Brown v. Cranford Transp. Services Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.1:01-CV1947BBM.,CIV.A.1:01-CV1947BBM.
• Citation: 244 F.Supp.2d 1314
• Parties: Brenda P. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. CRANFORD TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

244 F.Supp.2d 1314

Brenda P. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. CRANFORD TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV.A.1:01-CV1947BBM.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

December 3, 2002.

Lynn C. Stewart, Jason Wayne Graham, Schreeder Wheeler & Flint, Atlanta, GA, for Brenda P. Brown, plaintiff.

Ronald Kyle Woods, Office of R. Kyle Woods, Atlanta, GA, for Cranford Transportation Service, Inc., defendant.

ORDER

MARTIN, District Judge.

This action, alleging discharge in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, is before the court on Brenda P. Brown's motion to file original discovery [Doc. No. 18-1] and Cranford Transportation Service, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 21-1].

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 24, 2001, the plaintiff, Brenda P. Brown ("Brown"), filed suit in this court against her former employer, Cranford Transportation Service, Inc. ("Cranford"). In the complaint, Brown alleges that Cranford, a family-owned trucking business, terminated her employment in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA") when she requested leave to care for her terminally ill husband. On September 24, 2001, Cranford answered Brown's complaint, asserting a variety of defenses. Specifically, Cranford denies that Brown was fired due to a request for leave under the FMLA; instead, Cranford asserts that Brown's termination stemmed from failure to perform job responsibilities. Also, Cranford denies that it employed enough people to qualify as an employer under the FMLA.

In its trucking business, Cranford has two distinct types of employees. First Cranford hires and utilizes regular employees. These people are paid either salaries or hourly wages each week. As such, they appear on Cranford's employee payroll documentation. Second, Cranford uses a number of owner/operators to move freight. These owner/operators own their own vehicles, but haul freight under Cranford's operating authority and insurance. Some owner/operators lease their vehicles to Cranford, and all owner/operators are paid on a weekly basis for services performed days earlier. However, Cranford maintains separate payroll records and documentation for its owner/operators.

After several months of discovery, including two extensions of time, Cranford filed a motion for summary judgment. Importantly, Cranford argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. Cranford bases this assertion on the definition of "employer" under the FMLA. According to Cranford, during the statutory period applicable to this case, it did not employ fifty or more people. Because it did not employ the requisite number of people, Cranford argues it is not an "employer" under the FMLA, and summary judgment should be granted in its favor because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Contrary to Cranford's conclusion, Brown, evaluating the same payroll data and documentation, asserts that Cranford employed the requisite number of people during the applicable period.

To foster the court's understanding of the subject matter jurisdiction controversy in this case, the court held a hearing on November 25, 2002. Each party was given a chance to explain the methodology it utilized to determine the number of workers employed by Cranford during the applicable period. With the aid of the parties' explanations, the court now resolves the subject matter jurisdiction issue.

II. Legal Standard

A. Attacks on Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that "[a]ttacks on subject matter jurisdiction come in two forms: (1) facial attacks, and (2) factual attacks." Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960 (11th Cir.1999) (citing Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990)). Facial attacks "require the court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in the complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion." Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 960 (quoting Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529). In contrast, factual attacks challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered. Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 960. In a factual attack upon the court's subject matter jurisdiction, where the elements of the underlying cause of action are not implicated,¹ no presumption of truthfulness attaches to a plaintiffs allegations, as under a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Id. at 960-61. Instead, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving to the court that jurisdiction in fact exists. United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, n. 18 (11th Cir.2002) (stating that, to establish subject matter jurisdiction, "the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant fits within [Title VII's] definition of `employer' "); Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that plaintiff "has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction"); Dillard v. Jones, 89 F.Supp.2d 1362, 1368 (N.D.Ga.2000) (Forrester, J.) (stating that plaintiff must establish subject matter jurisdiction).

Cranford's status as an employer under the FMLA is a threshold jurisdictional issue that does not implicate the elements of the plaintiffs cause of action. Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683, 685 (11th Cir.1999); Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 961 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a defendant's status as an "employer" under Title VII "does not implicate an element of the Title VII cause of action"). In Wascura v. Carver, the Eleventh Circuit held that "where a defendant in an FMLA suit does not meet the statutory definition of `employer,' there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction over the claim against that defendant." 169 F.3d at 685. If a court "were to exercise jurisdiction where the employer does not meet the statutory prerequisite, it would effectively be expanding the scope of the [FMLA]." Id. (quoting Douglas v. E.G. Baldwin & Assocs., Inc., 150 F.3d 604, 608 (6th Cir.1998)). The Eleventh Circuit compared this holding to its decisions under Title VII, stating that "[t]his conclusion comports with our previous holding that the question whether a defendant meets the definition of `employer' under Title VII determines if there is subject matter jurisdiction over that claim." Wascura, 169 F.3d at 685. Accordingly, the court must independently determine if Cranford had the requisite number of employees before the court may evaluate the merits of the case. Id.

B. Definition of Employer Under the FMLA

The FMLA provides that "any employer" who interferes with or denies any rights provided to an employee under the act is liable for damages. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (1999). As such, plaintiffs may only assert claims against entities fitting the definition of "employer" in section 2611(4)(A). According to section 2611(4)(A)(i), "[t]he term `employer'. . . means any person . . . who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year." See also 29 C.F.R. § 825.104 (2002).

In order to determine how many employees an employer has for purposes of the FMLA, the court refers to the Department of Labor's FMLA regulations. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100-.800 (2002). Pursuant to these regulations, the court is to apply the "payroll method" in assessing whether an entity "employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i); see also Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207, 117 S.Ct. 660, 136 L.Ed.2d 644 (1997); S.Rep No. 103-3, at 21-22 (1993). Following the payroll method, "[a]ny employee whose name appears on the employer's payroll will be considered employed each working day of the calendar week, and must be counted whether or not any compensation is received." 29 C.F.R. § 825.105(b). Further, "[e]mployees on paid or unpaid leave . . . are counted as long as the employer has a reasonable expectation that the employee will later return to active employment." Id. at § 825.105(c). "Parttime employees, like full-time employees, are considered to be employed each working day of the calendar week, as long as they are maintained on the payroll." Id. However, "[i]f there is no employer/employee relationship (such as when an employee is laid off, whether temporarily or permanently) such individual is not counted." 29 C.F.R. § 825.105(c); see also Walters, 519 U.S. at 211, 117 S.Ct. 660; Laurie v. Ala. Ct. of Crim.App., 256 F.3d 1266, 1268-69 (11th Cir.2001). Finally, "[a]n employee who does not begin to work for an employer until after the first working day of a calendar week, or who terminates employment before the last working day of a calendar week, is not considered employed on each working day of that calendar week." Id. at § 825.105(d); see also Walters, 519 U.S. at 208-11, 117 S.Ct. 660.

III. Application to Cranford Transportation Service, Inc.

When Cranford moved for summary judgment asserting that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Cranford made a factual attack on the court's power to adjudicate this dispute.² Since the defendant's status as an "employer" does not implicate an element of Brown's cause of action against Cranford, the court "serves as the fact-finder and may weigh the evidence." Scarfo, 175 F.3d at 961.

In its motion for summary judgment, Cranford readily admits that, if its owner/operators are counted as employees,³ the trucking company employed more than fifty people during the last twelve weeks of 2001. Cranford reached this conclusion after Pamela Parris, Cranford's human resources director and payroll manager, reviewed the...