houston, TX, for Defendants Breck McDaniel, Ted C. Bloyd, D.L. Robertson.
Suzanne Bradley, Harris County Attorney's Office, Houston, TX, for Defendant Daniel J. Rizzo.
Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief United States District Judge Alfred Brown spent almost ten years on death row after he was convicted in 2005 of murdering a police officer during a robbery. He maintained his innocence. After Brown's habeas challenge uncovered exculpatory evidence hidden in the garage of the investigating police officer, Brown's conviction was vacated, the state court granted the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the charges against Brown, and he left prison an innocent man.
Brown has sued the City of Houston; Breck McDaniel, a detective in the Houston Police Department's Homicide Division; and Ted Bloyd and Darrell Robertson, police officers in the Homicide Division, (the "City Defendants"),1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking compensation for the lost decade of his life. Brown also filed for compensation with the Texas Office of the Comptroller under the Tim Cole Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 103.001, et seq.2 Brown eventually received almost $1 million under that Act.
The City Defendants have moved for summary judgment based on § 103.153(b), which prohibits a person who "receives compensation" under the Act from "bring[ing] any action involving the same subject matter" against "any governmental unit or ... employee." (Docket Entry No. 141 ). Brown has responded, and the City Defendants have replied. (Docket Entry Nos. 142, 143).
The City Defendants’ motion requires the court to decide whether § 103.153(b) bars a § 1983 lawsuit brought by an individual before he received compensation under the Tim Cole Act and, if so, whether that bar violates the Supremacy Clause. After a careful review of the motion, the response, and the applicable law, the court concludes that § 103.153(b) applies and does not violate the Supremacy Clause. The court grants the City Defendants’ motion, (Docket Entry No. 141 ), and enters final judgment by separate order.3
The reasons are explained below.
The court's earlier opinion, Brown v. City of Houston , 297 F. Supp. 3d 748 (S.D. Tex. 2017), set out the factual background of Brown's arrest, incarceration, and release. The relevant facts presented here come from the complaint, documents in the public record, the summary judgment motion, and the response. (See Docket Entry Nos. 1, 141, 142, 143).4
In 2005, Brown was convicted in Texas state court for the homicide of Officer Charles Clark, which occurred during a robbery in South Houston in 2003. (Docket Entry No. 1 at ¶¶ 24, 32.). He was sentenced to death. (Id. at ¶ 24). In 2014, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals vacated Brown's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for "a new trial or other proceeding." (Id. at ¶ 26). In 2015, the state district court granted the Harris County District Attorney's motion to dismiss the charges against Brown for insufficient evidence, and Brown was released from prison. (Id. at ¶¶ 140–41).
In 2016, Brown filed a petition with the Texas Office of the Comptroller for compensation under the Tim Cole Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 103.001, et seq. (Docket Entry No. 142-1 at ¶ 3). Under that Act, a person who was incarcerated under state law may receive lump-sum compensation and other benefits if that person: (a) "received a full pardon on the basis of innocence"; (b) was granted habeas corpus relief "based on a court finding or determination that the person is actually innocent of the crime for which the person was sentenced"; or (c) was granted habeas corpus relief and the state court dismissed the charge against the person "based on a motion to dismiss in which the state's attorney states that no credible evidence exists that inculpates the [person]" and "that the state's attorney believes that the [person] is actually innocent." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 103.001(a). The Office of the Comptroller denied Brown's petition because his habeas relief was not based on a finding that he was "actually innocent," he did not receive a pardon, and the state's attorney did not file a qualifying motion. (Docket Entry No. 142-1 at ¶ 4). Brown filed this lawsuit in June 2017, asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. (Docket Entry No. 1 ).
In May 2018, Harris County District Attorney Kim Ogg ordered an independent investigation into Brown's claim of actual innocence. This case was stayed pending that investigation. (Docket Entry No. 72 ). In March 2019, the investigation report concluded that "[b]y clear and convincing evidence, no reasonable juror would fail to have a reasonable doubt about whether Brown is guilty of murder." (Docket Entry No. 76-1 at 83). Based on the report, Harris County District Attorney Ogg filed in Texas state court an amended motion to dismiss the charges against Brown, which the court granted. (Docket Entry No. 76 ; Docket Entry No. 142 at 3–4).
In May 2019, Brown filed another petition for compensation with the Texas Office of the Comptroller, which was denied. (Docket Entry No. 81-1). In July 2019, this court lifted the stay. (Docket Entry No. 87 ). After the Office of the Comptroller again denied Brown's claim, he sought mandamus from the Texas Supreme Court. (Docket Entry No. 141-1). In December 2020, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the State of Texas had to pay Brown under the Tim Cole Act. In re Brown , 614 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. 2020). The Comptroller complied, and Brown received $980,000. (Docket Entry No. 141-2).
While Brown was pursuing compensation under the Tim Cole Act, this case continued. The parties have made and argued multiple motions to dismiss, which the court has addressed at length. (Docket Entry Nos. 39, 56, 117, 129). After extensive discovery, the City Defendants filed this motion for summary judgment.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Vann v. City of Southaven, Miss. , 884 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could enter a verdict for the non-moving party." Doe v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. , 964 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2020). The moving party "bears the initial responsibility of ... demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," Jones v. United States , 936 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted), and "identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
"Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial." Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist. , 964 F.3d 298, 301–02 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted). While the party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate the absence of a genuine and material factual dispute, it does not need to negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P. , 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp. , 37 F.3d 1069, 1076 n.16 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). "A fact is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Dyer v. Houston , 964 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the motion [for summary judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response." Pioneer Expl., L.L.C. v. Steadfast Ins. Co. , 767 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
When the moving party has met its burden, "the nonmoving party cannot survive a summary judgment motion by resting on the mere allegations of its pleadings." Duffie v. United States , 600 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 2010). The nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate how that evidence supports that party's claim. Willis v. Cleco Corp. , 749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014). "This burden will not be satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence." Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc. , 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Darden v. City of Fort Worth , 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).
Section 103.153(b) of the Tim Cole Act states that "[a] person who receives compensation under this...
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