Brown v. Condux Tesmec, Inc., Civil Action Number 5:15-cv-01505-AKK
| Decision Date | 30 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action Number 5:15-cv-01505-AKK |
| Citation | 161 F.Supp.3d 1101 |
| Parties | Julie Brown, Plaintiff, v. Condux Tesmec, Inc., et. al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
David H. Marsh, Michael K. Beard, Marsh Rickard & Bryan PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.
Thomas Coleman, Jr., Smith Spires & Peddy PC, Birmingham, AL, Charles F. Carr, Faith Ann Nixon, Carr Allison PC, Daphne, AL, Gary V. Conchin, Kenneth Bridges Cole, Jr., Conchin Cloud & Cole LLC, Huntsville, AL, for Defendants.
ABDUL K. KALLON
This case originated in the Circuit Court of Limestone County. It made its way to this court when Third-Party Defendant Christopher Shane Carman (“Carman”), who contends he is an employee of the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), removed it under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1442
, which permits “[t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer ... of the United States” to remove cases brought “for or relating to any act under color of such office.” Since then, the parties have filed multiple motions, including Carman's motion to dismiss or, alternatively, motion for summary judgment, and motion to remand, doc. 2, and Plaintiff Julie Brown's motion to dismiss her claims against Carman and to remand, doc. 9. Upon consideration of the record, the submissions of the parties, and the relevant law, the court finds that Defendant Carman's motions to dismiss and remand are due to be GRANTED .1
At the outset, because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction with the power to hear only cases authorized by the Constitution and federal statutes, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 376, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994)
, the court must first address whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. Relevant here, again, Carman initially removed this matter from state court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1442. The Supreme Court has held that § 1442(a) “is a pure jurisdictional statute” that “do[es] nothing more than grant district court jurisdiction over cases in which a federal officer is a defendant [and asserts a federal question defense].” Mesa v. California , 489 U.S. 121, 136, 109 S.Ct. 959, 103 L.Ed.2d 99 (1989). Therefore, the court must ascertain whether Carman is indeed a “federal officer.” See
Magnin v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors , 91 F.3d 1424, 1427 (11th Cir.1996) (). To do so, the court must determine whether Carman is an employee of the TVA, and because this determination concerns the court's jurisdiction over this matter, the court may consider extrinsic evidence. See
Slappey v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs , 571 Fed.Appx. 855, 856 (11th Cir.2014) () (quoting Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel , 657 F.3d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir.2011) ()).
This court may therefore consider Carman's declaration filed with his removal notice, doc. 1-2, the declaration of Tracey C. Walls, doc. 16, TVA's July 27, 2010 letter confirming its offer and Carman's acceptance “of employment for the position of Marine Pilot,” doc. 16-1, Carman's TVA identification badge designating him as an employee, and Carman's W-2 from the year 2013, doc. 16-3,—all of which confirm Carman's status as a TVA employee. Therefore, based on this extrinsic evidence, which the court may consider in determining subject matter jurisdiction under § 1442(a)(1)
, the court finds that Carman is, in fact, a TVA employee, and that this matter is properly before it.
The court turns now to the motions to dismiss, beginning first with Plaintiff Julie Brown's motion to dismiss Carman. After all, it is Brown's decision to file a claim against Carman that triggered, in part, the events that led to the removal of this case to this court under § 1442(a)
. Brown's motion is based on the fact that she “is satisfied that Mr. Carman is a TVA employee” and that she cannot pursue her claim for punitive damages against the TVA. Doc. 9 at 2. Because Brown's motion is unopposed, see docs. 19 at 2 (); 21 (challenging only Carman's motion to dismiss the claims against him on federal official immunity grounds); 23 at 4 n.2 (); 24 at 1 (), the motion is GRANTED .
Likewise, Carman's motion for dismissal on the grounds of federal official immunity, doc. 2 at 1, is also GRANTED . Created under 16 U.S.C. § 831
-831ee (1933), the TVA is a “constitutionally authorized corporate agency and instrumentality of the United States.” Bobo v. AGCO Corp. , 981 F.Supp.2d 1130, 1137 (N.D.Ala.2013) ; see also
Springer v. Bryant , 897 F.2d 1085, 1089 (11th Cir.1990) (). As such, TVA employees are considered federal employees. See, e.g. , United States v. Smith , 499 U.S. 160, 168, 111 S.Ct. 1180, 113 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991) (); Jones v. Tenn. Valley Auth. , 948 F.2d 258, 262 (6th Cir.1991) (same). Moreover, under Johns v. Pettibone Corp., TVA employees are entitled to absolute immunity “when the conduct of federal officials is within the scope of their official duties and the conduct is discretionary in nature.” 843 F.2d 464, 466 (11th Cir.1988) (emphasis in original) (quoting Westfall v. Erwin , 484 U.S. 292, 297–98, 108 S.Ct. 580, 98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988) (quotations omitted)). While the Third-Party Plaintiffs challenge Carman's contention that he is a TVA employee, they do not dispute, however, that Carman's actions during and after the accident were within the purview of his work or were discretionary in nature. See docs. 8 at 4-5 () and 9 at 8-16 (). Therefore, because Carman's actions are considered discretionary, he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. See
id. at 466–67 (...
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