Brown v. County of Charleston/Charleston County Council, 1536
| Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
| Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM |
| Citation | 399 S.E.2d 784,303 S.C. 245 |
| Parties | Allison BROWN, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF CHARLESTON/CHARLESTON COUNTY COUNCIL, Respondent. . Heard |
| Docket Number | No. 1536,1536 |
| Decision Date | 11 April 1990 |
Page 784
v.
COUNTY OF CHARLESTON/CHARLESTON COUNTY COUNCIL, Respondent.
Decided Aug. 27, 1990.
Page 785
[303 S.C. 246] Allison E. Brown, of Mt. Pleasant, pro se.
Randall M. Chastain, Columbia, for appellant.
Nancy B. Tecklenburg, Charleston, for respondent.
Janson A. Kauser, of North Charleston, amicus curiae for East Cooper Outboard Motor Club, Inc.
Conrad L. Falkiewicz, Charleston, amicus curiae for SC Shooting Ass'n.
PER CURIAM:
This is a zoning case. Allison Brown applied to the Charleston County Office of Zoning and Planning for a permit to operate a commercial outdoor gun range. 1 The Zoning Board denied the permit. County Council upheld the Zoning Board's decision. Brown then appealed to the circuit court which affirmed the Council. Brown appeals. We reverse and remand.
The County desired to decrease the number of zoning districts in the County and also to simplify the table of existing land uses through an amendment to its zoning ordinance. However, one provision of the amendment, in effect, proposed changes in existing land uses by requiring a different type of permit for certain property uses. One such use is an outdoor gun range. The amendment changed this use from a use of right to a conditional use which requires the Zoning Board's approval prior to issuance of a permit. Overall, the zoning amendments increased allowable property uses in the county, but in some cases it actually restricted an existing use.
[303 S.C. 247] The Zoning Board gave the amendments preliminary approval. On March 27, 1988, and April 3, 1988, the County ran the following advertisement in the News and Courier:
Charleston County
The Charleston County Council has scheduled a public meeting for Tuesday, April 12, 1988 at 7:00 p.m., County Office Building, Two Courthouse Square, Charleston, South Carolina to review the following:
No. 2122-C Text Change; to simplify and clarify the existing land use table and reduce the number of zoning districts.
It is uncontested that this advertisement complies with the statutory requirements regarding time and manner of notice. See Section 6-7-730, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, as amended. Brown, however, contests the sufficiency of the advertisement to give notice that the proposed amendment would restrict existing uses of land.
Brown argues that those interested...
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