Brown v. Coyne-Fague

• Decision Date: 27 December 2022
• Docket Number: PM-2017-1904
• Parties: LEON BROWN v. PATRICIA A. COYNE-FAGUE[1], [2]
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

LEON BROWN v. PATRICIA A. COYNE-FAGUE^[1], ^[2]

No. PM-2017-1904

Superior Court of Rhode Island, Providence

December 27, 2022

For Plaintiff: Christopher S. Gontarz, Esq.

For Defendant: Judy Davis, Esq. Daniel Guglielmo, Esq.

DECISION

MCGUIRL, J. (RET.)

Before this Court is Petitioner Leon Brown's (Petitioner) Application for Postconviction Relief (Application) challenging several aspects of his conviction and sentencing. Petitioner filed his Application pro se and was thereafter appointed counsel to assist in the prosecution of his claims.^[3] Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1.

I

Facts and Travel

A Trial

The facts underlying Petitioner's conviction and sentencing are set out in State v. Brown, 9 A.3d 1232 (R.I. 2010), the Supreme Court's decision affirming Petitioner's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. On August 14, 2004, fourteen-year-old Luis D. attended a birthday party on Public Street in Providence, and, during the party, he went to the corner store to get a snack. Id. at 1234-35. On his way out of the store, Luis D saw three people, including Petitioner, whom he recognized. Id. at 1235. As Luis D. was walking around the corner, Petitioner grabbed him by the neck, and when Luis D asked what he was doing, Petitioner replied, "[d]on't fuck with my family." Id. Luis D. later woke up to find himself on the sidewalk bleeding from his head, surrounded by two police cars, an ambulance, and various party guests. Id. Luis D. later testified at trial that, upon regaining consciousness, he immediately noticed that his ring and gold chain, both of which he had been wearing that day, were missing.^[4] Id.

An ambulance transported Luis D. to the hospital, where he was treated for head injuries. Id. Upon leaving the hospital, he went to the police station and told the police that "Boogie Brown" attacked him. Id. He identified Petitioner from some photos the police showed him. Id.

Officer Frank Newton was dispatched to the area of Public Street in Providence in response to a 911 call, taking approximately fifteen seconds to arrive, and that upon arrival he saw "'a Spanish male standing up,'" with glassy eyes and blood on the back of his head. Id. Officer Newton later testified at trial that the injured male told him that someone had come up behind him and picked him up, causing him to hit the ground and pass out, and that he was missing two necklaces and a ring. Id.

Pedro Gutirrez, a clerk at the corner store, testified that he was behind the counter when he heard banging and saw items falling off the shelves. Id. He went outside and saw Petitioner hitting a child against the wall and saw Petitioner drop the child on the ground, grab him, bang him against the floor, and then hit him on the head several times with his shoes. Id. Gutirrez attempted to push Petitioner off of the child because he thought Petitioner was going to kill the child, which prompted Petitioner to ask Gutirrez if he wanted to fight. Id. Gutirrez replied that he did not wish to fight but did not want Petitioner to kill the child, who was unconscious. Id. Gutirrez ran back into the store for a knife because Petitioner was chasing him, and Gutirrez testified that Petitioner said, "I'll get you." Id.

Three days later, Officer Jose Deschamps was on patrol on Broad Street in Providence when he and his partner saw Petitioner and recognized him as having a warrant out for his arrest for an alleged robbery. Id. at 1236. When Officer Deschamps and his partner attempted to arrest him, Petitioner resisted by fighting them off and yelling obscenities. Id. Before the officers could tell Petitioner why he was being arrested, he blurted out that he didn't rob anyone. Id.

On November 23, 2004, a grand jury indicted Petitioner for first-degree robbery, simple assault of a police officer, and resisting arrest. Id. at 1234. He entered a not guilty plea at his arraignment in Superior Court on February 4, 2005. Id. Twelve days later, on February 16, 2005, he received notice that he was subject to an added habitual criminal sentence under G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21. Id.

At his December 2006 trial, Petitioner was found not guilty of robbery, see G.L. 1956 § 11-39-1, but was found guilty of the lesser-included offense^[5] of felony assault with a dangerous weapon, see G.L. 1956 §§ 12-17-14 and 11-5-2, simple assault of a police officer, see § 11-5-3, and resisting arrest. See G.L. 1956 § 12-7-10 and Brown, 9 A.3d at 1236.

