Brown v. Dixon
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 19-60704-CIV-ALTMAN |
| Decision Date | 15 March 2022 |
| Citation | 591 F.Supp.3d 1251 |
| Parties | Oscar BROWN, Petitioner, v. Ricky D. DIXON, Secretary, Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Oscar Brown, Arcadia, FL, Pro Se.
Melynda Layne Melear, Attorney General Office, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent Florida Department of Corrections.
Our Petitioner, Oscar Brown, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Petition [ECF No. 1]. In it, he challenges certain aspects of his state-court conviction and sentence from 2002. Having carefully reviewed the Petition and the record, we now DISMISS part of it (Grounds One, Four, and Five) as procedurally defaulted, and we DENY the rest (Grounds Two and Three) on the merits.
After a trial in 1999, a Broward jury convicted Brown of armed kidnapping with a firearm, armed burglary of a dwelling, and three counts of aggravated assault with a firearm. See 1999 Jury Verdict [ECF No. 11-1] at 11–15; 1999 Judgment [ECF No. 11-1] at 17–18. Having determined that Brown was a "habitual felony offender," the state judge sentenced him to 35 years in prison. See 1999 Sentence [ECF No. 11-1] at 20–34. But, on Brown's appeal, see Notice of Appeal for 1999 Trial [ECF No. 11-1] at 36, the Fourth District Court of Appeal ("Fourth DCA") reversed and remanded for a new trial, see Brown v. State , 787 So. 2d 136, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
In his second trial, the jury acquitted Brown of three counts of aggravated assault with a firearm but found him guilty of kidnapping and burglary of a dwelling. See 2002 Jury Verdict [ECF No. 11-1] at 83–87; see also Felony Order of Acquittal [ECF No. 11-1] at 88. Again, the trial judge sentenced him to 35 years in prison. See 2002 Judgment [ECF No. 11-1] at 90–91; 2002 Sentencing Order [ECF No. 11-1] at 93–98.
Another appeal followed. See 2002 Notice of Appeal [ECF No. 11-1] at 100. This time, the Fourth DCA affirmed without explanation. See Brown v. State , 834 So. 2d 178, 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Undeterred, Brown filed a pro se Motion for Rehearing, see Motion for Rehearing on Direct Appeal [ECF No. 11-1] at 143–52, which the Fourth DCA denied on January 7, 2003, see Order Denying Rehearing [ECF No. 11-1] at 156. The Fourth DCA issued its mandate on January 3, 2003, see Mandate of Direct Appeal [ECF No. 11-1] at 158, and Brown apparently never sought review from either the Florida or the U.S. Supreme Court, see generally Respondent's Exhibits Appendix 1 [ECF No. 11-1]; Respondent's Exhibits Appendix 2 [ECF No. 11-2].
On September 23, 2003, Brown filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief under FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850 (" Rule 3.850 Motion") [ECF No. 11-1] at 160–79, and the State responded, see State's Rule 3.850 Response [ECF No. 11-1] at 181. The postconviction trial court gave Brown an evidentiary hearing on only one of his claims—his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a voluntary-intoxication defense—and denied the remaining claims on the papers. See Order Denying Postconviction Motion in Part and Granting Evidentiary Hearing ("Postconviction Order") [ECF No. 11-1] at 169–70, 197. Once the evidence was in, see Postconviction Hr'g [ECF No. 12-2], the postconviction trial court denied the voluntary-intoxication claim too, see Order Denying Remaining Postconviction Claim ("Post-Hearing Order") [ECF No. 11-1] at 199–202.
The postconviction trial court then gave Brown one chance to amend by February 18, 2011. See Order Granting Opportunity to Amend [ECF No. 11-1] at 209. Brown State's 2017 Response [ECF No. 11-1] at 220. But nothing in the record suggests that Brown received any additional extensions, and Brown's postconviction counsel blew the extended deadline by submitting his amendment on May 1, 2017—more than six years after the March 29, 2011 window had closed. See Amendment to Ground One [ECF No. 11-1] at 211–15 (). In its response, the State argued (1) that Brown had "waived his opportunity to amend his claim" by missing the twice-extended deadline, and (2) that the claim failed on the merits. See State's 2017 Response at 217–23.
