Brown v. Desert Christian Ctr.

• Decision Date: 17 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. F060139.,F060139.
• Citation: 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 590,11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3341,2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4001,193 Cal.App.4th 733
• Parties: Frank D. BROWN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DESERT CHRISTIAN CENTER, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

193 Cal.App.4th 733

122 Cal.Rptr.3d 590

11 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3341

2011 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4001

Frank D. BROWN, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.DESERT CHRISTIAN CENTER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. F060139.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

March 17, 2011.

Mark W. Deutinger for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

KANE, J.

In this personal injury case, defendant Desert Christian Center was successful in proving its affirmative defense that the injuries alleged by plaintiff Frank D. Brown were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the workers' compensation system. A judgment of dismissal was entered and defendant sought to recover its costs as the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032.¹ Plaintiff moved to strike defendant's memorandum of costs, asserting that since defendant prevailed on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award costs. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion and defendant now appeals from that order. Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court had jurisdiction to award costs under the particular circumstances of this case. We agree and accordingly reverse the trial court's order striking the memorandum of costs.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 14, 2006, plaintiff was injured at defendant's building site in Ridgecrest, California, when he fell from a ladder while painting and doing paint preparation work. On November 14, 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint in Kern County Superior Court against defendant, seeking the recovery of damages for his personal injuries. The complaint included causes of action for premises liability and general negligence, and alleged as supporting facts that while plaintiff was working for defendant as an unlicensed contractor ² he sustained serious personal injuries as a result of defendant's negligent failure to provide a safe work environment.

Defendant filed an answer consisting of a general denial and several affirmative defenses. The affirmative defenses included a ninth affirmative defense, which asserted that plaintiff's exclusive remedy for his injuries was workers' compensation benefits.

On October 14, 2009, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. The first amended complaint specified that the injury occurred when plaintiff fell from a ladder and suffered a severe fracture of the right femur. The amended pleading also alleged that plaintiff was not covered by defendant's workers' compensation insurance policy and/or that he was informed that such coverage would not apply to him.³ Defendant's answer to the first amended complaint once again asserted as a ninth affirmative defense that plaintiff's exclusive remedy was to seek benefits available to him under the workers' compensation system.

The case came on regularly for trial on November 23, 2009. Before proceeding to other issues in the case, the trial court convened an evidentiary hearing or mini-trial to determine the merits of defendant's ninth affirmative defense and to exercise “its inherent power to inquire into its subject matter jurisdiction.” ⁴ After hearing evidence that included a number of exhibits and the testimony of several witnesses, the trial court found that defendant's ninth affirmative defense was meritorious. Specifically, the trial court held that plaintiff's injuries were sustained within the course and scope of his employment with defendant, no exemption to workers' compensation coverage applied, and plaintiff was covered by defendant's workers' compensation policy. Therefore, workers' compensation was plaintiff's exclusive remedy, the matter came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the workers' compensation system, and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In the trial court's written order filed on December 31, 2009, the action was dismissed based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A judgment of dismissal was thereafter entered.

Defendant filed a memorandum of costs by which it sought the recovery of allowable costs pursuant to section 1032 as the prevailing party in the case. The total amount of costs claimed in the memorandum was $7,909.88, the majority of which consisted of deposition costs.

Plaintiff responded by filing a motion to strike the entire memorandum of costs on the ground that no costs could be awarded by the trial court because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court agreed that it lacked jurisdiction to award costs and granted the motion to strike the memorandum of costs. Defendant timely appealed from that order.

DISCUSSION

The question of whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to award costs under the circumstances presented is essentially one of law; thus, we conduct an independent review. ( Shisler v. Sanfer Sports Cars, Inc. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1, 6, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 771( Shisler );Salawy v. Ocean Towers Housing Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 664, 669, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 427.)

