Brown v. Crews, 5:08-CV-280-KSF
| Decision Date | 30 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:08-CV-280-KSF,5:08-CV-280-KSF |
| Parties | KAREN BROWN, Petitioner, v. WARDEN COOKIE CREWS, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
On June 23, 2008, Petitioner Karen Brown, by counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. DE #6 (Petition). Respondent, Warden Cookie Crews, responded in opposition, DE #19 (Response), and Petitioner replied, DE #25 (Reply). The matter is now ripe for consideration.
In accordance with local practice, this matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge for consideration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). However, in the interests of judicial economy, the Court hereby withdraws the reference of this action to the Magistrate Judge.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the petition. Petitioner fails to justify displacing the treatment of the matter by the courts of the Commonwealth.
Following a joint trial in Fayette Circuit Court, Petitioner, Karen Brown, and her co-defendant, Elizabeth Turpin, were convicted of capital murder in the death of Turpin's husband Michael. See Appendix, at 1-4 (Judgment), 655. Although the case was deatheligible, the jury sentenced both to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. See id. A third co-defendant, Keith Bouchard, pled guilty to the crime before trial. See id. at 653. He received a life sentence in exchange for testimony against Brown and Turpin. See id.
The record indicates that Petitioner, Turpin, and Bouchard met in 1985 when they worked together at a car dealership in Lexington, Kentucky. DE #6 at 6; DE #19 at 3. The three also socialized outside of work, and Brown had a romantic interest in Turpin. See DE #6 at 6; DE #19 at 3. Testimony at trial suggested that although Turpin was recently married, she was not satisfied in her relationship with Michael. See Appendix, at 653, She claimed that he was physically abusive, and in January 1986 she stated that she planned to divorce him. See id. In the same time period, Michael made Turpin the beneficiary of his $50,000 life insurance policy. See id.
On February 2, 1986, Petitioner, Turpin, and Bouchard spent the evening together at The Circus, a local club. See id. at 654. Later that night or in the early morning hours of February 3, all three ended up at Petitioner's apartment. Id. At some point, Brown and Bouchard decided to go to Turpin's apartment; Brown now denies knowing that Turpin and Bouchard intended for Bouchard to murder Michael, stating she believed they were only going to "rough him up". See DE #19 at 9; DE #6 at 62. Brown helped Bouchard gain entry to the home, and Bouchard attacked Michael, stabbing him repeatedly. See Appendix, at 654; DE #19 at 11. Brown assisted Bouchard in cleaning up the scene and disposing of the body at a local golf course. See Appendix, at 655; DE #6 at 62; DE #19 at 10-11. Brown, Bouchard, and Turpin quickly became suspects in the crime. See Appendix, at 652.
Upon conviction, Brown appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court. See Appendix, at 5. In relevant part, she argued that the trial court failed to prohibit the prosecutor from engaging in improper leading questioning of Bouchard on direct examination. Id. at 45-50. She further argued that the trial court violated her constitutional rights by locking the courtroom doors during trial proceedings and submitting an improper aggravating factor instruction to the jury. Id. at 54-62. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Brown's conviction. Appendix, at 141-47; see also Brown v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1989). The United States Supreme Court denied Brown's petition for writ of certiorari. Appendix, at 237.
Many years later, Brown attacked her conviction collaterally in state court, filing a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.42. See Appendix, at 239. Initially, the trial court denied the motion without holding a hearing. See id. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, finding that an evidentiary hearing was required. Id. at 240. Following the hearing on remand, the Fayette Circuit Court set aside Brown's conviction. Id. at 243-45. The trial court found that Julius Rather, Brown's counsel, provided ineffective assistance when he advised her not to testify in her own defense and when he failed to present adequate mitigation evidence during the penalty phase of her trial. Id. The trial court specifically found, however, that Rather's failure to further investigate the mental health and competency of Keith Bouchard did not constitute ineffective assistance. Id, at 243.
The government appealed the Fayette Circuit Court's decision, and Brown cross-appealed. Id. at 246, 368. The Kentucky Court of Appeals then reversed the trial court's order granting post-conviction relief, reinstating Brown's conviction. Id. at 450. TheSupreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review and unanimously affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Id. at 528, 652; see also Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W,3d 490 (Ky. 2008). The court denied Brown's petition for rehearing. Appendix, at 694. Thereafter, Brown filed the habeas petition currently before the Court.1
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254, established a '"highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Bell v. Cone, 125 S. Ct. 847, 853 (2005) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 123 S. Ct. 357, 360) (2002) (per curiam)) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059. 1067 n. 7 (1997)). Specifically, AEDPA provides:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)-(2). In contrast, when a state court has not addressed the merits of a properly presented claim, the reviewing federal court assesses the claim de novo. Van v. Jones, 475 1.3d 292, 293 (6th Cir. 2007). A petitioner bears the burden ofestablishing that relief is warranted. Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 261 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2003)) (quoting Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 2001)).
As the United States Supreme Court has articulated, "Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'" Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000) (O'Connor, J., opinion of the Court for Part II)). In this regard, Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 2002). At the same time, habeas review focuses on the holdings of the Supreme Court, not its dicta or holdings of the courts of appeals. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (regarding dicta); id. at 1507 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989)) (regarding reliance on jurisprudence from courts of appeals).
Regarding the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court has held that "a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1523. The writ may not issue solely because the state court incorrectly applied the relevant Supreme Court . precedent; instead, the state court's misapplication must have been objectively unreasonable. Id. at 1521-23. In determining whether the state court misappliedSupreme Court precedent, a federal court may look only to the state of the case law "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision" Id. at 1523. Ultimately, the habeas court should not grant relief "so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
As to any "unreasonable determination of the facts" claim, a federal court must presume all determinations of factual issues by the state court to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Findings of fact entitled to the presumption include "[p]rimary or historical facts found by state courts," Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 736 (6th Cir. 2000), as well as factual findings made by state appellate courts based upon the trial record. Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 497 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Sumner v. Mata, 101 S. Ct. 764, 769 (1981)). However, the presumption does not fully apply when, as with an ineffective assistance claim resolved on the merits, the § 2254 petition involves mixed questions of law and fact. See Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984); Ramonez v. Berghuis, 490 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2007). In essence, while federal courts need not defer to ultimate findings regarding ineffectiveness of counsel, the "underlying facts" supporting such state court decisions warrant deference. Strickland, 104...
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