Brown v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 23 March 2022
• Docket Number: Case No. 21-CV-01397
• Citation: 594 F.Supp.3d 1021
• Parties: Maurice BROWN, for himself and on behalf of his minor child, Amir Brown, Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

594 F.Supp.3d 1021

Maurice BROWN, for himself and on behalf of his minor child, Amir Brown, Plaintiffs,

v.The CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 21-CV-01397

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed March 23, 2022

Edward M. Fox, Robin Ann Grinnalds, Jaclyn Diaz, Ed Fox & Associates, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff Maurice Brown.

Edward M. Fox, Jaclyn Diaz, Ed Fox & Associates, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff Amir Brown.

Kyle A. Rockershousen, Illinois Department of Employment Security, Chicago, IL, Joi Kamper, Marion Claire Moore, Raoul Vertick Mowatt, City of Chicago Department of Law, Chicago, IL, for Defendant City of Chicago.

Lawrence S. Kowalczyk, Megan Kathleen Monaghan, Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Defendants John Nemec, Joshua Champion, Michael Sebastian, Ricardo Lopez, Matthew Hecker, Daniel McNicholas, Elvis Turcinovic, Brian Bardsley, Jr., Paul Amelio, Andrew Turner, Vicky Perez, Ryan McCallum, Daniel Colbenson, Piotr Nestorowicz, Marco Zenere, Maria Marquez, Sean Farley, Kevin Sheahan, William Murphy, Scott Minneci, Timothy Schnoor, Patrick Quinn, Armando Chagoya, Charles Rhein, Matthew Lucki, Emmanuel Zambrano, Kenneth Adair, Eric James, Peter Jonas, Bryan Zydek, Andrew Cuomo, Matthew Lockitski, Sergio Vences, Albert Dobbins, Tawaga Roberts, Clinton Sebastian, John Hroma, Jr., Michael Nowacki, Thomas Lamb, Jr.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

John Robert Blakey, United States District Judge Plaintiffs Maurice Brown and Amir Brown (collectively, "Plaintiffs") sue the City of Chicago (the "City"), and numerous Chicago police officers (the "Officers") alleging civil rights violations in connection with the Officers’ search of Plaintiffs’ home. [28]. The City and Officers (collectively, "Defendants") jointly move to dismiss Count I (unreasonable seizure) and Count II (unreasonable search) of Plaintiffs’ complaint. [29]. The City moves separately to dismiss Count III, a Monell claim stemming from the alleged mistreatment of two-year old Plaintiff Amir Brown. [31]. For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Defendants’ motions, [29] and [31].

I. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint that fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Courts are not, however, "obliged to accept as true legal conclusions or unsupported conclusions of fact." Hickey v. O'Bannon , 287 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2002).

The complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and allege facts that are "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although "detailed factual allegations" are not required, mere "labels," "conclusions," or "formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action" are not enough. Id. The complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Hecker v. Deere & Co. , 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). To be facially plausible, the complaint must allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

II. Complaint's Allegations

The Court recites the facts assuming the truth of Plaintiffs’ allegations.¹ It was a rainy and cold morning in mid-March. [28] ¶¶ 11–12, 15, 18. Plaintiff Maurice Brown and his family were fast asleep in their home just south of Chicago. Id. ¶ 7. While the family slept, 40 law enforcement officers surrounded the home in a semi-circular fashion. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9. The Officers, an amalgamation of Chicago police officers and members of the Special Weapons and Tactics ("SWAT") unit, were "heavily armed with loaded assault rifles." Id. ¶ 9. They were there to execute a search warrant targeting the location and an individual named Denokey Midderhoff ("Midderhoff"). Id. ¶ 8; [29-1].

In a flurry, the Officers erupted with noise and light diversions, "calling" the family "out of the house over a bullhorn." [28] ¶ 7. Roused from their sleep, the family exited their home. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff Maurice Brown stepped out into the 37-degree weather with his hands overhead, followed by his girlfriend, Sharron, who held two-year-old Plaintiff Amir Brown. Id. ¶ 16. Additional family members hurried out into the rain, including three other children—all under the age of nine. Id. ¶ 9. According to Plaintiffs, they did not have time to prepare for the weather; Plaintiff Amir Brown was carried outside without shoes or socks on his bare feet. Id. ¶¶ 15, 18, 19. The target of the search warrant, then nineteen-year-old Midderhoff, stepped outside alongside the family and was immediately apprehended without incident by the armed officers. Id. ¶ 13; [29-1].

