Brown v. CSX Transp. Inc.

• Citation: 155 F.Supp.3d 265
• Decision Date: 04 January 2016
• Docket Number: 1:11-CV-00999 EAW
• Parties: Keith Brown, Plaintiff, v. CSX Transportation Inc., Michael Lewandowski, and Thomas Ferris, Jr., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

155 F.Supp.3d 265

Keith Brown, Plaintiff,

v.CSX Transportation Inc., Michael Lewandowski, and Thomas Ferris, Jr., Defendants.

1:11-CV-00999 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed January 4, 2016

Denetra D. Roberts, Steven M. Cohen, HoganWillig, Getzville, NY, for Plaintiff.

Susan C. Roney, Nixon Peabody LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD

, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Keith Brown (“Plaintiff”), an African-American male, commenced this employment discrimination action on November 22, 2011, alleging that Defendants CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”), Michael Lewandowski, and Thomas Ferris, Jr. (collectively “Defendants”) discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.

(“Title VII”); the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981 ”); and the New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law §§ 290 et seq. (“NYSHRL”). (Dkt. 1; Dkt. 7).

This case was initially assigned to the Hon. Richard J. Arcara, United States District Judge. On June 21, 2012, Judge Arcara entered an order referring this matter to the Hon. Leslie G. Foschio, United States Magistrate Judge, for hearing and disposition of all non-dispositive motions or applications, supervision of discovery, and to hear and report upon dispositive motions. (Dkt. 14).

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on January 21, 2014. (Dkt. 43). Plaintiff opposed the motion. (Dkt. 49). This case was transferred to the undersigned on January 30, 2015. (Dkt. 53). On April 20, 2015, Judge Foschio issued a Report and Recommendation recommending the Court grant summary judgment and dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. (Dkt. 54).

On June 4, 2015, Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. 57). Plaintiff contends that he has established a material question of fact with respect to the fourth element of the prima facie case for his employment discrimination claims and that the Report and Recommendation erred in finding no individual liability with respect to Defendant Lewandowski under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

. (Id. ). On July 2, 2015, Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff's objections. (Dkt. 59). In addition to responding to Plaintiff's objections, Defendants posit that there are additional grounds for summary judgment not recognized in the Report and Recommendation, including Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate that he was qualified for his position in satisfaction of the second prong of any prima facie case, and that additional training was not an adverse employment action. (Id. ).

The Court held oral argument on October 28, 2015. After considering the record before the Court and the arguments of the parties, the Court adopts the dispositions recommended in the Report and Recommendation, although some of this Court's reasoning is slightly different from that contained in the Report and Recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 43) is granted and Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. 1) is dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural background of this case is set forth in detail in the Report and Recommendation. (See Dkt. 54 at 4-11). Familiarity with the Report and Recommendation is assumed for purposes of this Decision and Order.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

, this Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections have been made.” Crowe v. Leroy Cent. Sch. Dist. , 949 F.Supp.2d 435, 438 (W.D.N.Y.2013). “The Court reviews unobjected-to findings for clear error.” Am. Ins. Co. v. City of Jamestown , 914 F.Supp.2d 377, 384 (W.D.N.Y.2012).

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that summary judgment should be granted if the moving party establishes “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”). The Court should grant summary judgment if, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no rational jury could find in favor of that party. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007)

(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party '“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. ”' Caldarola v. Calabrese , 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir.2002)

(quoting Matsushita Elec

. , 475 U.S. at 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ) (emphasis in original). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment....” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original).

II. Title VII Claim¹

“To state a prima facie case of race discrimination, a plaintiff must proffer evidence that (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) his employer took an adverse action against him; and (4) the adverse action occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of race discrimination.” Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys. , 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir.2014)

. Race discrimination claims are assessed using the burden-shifting framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). As explained by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:

[o]nce a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of ... discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [adverse act]. If the defendant carries that burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate by competent evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. However, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.

Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ. , 584 F.3d 487, 498–99 (2d Cir.2009)

, superseded by statute on other grounds , N.Y.C. Local L. No. 85, as recognized in

Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc. , 715 F.3d 102, 108–09 (2d Cir.2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alteration in original). “[T]hough the burden upon a plaintiff attempting to establish a prima facie case may be ‘minimal,’ it remains a burden nonetheless, and summary judgment may be granted against a plaintiff who fails to meet this burden.” Tuccio v. FJC Sec. Servs., Inc. , No. CV 12–5506(JFB)(GRB), 2014 WL 4438084, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014). “It is well settled that ‘a plaintiffs mere subjective belief that he was discriminated against because of his race does not sustain a race discrimination claim.”’ Id. at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2014) (quoting Moore v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr. , No. 11–CV–3625 ( MKB), 2013 WL 3968748, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2013) ).

A. Protected Group

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against “any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national group.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)

. The parties do not contest that, as an African-American male, Plaintiff is a member of a protected group. (Dkt. 43-23 at 8; Dkt. 49 at 10).

B. Qualified for His Position

“[T]he second prong only requires plaintiff to demonstrate that he was ‘qualified for the position he held,’ with a focus on his ‘competence and whether he possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job.”’ Payne v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't , 863 F.Supp.2d 169, 180 (E.D.N.Y.2012)

(quoting Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland , 609 F.3d 486, 492 (2d Cir.2010) ). “[A]ll that is required is that the plaintiff establish basic eligibility for the position at issue, and not the greater showing that he satisfies the employer.” Slattery v. Swiss Reins.

Am. Corp. , 248 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir.2001).

The Report and Recommendation found that there was a “genuine issue of material fact on which a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff was qualified for the conductor position from which he was terminated....” (Dkt. 54 at 20). Defendants maintain that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was qualified for his position, and thus failed to satisfy the second prong of his prima facie case. (Dkt. 59 at 17). Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff never passed his lines east qualification test, and was therefore not qualified for his position. (Id. ).

Although Plaintiff never successfully completed the lines east qualification test, Plaintiff successfully completed training at the Railroad Education and Development Institute (“REDI training”), rules classes, and qualifying rides.² (Dkt. 43-4 at 61:7-21; Dkt. 49-3 at ¶¶ 5, 11, 16; Dkt. 49-4 at ¶ 6). In addition, before taking medical leave, Plaintiff had worked as a conductor for Defendant CSX for approximately three years, indicating he possessed the basic skills necessary for the job. See Gregory v. Daly , 243 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir.2001)

(“by hiring the employee, the employer itself has already expressed a belief...