I. Defendant Met Statutory Criteria for Entitlement to Cost Award

The right to recover costs is entirely a creature of statute ( Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 989, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 953 P.2d 858), and section 1032 is “the fundamental authority for awarding costs in civil actions.” ( Scott Co. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 979 P.2d 974.)Section 1032 establishes the following rule: “Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding.” ( Id., subd. (b).) As defined by the statute, a “ ‘[p]revailing party’ ” includes “a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered.” ( Id., subd. (a)(4).) Therefore, upon dismissal of an action in a defendant's favor, that party is entitled to an award of costs under the clear authority and mandate of these statutory provisions. “ ‘No qualifications or conditions are imposed. He [or she] is entitled to ... costs as a matter of right....’ ” ( Sealand Inv. Corp. v. Shirley (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 323, 324, 12 Cal.Rptr. 164.)

In the present case, defendant was the prevailing party because a judgment of dismissal was entered in its favor. (§ 1032, subd. (a)(4).) Since no other statute expressly provided to the contrary,⁵ defendant was plainly entitled to recover its costs as a matter of right. ( Id., subd. (b).)

Furthermore, we note the statutory language is clear and explicit that “a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered” is a “prevailing party” and “entitled as a matter of right to recover costs.” (§ 1032, subds. (a)(4) & (b).) Nothing in the wording of the statute indicates that a defendant's right to recover costs is limitedto certain types of dismissals (e.g., dismissals on nonjurisdictional grounds). Since the Legislature has not distinguished between types of dismissals in the statute, we will not read such a restriction into it. “ ‘[O]ne should not read into the statute allowing costs a restriction which has not been placed there. “In general, a court should not look beyond the plain meaning of a statute when its language is clear and unambiguous, and there is no uncertainty or doubt as to the legislative intent. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ ” ( Crib Retaining Walls, Inc. v. NBS/Lowry, Inc. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 886, 890, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 850; see also Agnew v. State Bd. of Equalization (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 899, 913, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 464 [“When the Legislature intends to restrict the recovery of costs or fees[,] it knows how to express such restriction”].)

Therefore, assuming there was no fundamental jurisdictional defect that deprived the trial court of power to award costs, defendant was clearly entitled to such an award under a plain reading of section 1032. We now turn to the specific issue of the trial court's jurisdiction to award costs in this case.

II. The Trial Court's Jurisdiction to Award CostsA. Jurisdiction to Determine Jurisdiction Supported Judgment of Dismissal and Costs Incidental Thereto

We begin with the procedural context in which the issue at hand was raised. Defendant properly raised the jurisdictional issue of workers' compensation coverage by asserting it as an affirmative defense. Generally speaking, in a lawsuit for personal injury damages, a defendant has the burden of pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense, the existence of the conditions of compensation under the workers' compensation law. ( Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 91, 96, 151 Cal.Rptr. 347, 587 P.2d 1160.) Based on the allegations of the first amended complaint and defendant's answer, the disputed factual issues before the trial court relating to this jurisdictional defense included whether plaintiff, as an unlicensed contractor, was an employee of defendant, and if so, whether defendant satisfied its obligation of securing workers' compensation insurance coverage that applied to plaintiff.⁶ Depending on how the trial court resolved those issues, subject matter jurisdiction would either be exclusively in the workers' compensation system or exclusively in the trial court. “Jurisdiction, once determined, is exclusive and is not concurrent.” ( Rowland v. County of Sonoma (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 331, 333, 269 Cal.Rptr. 426.)

After conducting an evidentiary hearing on defendant's ninth affirmative defense, the trial court resolved the disputed factual issues and found that plaintiff's injuries were wholly covered by workers' compensation law. Plaintiff's exclusive remedy was therefore under workers' compensation law and the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to act with respect to that remedy. ( La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 27, 43, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 100, 884 P.2d 1048 [workers' compensation tribunal, rather than trial court, had exclusive jurisdiction over award of workers' compensation benefits]; Rowland v. County of Sonoma, s...