Despite safely securing the target of the search warrant, the Officers kept their loaded weapons trained on the family. [28] ¶¶ 9–10. The Officers handcuffed Plaintiff Maurice Brown tightly, despite his compliance with all of the Officers’ requests. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14, 43, 41; see also id. ¶ 20 ("At no time during the execution of the search warrant did Plaintiff Maurice Brown refuse to follow instructions, resist arrest, attempt to flee, or pose any threat whatsoever to any of the officers at any time."). The Officers kept the family outside for the duration of the search, approximately 45 minutes according to Plaintiffs, during which time Sharron made several requests to the Officers. Id. ¶¶ 15–18. First, she asked permission to place Plaintiff Amir Brown down, as she was struggling to hold him. Id. ¶ 16. The Officers refused. Id. Next, she asked permission to change Plaintiff Amir Brown's soiled diaper. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. Again, the Officers refused. Id. ¶ 17. Then, Sharron asked if she could tend to Plaintiff Amir Brown, now crying, as he was "not wearing shoes, was cold, rain-soaked, and needed his diaper changed," to which one of the Officers replied: "You're just going to have to f------ deal with it!" Id. ¶ 18.

While the family remained corralled outside, the Officers conducted their search inside. Id. ¶ 22. The Officers entered the home, a "split single family residence," in search of a "two-tone .9mm caliber semi-automatic Smith and Wesson handgun, a black unknown caliber adjustable bump stock Assault Rifle, and any other unlawfully possessed handgun and ammunition[.]" [29-1]. The Officers were also authorized, pursuant to the warrant, to seize any "paraphernalia for maintaining firearms, and photographs of individuals with firearms, any records of firearms transactions and proof of residency." Id. In searching for the weapons and related paraphernalia, the Officers allegedly "deployed a loud explosive" device "ripping a hole in the second-floor ceiling and causing toxic dust and debris to coat the residents’ clothing and belonging[s]." [28] ¶ 22; see also ¶¶ 23, 27. The search left the home "unnecessarily damaged and otherwise trashed." Id. ¶ 23.

The alleged ordeal for Plaintiffs did not end there: "Following the search, the family members were brought back inside from the cold" but remained "detained within the home for close to two hours." Id. ¶ 24. At this point, the Officers allowed Plaintiff Maurice Brown's aunt to take custody of Plaintiff Amir Brown to "get him dry, clothed, and into a clean diaper." Id. ¶ 19.

Hours after their arrival, the Officers left. No guns or contraband were found during the search. Id. ¶¶ 25–26.

III. Analysis

Defendants collectively move to dismiss all counts of Plaintiffs’ complaint. [29], [31]; see also [28] ¶¶ 33–67. In short, Defendants argue that the Officers acted well within their authority, [29] at 6–8, that the mode and manner of the Officers’ entry, search and seizure were reasonable, id. at 11–13, and that Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to set forth sufficient factual matter to plausibly demonstrate each element of a cognizable Monell claim, [31] at 3.

A. Body-Worn Camera ("BWC") Footage

As a threshold matter, the parties disagree on whether the Court can properly consider BWC footage attached to Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss at this preliminary stage. [29-2], [29-3], [29-4], [29-5]. Generally, in deciding a motion to dismiss, courts cannot consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the motion into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Tierney v. Vahle , 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2002). Defendants nevertheless attempt to fit the BWC footage into a well-recognized exception to the otherwise resolute rule: under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, the BWC footage can properly be considered because the footage is "central to the allegations in this case [and] consist[s] of video footage of almost the entire underlying incident." [29] at 5–6. Plaintiffs vehemently disagree, arguing first that the complaint only references BWC footage in passing (in reference to their Monell claim); second, the four videos attached do not "capture the entirety of the event alleged in the complaint and the actions of all thirty-nine Defendant Officers" during the search, as the initial call-out was not captured. [35] at 7 ("Defendants admit that the SWAT Officers, the individuals responsible for the call-out and for clearing the residence, were not equipped with BWC.").

In support, Defendants place primary reliance on Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). [29] at 4–5. There, Harris sued police-officer Scott under § 1983 for excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure following a high-speed chase. Id. at 375–76,...