Brown v. Collier
| Decision Date | 02 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | consolidated with 14-20444,No. 14-20249,14-20249 |
| Citation | 929 F.3d 218 |
| Parties | Bobby R. BROWN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff—Appellee, William E. Scott, Intervenor Plaintiff—Appellee, Tyrone Day; Kenneth Hickman ; R. Wayne Johnson ; Torrance Flemings; Kenneth Pryor; Julian A. Randall; Lonnie Dean Collins; Lamont Edward Wilson, Intervenor Plaintiffs—Appellees, v. Bryan COLLIER, Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Defendant—Appellant. Bobby R. Brown, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff—Appellee, Tyrone Day; Kenneth Hickman ; R. Wayne Johnson ; Torrance Flemings; Kenneth Pryor; Julian A. Randall; Lonnie Dean Collins; Lamont Edward Wilson, Intervenor Plaintiffs—Appellees, v. Bryan Collier, Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Defendant—Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Gerald Mark Birnberg, Williams, Birnberg & Andersen, L.L.P., Edward A. Mallett, Esq., Mallett Saper Berg, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Deborah Carleton Milner, Stephanie Lynn Miller, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P., Houston, TX, for Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellee.
Brian Rolland McGiverin, Esq., Austin Community Law Center, Austin, TX, for Intervenor Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Nadine Felicia Phillpotts, Assistant Attorney General, Heather Gebelin Hacker, Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, Austin, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge, joined by KING, Circuit Judge, in Parts I, II, III, IV, V and VII:
Pursuant to a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),1 the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) seeks to terminate a consent decree entered in 1977, which exempts Muslim inmates from the requirement that all religious gatherings and activities in Texas state prisons attended by more than four inmates must be directly supervised by either prison staff or a prison-approved outside volunteer. The district court denied the motion in part, concluding that a portion of the consent decree remains necessary to correct current and ongoing violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),2 the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. We reverse and terminate the 1977 consent decree.
More than forty years ago, Bobby Brown (Brown), a Muslim, initiated a class action against the executive director of TDCJ that resulted in the 1977 consent decree. That decree required TDCJ to make an exception for Muslim inmates to a policy that otherwise applied to those attending religious activities. TDCJ's rules and policies have required religious worship services or study gatherings attended by more than four inmates to be "directly" supervised by either prison staff, which would include a chaplain employed by TDCJ, or a prison-approved outside volunteer.3 Direct supervision means that either a TDCJ employee or a qualified volunteer is in the room during the religious activities at all times and is supervising only those activities, with no responsibility for supervising other areas of the prison or other inmates until the activities have concluded.4 However, when a volunteer is supervising or leading the religious gathering, a TDCJ officer "will be roving the hallways checking on the offenders, checking on the volunteers."5 If an officer is not available, the service or activity will be cancelled, even if a volunteer is scheduled to be present.6
The 1977 consent decree afforded Muslim inmates the right to participate in group religious services and studies that were "indirectly" supervised if no prison staff member or outside volunteer was available for direct supervision.7 Indirect supervision means that a prison staff member is in the vicinity and observes the religious gathering intermittently, through windows or by the use of audio or video equipment, but does not remain present in the room or area where the activity is occurring.8 The consent decree also provided that adherents to the Religion of Islam must be allowed "equal time for worship services and other religious activities each week as is enjoyed by adherents to the Catholic, Jewish and Protestant faiths," and the decree said that TDCJ must "specifically, allow adherents to the Religion of Islam at least two (2) full hours of time for worship services or other religious activities each week, rather than the one (1) hour previously permitted."9 In the present proceedings, the district court found that from 1977 until January 1, 2013, Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and Native American inmates could engage in an average of six hours of religious activities each week at units in which members of each of these faith groups were housed.10
However, members of other faiths were not permitted to gather as frequently due to the lack of civilian volunteers. William Scott, a Jehovah's Witness, sued the director of TDCJ in federal district court in 2009, seeking an injunction ordering prison officials to allow him and other members of the Jehovah's Witness faith to meet without volunteers, just as Muslims were permitted to do as a result of the consent decree. The district court's 2012 opinion and order in the Scott suit reflected that there were 217 offender faith preferences represented in the TDCJ system, and 59 designated faith groups at the Huntsville Unit, where Scott had been confined for a period of time.11 TDCJ asserted that it did not have sufficient staff to provide adequate supervision of all offender faith groups if they were allowed to meet without volunteers present.12 The district court held in Scott that the Establishment Clause requires "denominational neutrality," its "prohibition against preferential treatment of religion is ‘absolute,’ " and that Muslim inmates "are preferred to Jehovah's Witnesses with respect to the volunteer policy."13 The court concluded "[i]f alternative means exist to treat Muslim and Jehovah's Witness prisoners without favoritism, then the Establishment Clause demands them."14 The district court concluded that injunctive relief based on the Establishment Clause violation was warranted but did not enter an injunction at that time. It instead ordered the Executive Director of TDCJ "to propose a method of compliance" within sixty days.15 The district court's opinion in Scott observed that "if Muslims regularly engage in communal worship without an approved religious volunteer present, evidence exists that the government's rule against Jehovah's Witnesses' meetings is not ‘closely fitted’ to the government's compelling interest in enforcing the [ Brown ] consent decree."16
In the Scott litigation, Scott had also requested injunctive relief under RLUIPA. The district court denied that request, reasoning that "the accommodation of an offender's religious or spiritual needs does not outweigh a prison's need to maintain order and safety,"17 that "due deference" is to be given to prison administrators regarding "good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources," and "that a rational connection exists between" requiring directly supervised religious gatherings "and the government's legitimate interest in prison security."18
TDCJ responded to the district court's decision in Scott by promulgating Administrative Directive AD-07.30 (rev. 7) (June 30, 2014), which the parties refer to as the "Scott Plan." Under the Scott Plan, all religious gatherings of more than four inmates require direct supervision, including worship and studies by more than four Muslim inmates.19 The Scott Plan conflicts with the 1977 consent decree that permitted Muslim inmates to congregate with only indirect supervision. Under the Scott Plan, each religious group is permitted to have a group worship service for one hour per week that is directly supervised by prison staff. Additional group religious activities are permitted if supervised by an outside, authorized volunteer.20
In the present case, and as a result of the district court's conclusion in the Scott case that TDCJ had violated the Establishment clause by preferring adherents to the Religion of Islam over the Jehovah's Witness faith group, TDCJ moved to terminate the 1977 Brown consent decree pursuant to the PLRA.21 The PLRA provides that "in any civil action with respect to prison conditions in which prospective relief is ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervenor," if the order has been in effect for a certain period of time, unless "the court makes written findings based on the record that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation."22
Pursuant to provisions of the PLRA, TDCJ's motion operated as an automatic stay of the 1977 Brown consent decree,23 allowing TDCJ to implement the Scott Plan pending further proceedings in the district court. Accordingly, the direct supervision requirement for all religious groups in TDCJ prisons, including members of the Religion of Islam, went into effect in 2013.24
After the implementation of the Scott Plan, Muslim inmates may attend a weekly, one-hour Jumu'ah service directly supervised by TDCJ chaplains or employees, but opportunities for Muslim prisoners to participate in other communal worship or studies diminished due to a dearth of Muslim volunteers from outside the prison system.25 Protestant and Catholic prisoners, by contrast, maintained the ability to engage in group worship or study in addition to the one-hour, weekly service directly supervised by TDCJ-employees because of a relative abundance of...
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