Brown v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 21 July 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:13–cv–0569 (CRC)
• Citation: 115 F.Supp.3d 56
• Parties: Kimberly Katora Brown, et al., Plaintiffs, v. District of Columbia, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

115 F.Supp.3d 56

Kimberly Katora Brown, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.District of Columbia, Defendant.

Case No. 1:13–cv–0569 (CRC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 21, 2015

William Charles Cole Claiborne, III, Law Offices of William Claiborne III, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Chad Wayne Copeland, Gary Daniel Feldon, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, United States District Judge

Civil asset forfeiture laws—which enable law enforcement agencies to seize property they believe has been involved in criminal activity—have generated considerable controversy in recent years. Citing a dramatic rise in the value of seizures, critics assert that police departments are using the laws not to legitimately fight crime, but to generate revenue for dubious expenditures, often at the expense of innocent property owners. Defenders of the laws counter that seizures have crippled drug and other criminal organizations while the proceeds of the forfeitures enhance the ability of financially-strapped police departments to protect the public from other crimes. In either event, evidence has emerged suggesting that at least some police departments have abused the civil forfeiture process, see, e.g., Michael Sallah, Robert O'Harrow Jr., & Steven Rich, Stop and Seize, Wash. Post, (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/, which in turn has led to public debate and legislative reforms in many jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia. The controversy has also generated lawsuits across the country challenging the constitutionality of municipal forfeiture laws. This is one such case.

The twenty-two Plaintiffs in this case are owners of cars or currency that they allege were improperly seized and retained by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"). The seizures were effected under a prior version of Washington D.C.'s civil forfeiture statute, D.C.Code § 48–905.02 (2012). Plaintiffs contend that various aspects of the former law, and MPD's implementation of it, violated their constitutional rights under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In sixteen separate counts, they generally allege (1) that they did not receive requisite notice that their property was subject to forfeiture, either at the time of or after the seizure; (2) that the law denied them a prompt and meaningful opportunity to be heard to challenge the seizure and continued retention of their property pending the ultimate forfeiture determination; (3) that the law impermissibly conditioned a judicial hearing on posting a bond and that MPD systematically denied waivers of this bond requirement to eligible claimants; (4) that MPD allowed some claimants, but not others, to challenge forfeiture of their property through informal "secret" procedures; and (5) that MPD routinely failed to return seized property that was no longer subject to forfeiture. Plaintiffs bring their claims as a putative class action on behalf of themselves and others whom they allege have been harmed in similar ways.

The District moves to dismiss the amended complaint. Upon consideration of the motion, the opposition and reply, the parties' arguments during the hearing on the motion, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds as follows: It will dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims because their challenges to the adequacy of the District's forfeiture procedures—as opposed to the propriety of the underlying seizures—are properly brought under the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourth. The Court will also dismiss Plaintiffs' claim that the Constitution requires a prompt hearing after seizures of cash, as it finds that any relief an interim hearing could provide is outweighed by the government's interest in retaining seized currency. The Court will dismiss as well Plaintiffs' challenge to the statute's lack of a requirement that MPD give notice at the time of seizure, which it finds is consistent with due process, and Plaintiffs' claim that the content of the notice MPD sent to claimants is insufficiently detailed. Finally, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' facial challenge to the statute's requirement that claimants post a bond—subject to an income-based waiver or reduction—in order to invoke judicial review.

The Court will deny the District's motion to dismiss in all other respects. It finds—consistent with the reasoning of the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and this court in Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F.Supp.2d 90 (2012) —that the government must provide a prompt opportunity for owners of seized automobiles to challenge the reasonableness of the seizure and propose means to protect the government's interest short of retaining their cars until the conclusion of forfeiture proceedings. The Court further finds that while the MPD notices comport with due process, certain Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the District does not issue the notices (or follow up on returned notices) in a manner reasonably calculated to reach claimants. The complaint also alleges plausible due process violations resulting from MPD's purported "secret" procedures for challenging forfeitures and its retention of property that is not deemed forfeitable or needed as evidence in a criminal case. Finally, although the statute's bond requirement does not facially violate due process, certain Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled that the District denied them bond waivers and reductions in violation of their due process rights. The Court will therefore deny the District's motion to dismiss as to these claims.¹