The postconviction trial court denied the amended claim "for [the] reasons set forth in the State's Response, which [was] incorporated by reference [t]herein." Order Denying Amended Claim [ECF No. 11-1] at 225–26. On appeal, see 2018 Notice of Appeal [ECF No. 11-1] at 228, the State chose not to raise timeliness as a defense, see Postconviction Answer Brief [ECF No. 11-1] at 275–92. The Fourth DCA summarily affirmed anyway, see Brown v. State , 256 So. 3d 867, 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), and then denied a motion for rehearing, see Order Denying Motion for Rehearing [ECF No. 11-2] at 23. On December 21, 2018, the Fourth DCA issued its mandate on Brown's postconviction appeal. See Postconviction Mandate [ECF No. 11-2] at 25.
Brown filed this federal Petition on March 13, 2019.2 See Petition at 13. In it, he advances the following five claims: (1) "[t]he jury's inconsistent verdicts as to Counts I and II of the information" resulted in "a substantial violation of [Brown's] constitutional right[s]"; (2) "[i]neffective assistance of counsel for failing to object and ask for mistrial or curative jury instructions" or otherwise "failing to impeach [the] State's key witnesses with their prior trial testimony or depositions"; (3) "[i]neffective assistance of counsel for failure to ask the trial court for a voluntary intoxication jury instruction, and for failing to properly investigate this claim"; (4) "[c]umulative impact error where the errors of counsel combined to deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial"; and (5) "[t]he trial court order denying ... ‘for the reasons stated in the state's response’ is inadequate and insufficient and violates the Florida and United States Constitutions." Id.
AEDPA instructs district courts to deny any claim that was "adjudicated on the merits" in a state-court proceeding unless that adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 97–98, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (summarizing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) – (e) ).
To have "adjudicated [the claim] on the merits," the state court need not have issued any kind of formal opinion or even outlined its reasoning. Id. at 99, 131 S.Ct. 770 (). Rather, when a state court doesn't articulate its reasons for the denial, the federal court must " ‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a rationale" and "then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." Wilson v. Sellers , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192, 200 L.Ed.2d 530 (2018).
"Clearly established Federal law" means "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the United State Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). To be "contrary to clearly established federal law, the state court must either (1) apply a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law, or (2) reach a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts." Ward v. Hall , 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).
For "a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent" to be Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510, 520–21, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (cleaned up). "[I]t is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by Court." Richter , 562 U.S. at 101, 131 S.Ct. 770. Woods v. Donald , 575 U.S. 312, 316, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 191 L.Ed.2d 464 (2015) (cleaned up).
Section 2254(d) similarly prohibits federal judges from reevaluating a state court's factual findings unless those findings were "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). To establish that a state court's factual findings were unreasonable, "the petitioner must rebut ‘the presumption of correctness [of a state court's factual findings] by clear and convincing evidence.’ " Ward , 592 F.3d at 1155–56 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ).
"AEDPA's standard is intentionally difficult to meet." Woods , 575 U.S. at 315, 135 S.Ct. 1372 ...
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Budd v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.
... ... trial court had a “substantial and injurious effect or ... influence” in determining the jury's verdict ... Brown v. Davenport , 596 U.S. 118, 126 (2022) ... (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S. 619, 637 ... (1993); quotation marks omitted). To ... section 2254 petition is unexhausted, the claim is barred ... from consideration and must be dismissed. See Brown v ... Dixon , 591 F.Supp.3d 1251, 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2022) ... certificate of appealability denied sub nom Brown v ... Dep't of Corr. , No. 22-11344, ... ...