Brown v. Correa
| Decision Date | 25 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:13-cv-49-T-30MAP |
| Parties | JOSHUA BROWN, pro se, Plaintiff, v. MANUEL CORREA, Probation Supervisor, Tarpon Springs, FL, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause comes before the Court upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Dkt. #47) and Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Dkt. #48). The Court having reviewed the motion, response, and being otherwise advised in the premises, concludes that the motion to dismiss should be granted.
In the original complaint, pro se Plaintiff Joshua Brown alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants State of Florida; Florida Department of Corrections ("DOC"); Manuel Correa as Probation Supervisor in Tarpon Springs, Florida; Beth Virgil as Probation Officer in Tarpon Springs, Florida; and an Un-Named Supervisor in Tarpon Springs. Brown, a convicted sex offender under the supervision of DOC, alleged his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by his unlawful arrest and confinementwithout probable cause for an alleged violation of his probation. The original complaint was dismissed with prejudice against the State of Florida and the DOC based on the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed without prejudice against Correa and Virgil for failure to state a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) and for failure to comply with Rule 8(a). Brown filed an Amended Complaint again alleging a § 1983 action based on the same operative facts and added Defendants Janet Mangan and Samuel Flynn, both probation supervisors of Virgil at the DOC. All Defendants are being sued in their individual capacities.
On October 8, 2012, Brown was arrested for an alleged violation of his probation for being at a strip club in Pasco County, Florida. The arresting officer included the following probable cause narrative in the Pasco County Complaint Affidavit:
I made contact with the defendant at the Emperor's Club which is a full nude gentlemen's club. He was found to be a "High Risk Sex Offender" who is currently on felony probation. His conditions state he is not to be in possession of pornographic materials. Due to his current location, his probation officer was contacted. She responded to the scene where she confirmed he was in violation of his probation. I made contact with management of the Emperor's Club who confirmed he was just inside the club. The manager and members of the staff confirmed the defendant is a frequent customer who is at the club 3-5 times per week. The manager called him a "good customer" who "comes in all the time."
Virgil also drafted an affidavit in support of Brown's violation of probation charges, which Brown attached to the Amended Complaint. In the affidavit, Virgil lists two bases for Brown's violation of probation: violation of condition 27 of his probation for attendance at the strip club and violation of condition 42 of his probation for leaving his home without his monitoring device on October 3, 2012.
As a standard condition of probation for sex offenders, Brown was prohibited from "viewing, accessing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern." Fla. Stat. § 948.30(1)(g). According to the Amended Complaint, Defendant Virgil, Brown's probation officer, called her supervisors, Mangan and Flynn, and the three of them decided that the entertainers at the club were considered "pornographic material" in violation of the terms of Brown's probation or community control conditions as a sex offender.
Virgil allegedly "went into a screaming mode loudly professing to all in the parking lot that Plaintiff 'is a rapist' a 'stupid man that needs to be in jail' and 'we are getting another sex offender off the streets.'" Brown alleges he informed Virgil it was not a violation of his probation to be at a gentleman's club per Judge Timothy Peters ruling, but that Virgil responded by calling him a liar and sex offender and that "nobody believes anything you say."
Brown alleges that the Pasco County sheriff deputy arrested Brown and transported him to the county jail. He further alleges that the following day, a Pasco County circuit judge told the State Attorney's Office that there was no probable cause to arrest Brown because women at the strip clubs are considered entertainers, not pornographic material. On November 19, 2012, the State Attorney's Office dismissed all charges related to this incident.
Upon Brown's release from jail, Defendant Correa allegedly told Brown that "I will violate you again if you are in a gentleman's club," "you are not allowed to have a girlfriend," and "what would happen if you got aroused[?]" Due to these threats, Brown alleges Correa "effectively quashed [his] Fifth Amendment civil right to the pursuance of happiness."
In addition to the above allegations, Brown also alleges that each Defendant discriminated against him based on his status as a sex offender. "Plaintiff believes defendant's [sic] Virgil, Mangan, Flynn and Correa intentionally discriminated against him due solely for the sex offender label." Brown does not elaborate as to how other, non-sex offender probationers are treated differently by Defendants.
In the Amended Complaint, Brown appears to bring the following three § 1983 claims: (1) violation of the Fourth Amendment for an arrest without probable cause; (2) violation of the Fifth Amendment's "civil right to the pursuance of happiness;" and (3) "intentional discrimination of sex offenders."1 Brown seeks the following relief from each Defendant:
Brown does not delineate his claims into counts. However, based on the factual allegations, it appears that Brown intends to assert liability against Correa based on the Fifth Amendment; liability against Virgil based on the Fourth Amendment; supervisory liability against Mangan and Flynn based on the Fourth Amendment; and liability against all four Defendants based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) and based on qualified immunity.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations contained in the complaint as true, and view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). However, unlike factual allegations,conclusions in a pleading "are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). On the contrary, legal conclusions "must be supported by factual allegations." Id. Indeed, "conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
Typically, a "heightened fact pleading of specifics" is not required, "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" is necessary. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on one who, under color of state law, deprives a person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. Therefore, at the motion to dismiss stage, "[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law." See Amnesty International, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1179-80 (11th Cir. 2009). In Battle, the Eleventh Circuit noted that:
Moreover, when the factual allegations are "not only compatible with, but indeed [are] more likely explained by" lawful activity, the complaint must be dismissed. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680; see also N.Am. Clearing, Inc. v. Brokerage Computer Sys., Inc., 2009 WL 1513389(M.D. Fla. May 27, 2009) ().
"It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinate on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious...
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