Brown v. Cranberry Iron & Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 07 February 1894 |
| Citation | 59 F. 434 |
| Parties | BROWN et al. v. CRANBERRY IRON & COAL CO. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Long before bringing the suit, the plaintiff had made the following deed to the parties under whom defendants claim:
This indenture, made and entered into this 7th day of June, A. D 1867, between John E. Brown, by his agents and attorneys in fact, Z. B. Vance and William J. Brown, of the first part and Thomas J. Sumner and Robert F. Hoke, of the second part, witnesseth that the said John E Brown, for and in consideration of the sum of twenty-two thousand dollars in hand paid, and secured to be paid, before the execution of this deed, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the said John E. Brown hath bargained and sold, and by these presents doth bargain, sell, release, relinquish, and confirm, unto the said Thomas J. Summer and Robert F. Hoke, the following tract of land, situate and being in the county of Mitchell, in the state of North Carolina; that is, the one-half of the mineral interest in the said land: Beginning on a hickory and sugar tree marked 'W. F. P.,' west of Cranberry creek, in the gap of the humpback of the Yellow mountain, and runs west 123 poles, crossing a branch at 8 poles, and another at 88 poles, to a Spanish oak and maple tree; then south 74 poles, crossing a branch at 20 poles, to a large Spanish oak on the top of a ridge; the same course, 120 poles, crossing a branch at 83 poles, to a small chestnut on the east of the humpback of the said Yellow mountain; then east 40 poles, to a large sugar tree; then south 114 poles, crossing a branch at 8 poles, and Roaring creek at 108 poles, to a beech marked 'W. F. P.;' then east 130 poles, to a buckeye and sugar tree; then south 70 poles, to a poplar in a flat; then west 30 poles, to a buckeye; then south 120 poles, crossing a branch at 100 poles, and another at 110, to a maple in a flat; then east 574 poles, crossing Cranberry creek, 9 poles, to a stake on the West fork, east of Cranberry creek; then north 949 poles, to a stake; then west, crossing said creek, 489 poles, to a black oak, white oak, and chestnut; same course, 92 poles, to a stake; then south to the beginning,--containing some three thousand acres, and being the same lands condemned for the Cranberry Iron Works, known as the 'Bounty Lands,' and the same conveyed by Thomas M. Pettit to William Dugger, and the same purchased by the said Jno. E. Brown, under the decree of the court of equity for Buncombe county, as the property of Thomas M. Pettit and the heirs of Wm. Cathcart. To have and to hold, the one-half of the mines and minerals and mineral interest in said land, and the appurtenances thereunto belonging. And the said John E. Brown doth warrant and defend the title to the one-half of the mines, minerals, ore bank, and mineral interest within the boundaries of the said lands, except the five tracts granted to Waighstill Avery, and one to Reuben White, within said grant of prior date to the grant to William Cathcart, to the said Thomas J. Sumner and Robert F. Hoke, and their heirs, forever, against the lawful claims of all and every person whatsoever. In testimony whereof, the said John E. Brown, by his agents and attorneys, Z. B. Vance and Wm. J. Brown, has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and date above written.
[Signed]
For Jno. E. Brown. [Seal.]
W. J. Brown, Agt. [Seal.]
Zebulon B. Vance, Agt. [Seal.]
Witness:
Geo. W. Swepson,
B. S. Gaither.
Chas. A. Moore, P. J. Sinclair, M. E. Carter, and P. A. Cummings, for plaintiff.
R. H. Battle, Geo. N. Folk, W. H. Malone, and J. W. Bowman, for defendant.
On the trial of this case the defendant offered in evidence a deed executed by the plaintiff, and insisted that he was estopped thereby from asserting title to any minerals embraced within the boundaries mentioned in the deed. This question of law was fully discussed by counsel in the argument, and was reserved by the court for subsequent determination. An issue was then submitted to the jury, as to whether the plaintiff was estopped by matters of fact occurring previous to and contemporary with the negotiation of sale, and the execution of the deed, as disclosed in the pleadings and evidence; and that issue was found in favor of the defendant.
As the counsel of plaintiff presented written requests for instructions, and filed a bill of exceptions to the charge of the court, with the view of carrying the case to the circuit court of appeals by a writ of error, I think the record of the trial will not be complete, without a determination of the question of law reserved by the court. The deed of the plaintiff, made to the grantees under whom the defendant claims, was properly executed by the fully-authorized agents and attorneys in fact of the grantor; was founded on a valuable and adequate consideration; was duly registered, and embraced within its description of boundary the entire tract of land in which the plaintiff claimed an undeveloped mineral interest; the fee in the soil then being in the grantees by previous purchase from other parties, who had title and a right to convey. In this case, it is unnecessary to consider whether the title of the grantor was legal or equitable, or the right to the subject-matter was corporeal or incorporeal in its nature, or what is the form and operation of the conveyance, as the common-law rule is well settled in this state, that, if a deed cannot operate fully in the way intended by the parties, the court will endeavor to construe it so that it shall operate in some other manner, to effect the objects and purposes intended, and in accordance with the good faith and the manifest merits of the transaction.
The plaintiff insisted that at the time of the execution of the deed he had a mineral interest in said lands, as tenant in common with the grantees and with other parties, amounting to more than an undivided half, and that he conveyed only an undivided half of such mineral interest under the express description of the subject-matter set forth in his deed, and that he is now entitled to the part interest not conveyed. The interest claimed by the plaintiff was not an undivided right, as tenant in common, to the minerals in all the lands within the boundaries of the deed. It was attached to some parts of the land which he had previously sold, reserving some or all the minerals, and the location, extent, and value of his interest was unascertained. There were other persons who owned tracts of land and minerals within said large boundaries. The claim of the plaintiff, as to quantity and value, was indefinite, and not capable of being accurately fixed; and the description of 'the one-half of the mineral interest in said lands' probably largely exceeded his interest, as the most valuable minerals had been developed, and then belonged to the grantees.
The question of construction presented for determination is whether such description of the subject-matter of the deed was intended to convey all the mineral interest then owned by the grantor, or only an undivided half of the mineral interest in said lands.
The counsel of defendant insisted that the law presumes that a legal instrument is grammatically written, and it should be construed according to the rules of grammar, to give effect to the intelligible meaning and purpose of the parties. The deed purports to transfer or release the interest of the grantor in the entire tract of land described by metes and bounds, and then the definite article is employed to make cumulative and more particular description, and shows that the grantor only claimed 'the one-half of the mineral interest in said lands' and intended to convey or release his entire interest to his cotenants in possession. They further insisted that the legal force and effect of the deed was to convey such entire interest, as there was no express reservation or exception distinctly and definitely excluding any right or interest from the operation of the deed; that where a deed is executed by one party only, and it contains an indefinite or ambiguous clause, susceptible of two plausible but inconsistent...
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Brown v. Cranberry Iron & Coal Co.
...of law (the construction of deeds) his honor reserved for himself, and decided that they also estopped the plaintiffs from claiming title. 59 F. 434. exceptions were taken during the trial and to the charge by the court on the part of the plaintiffs, all of which were duly formulated in the......