B Sentencing

During the May 18, 2007 sentencing hearing, Petitioner's counsel, Joseph DeCaporale, argued that (1) the facts did not support the State's theory of the case, see Appl. Ex. A (Tr.) at 306, (2) Petitioner was entitled to leniency, id. at 313, and (3) the State's proposed sentence was unreasonable. See id. Petitioner made a statement challenging witness accounts of the incident, and expressing contrition. Id. at 314.

In support of the State's recommended sentence, id. at 308-311, the prosecutor emphasized (1) the severity of the crime, id. at 308-309, (2) the age of the victim (fourteen) and the age of Petitioner (forty-two or forty-three) at the time of the assault, id. at 309, (3) the fact that Petitioner had attacked the victim and left him "unconscious on the street corner in the middle of the day," id. at 309, and (4) Petitioner's criminal record. Id. at 310311.

In sentencing Petitioner, the Court weighed sentencing factors^[6] such as Petitioner's history, the nature of the crime, and Petitioner's prospects for rehabilitation. See id. at 313319. The Court explained that the jury's verdict was consistent with the evidence. See id. at 314.^[7]

The Court addressed Petitioner, stating:

"I don't think you've gone a year or two years without being charged with a crime since you were 18 years old. I'm supposed to be looking at that as far as rehabilitation, remorse.... I'm looking at the contacts. You've had contact with the police almost every year you have been an adult you have been in jail. You know, you go to jail for rehabilitation, I'm not sure I see that you're getting rehabilitated or getting any help. You just seem to be getting out and committing new offenses." Id. at 314:25-315:13.

The Court continued, stating:

"The history of [Petitioner] with respect to his contacts with the police, the first one I have is 56 contacts . . . [h]e has seven felony convictions as I count them.... I mean the record alone, the convictions he has, alone, and the contact over and over again for a long period of time certainly is enough to put this case way outside the guidelines. This is the third felony type assault upon which he is being sentenced[.]" Id. at 317:13-318:24.

Addressing the nature of the crime, the Court stated, "You certainly attacked him.... He was 14 years old. You were 42 years old.... I think the jury's verdict with respect to the robbery versus felony assault was a correct verdict.... it was a brutal attack[.]" Id. at 315:24-316:23.

The Court sentenced Petitioner to twenty years on Count I, one year on Count II, to run concurrently with Count I, see Appl. Ex. B. at 1, and one year on Count III, to run concurrently with Counts I and II. See id. In sentencing Petitioner, the Court emphasized the violent nature of the attack, (Appl. Ex A (Tr.) at 316), Petitioner's voluminous criminal record, which included numerous convictions for like conduct, id. at 316-19, and the seemingly poor prospects for Petitioner's rehabilitation. Id. at 315.^[8]

After sentencing Petitioner for the crimes of which he was convicted, the Court continued the sentencing to June 14, 2007 to hold a separate hearing on the question of whether to sentence Petitioner as a habitual offender. See id. at 321-325; see also § 12-1921. After hearing argument from the parties, the Court sentenced Petitioner to ten years as a habitual offender, explaining: "I think the matter with the habitual offender is in order. I'll sentence him to 10 years on the habitual, as an habitual offender. That would be in addition, consecutive to the sentence he received on this offense." (Appl. Ex. A (Tr.) at 335:23-336:1.) For the purpose of clarity, the Court reiterated that it couldn't "imagine he would get out before [the ten years had elapsed]. He should serve the 10 years. And I'll leave it up to the Parole Board after that." Id. at 336:13-16.

In total, this Court sentenced Petitioner to serve thirty years (twenty years for the offenses of which he was convicted and ten years as a habitual offender). See id. at 336337.

C Appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court

Petitioner timely appealed his conviction, see Brown, 9 A.3d 1232, raising three issues on appeal: (1) the trial justice should have granted Petitioner's motion for acquittal because the evidence at trial was not sufficient to sustain a robbery conviction, id. at 123638, (2) the trial justice erred in denying Petitioner's motion to pass the case after a witness's allegedly prejudicial remark, id. at 1238-39, and (3) the trial justice should not have imposed a sentence under the habitual offender statute because the requisite notice of intent to seek such a sentence was not timely filed. Id. at 1239-40 (interpreting § 12-19-21(b)).

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's appeal and affirmed his conviction. See id.

D Application for Postconviction Relief

Petitioner filed the instant Application for Postconviction Relief on April 27, 2017. See generally Petitioner's Verified Application for Post-Conviction Relief (Application) and Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Post-Conviction Relief (Mem. in Supp.). Petitioner puts forth three claims: 1) Petitioner's attorney rendered ineffective assistance at Petitioner's trial and sentencing, 2) Petitioner...