I. Background

A. Civil Forfeiture Procedures in the District of Columbia

In February 2015, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted sweeping changes to the city's asset forfeiture statute. See Civil Asset Forfeiture Amendment Act of 2014, 62 D.C.Reg. 1,920 (Feb. 13, 2015) (imposing stricter notice and reporting provisions; requiring the MPD to inventory and catalogue seized property; reducing the bond requirement; giving owners an opportunity to request interim release of their property; shifting the burden of proof from the owner to the government; and providing that drug possession is no longer a forfeitable offense). The new legislation addresses many of the infirmities in the prior version of the law alleged by the Plaintiffs in this case. Id. The Court must nevertheless decide the merits of this motion to dismiss, as Plaintiffs claim damages stemming from the District's past conduct under the pre-amendment asset forfeiture regime.

The seizures and forfeitures at issue in this case were governed by former D.C.Code § 48–905.02 (2012). That statute authorized MPD to seize, without a warrant, vehicles, currency, or other property if police had probable cause to believe that the property was the proceeds of or used in a crime or infraction. Id. §§ 48–905.02(a), (d)(3)(A). After a seizure, the statute required the Mayor to provide notice to any person having "a right of claim to the seized property." Id. § 48–905.02(d)(3)(A). If an owner received notice, he or she needed to file a claim and pay a bond of the lower of $2,500 or 10 percent of the appraised value of the property, but not less than $250, in order to assert an interest in the property. Id. § 48–905.02(d)(3)(B). The claimant could request a waiver or reduction of the bond requirement from MPD's Property Clerk. D.C. Mun. Regs. 6–A § 806.6–7.

If a claimant paid the bond, the District did not return the property. Rather, it initiated judicial forfeiture proceedings in the District of Columbia Superior Court. D.C.Code § 48–905.02(d)(3)(E) (2012). If a claimant did not trigger judicial proceedings by paying the bond or obtaining a waiver, the property became subject to administrative forfeiture. The statute required the Mayor to then determine whether the property was forfeitable. Id. § 48–905.02(d)(3)(C). The Mayor in turn delegated authority over those administrative forfeiture determinations to the MPD Property Clerk. D.C. Mun. Regs. 6–A § 805. The Property Clerk's decision was made ex parte ; claimants had no formal opportunity to challenge the rationale for the original seizure, assert their rights as innocent owners, or suggest reasons they should be able to recover their property. If the Property Clerk did not deem the property forfeitable or it was not needed as evidence in a criminal case, the statute required the District to return it. D.C.Code § 48–905.02(d)(3)(C) (2012).

B. Factual Allegations

As noted above, the Plaintiffs in this putative class action are owners of either vehicles or cash that was seized by the police incident to traffic stops or other arrests. While the specifics of their allegations differ, all generally claim that the District's civil forfeiture regime was designed and implemented without regard for their constitutional rights. The following allegations are illustrative of Plaintiffs' contentions.

Kelly Hughes alleges that her vehicle was seized merely because she had an "air freshener hanging from the rear view window and heavy tint." Compl. ¶ 165. Hughes says she spent hours calling the police and District agencies to recover her vehicle. Id. ¶ 171. When the police finally directed her to the impound lot, she claims the officer would not show her the copy of the seizure warrant. Id. ¶ 173. According to Hughes, she struggled to get to work and to a truck driving course in Baltimore without her car, yet still had to make all the loan and insurance payments. Id. ¶¶ 179–80.

Another plaintiff, Takia Jenkins, claims her Mercedes was taken from the parking lot behind her house because someone (whom the police would not identify) had allegedly driven it in an illegal manner. Id. ¶ 184. She contends the officers told her she would never recover her car, or that it would be prohibitively expensive to do so. Id. ¶ 187. Jenkins says she...