Brown v. Colvin, Civil Action No. 14–cv–1826 (CRC) (DAR)

• Decision Date: 30 November 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14–cv–1826 (CRC) (DAR)
• Citation: 219 F.Supp.3d 121
• Parties: Donald BROWN, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

219 F.Supp.3d 121

Donald BROWN, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 14–cv–1826 (CRC) (DAR)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed November 30, 2016

Stephen F. Shea, Elkind & Shea, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiff.

Robert Shannon Drum, Lauren Donner Chait, Social Security Administration, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

ORDER

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, United States District Judge

Upon careful consideration of the record in this case and the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation filed September 29, 2016, and hearing no objections from the Defendant, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and ACCEPTS the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that [9] Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment of Reversal be GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED that [10] Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Affirmance be DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that the case be remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with the Report and Recommendation.

SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DEBORAH A. ROBINSON, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Donald Brown Jr. ("Plaintiff") commenced this action against the Acting Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking reversal of an Administrative Law Judge's decision denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1. This matter was referred to the undersigned for full case management. Referral, ECF No. 3. Pending for consideration by the undersigned are Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment of Reversal ("Plaintiff's Motion") (ECF No. 9) and Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Affirmance ("Defendant's Motion") (ECF No. 10). Upon consideration of the motions, the memoranda in support thereof and opposition thereto, the administrative record, and the entire record herein, the undersigned will recommend that the Court grant Plaintiff's Motion and deny Defendant's Motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income Benefits on May 23, 2011, pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Pl.'s Mem. 1, ECF No 9–1. Plaintiff alleged disability, commencing on February 27, 2007, based on carpal tunnel syndrome, arthritis of the knees and back, hypertension, asthma, and a hernia. Id. at 1–2. Defendant denied Plaintiff's claims initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 2.

On June 3, 2012, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. Administrative Record ("AR") at 100, ECF No. 7–4. The hearing took place on April 22, 2013. Pl.'s Mem. 2, ECF No. 9–1. On June 6, 2013, Administrative Law Judge Larry Banks ("ALJ") denied Plaintiff's claim, finding that Plaintiff was not "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act. AR at 33, ECF No. 7–2. In the decision, the ALJ used the five-step process to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled. Id. at 28–33. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity since the application date. Id. at 28. Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), anemia, pre-glaucoma, diabetes, cervical and lumbar degeneration, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), and depression. Id. Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. Further, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform "light work" as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b)"except he must have [the] option to alternate between sitting and standing at intervals of 20–30 minutes; can stoop occasionally; is unable to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, or work around dangerous machinery or unprotected heights; and must avoid concentrated exposure to environmental pollutants." Id. at 30. In addition, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was limited to "performing simple instructions and can have occasional contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the public[,]" and "may be off-task 5% of the work day." Id. Fourth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not capable of performing her past relevant work. Id. at 32. Fifth, relying on a vocational expert's testimony, with the consideration of Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the ALJ ultimately determined that Plaintiff was capable of "making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy," and thus found that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 33.

Following the unfavorable decision, Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ's findings. AR at 20, ECF No. 7–2. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request. Id. at 2. To reverse the ALJ's decision, Plaintiff filed an action in this Court on October 30, 2014. Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The Social Security Act of 1935 established a framework to provide "disability insurance benefits" to eligible individuals and "supplemental security income" to individuals who have "attained age 65[,] ... are blind[,] or disabled." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423, 1381, 1381a. The Act defines "disability" for non-blind individuals as "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) ; 20 C.F.R. § 416.905. A "disabled" individual is eligible for supplemental security income if he or she meets additional statutory requirements concerning income and resources. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). The Social Security Administration ("Administration") has promulgated regulations, pursuant to the Act, outlining a five-step process for determining disability of adults. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

First, the agency evaluates whether the claimant is "doing substantial gainful activity." If so, the agency concludes that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b) ; 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b).

Second, if the claimant is not engaging in substantial gainful activity, the agency determines whether the claimant has a "severe medically determinable physical or medical impairment that meets the duration requirement ... or a combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration requirement ...." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).

Third, if the claimant's impairments are deemed "severe," the next question becomes whether the impairment "meets or equals one of the listings" in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). The "listings" refer to a "listing of impairments" which "describes for each of the major body systems impairments that [the Administration] consider[s] to be severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any gainful activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work experience." Id.

Fourth, if the claimant's impairments do not satisfy one of the listings, the agency assesses the claimant's "residual functional capacity" to see whether the claimant is still capable of performing "past relevant work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. Residual functional capacity is "the most [an individual] can still do despite [his or her] limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.

Fifth, and finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his or her "past relevant work," the agency evaluates the claimant's "residual functional capacity and ... age, education, and work experience to see if [he or she] can make adjustment to other work." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g) ; 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g) (emphasis added). If the claimant cannot make such an adjustment, the Administration finds that the individual is "disabled." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1).

APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW

Claimants may seek judicial review in a district court of "any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which [they were] a party." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner's ultimate determination will not be disturbed "if it is based on substantial evidence in the record and correctly applies the relevant legal standards." Butler v. Barnhart , 353 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In other words, a "district court's review of the [Administration's] findings of fact is limited to whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence." Broyles v. Astrue , 910 F.Supp.2d 55, 60 (D.D.C. 2012) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Butler , 353 F.3d at 999 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) ). The test requires "more than a scintilla, but can be satisfied by something less than a preponderance of evidence." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The D.C. Circuit has observed that "[s]ubstantial-evidence review is highly deferential to the agency fact-finder," Rossello ex rel. Rossello v. Astrue , 529 F.3d 1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and that "a reviewing judge must uphold the ALJ's legal ‘determination if it ... is not tainted by an error of law.’ " Jeffries v. Astrue , 723 F.Supp.2d 185, 189 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Smith v. Bowen , 826 F.2d 1120, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ); see also Nicholson v. Soc. Sec. Admin. , 895 F.Supp.2d 101, 103 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (noting that the inquiry upon judicial review "examines whether the ALJ has analyzed all evidence and has sufficiently explained the weight he had given to obviously probative exhibits"); Guthrie v. Astrue , 604 F.Supp.2d...