Brown v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n
| Decision Date | 18 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.: 11-cv-666 |
| Parties | TERRY BROWN, Plaintiff, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Litkovitz, M.J.
OPINION AND ORDERThis matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Litkovitz's Report and Recommendation ("Report"). (Doc. 18). The parties were given proper notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), including notice that the parties may waive further appeal if they fail to file objections in a timely manner. (Doc. 18, p. 8); see also United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff Terry Brown timely filed objections to the Report (Doc. 19), Defendant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed a response to the objections (Doc. 20), and Plaintiff Terry Brown filed a subsequent response to Defendant's opposition to the objections (Doc. 22). This matter is now ripe for review.
Magistrate Judge Litkovtiz's Report (Doc. 18) addresses three motions: (1) the EEOC's motion to dismiss (Doc. 8); (2) Mr. Brown's motion for a more definite statement (Doc. 11); and (3) the EEOC's motion to strike (Doc. 16).
The Report starts with an analysis of the EEOC's motion to dismiss. (See Doc. 18, pp. 1-4). The Report indicates that the Complaint filed by Mr. Brown suggests he is pursuing a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361, but that the EEOC in its motion construed the Complaint as raising claims for relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and/or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (Doc. 18, pp. 1-2). The Report considers both issues in determining whether Mr. Brown may proceed. (Doc. 18, pp. 1-7). Looking first to whether a writ of mandamus should issue pursuant to Section 1361, the Report concludes that a writ is an extraordinary remedy to which Mr. Brown has not demonstrated he is entitled. (Doc. 18, pp. 2-3). Specifically, the Report concludes that Mr. Brown has not demonstrated that the EEOC owes him a nondiscretionary duty or that he lacks another avenue of relief given that he already had filed a separate lawsuit against his former employer. (Doc. 18, pp. 2-3). As such, it is recommended that Mr. Brown be denied a writ of mandamus. (Doc. 18, p. 4).
After recommending that Mr. Brown be denied a writ of mandamus, the Report considers whether any claim asserted by Mr. Brown under either Title VII or the ADEA would be subject to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). (Doc. 18, pp. 4-7). The Report concludes that neither Title VII nor the ADEA provides the Court with subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Brown's ostensible claims against the EEOC because neither permits an express or implied cause of action against the EEOC for its investigation, processing or handling of a charge. (Doc. 18, pp. 5-7). Given that conclusion, the Magistrate Judge found it unnecessary to reach the EEOC's argument that Mr. Brown failed to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 18, p. 7).Accordingly, the Report recommends that, in the alternative, the action be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Title VII and the ADEA. (Doc. 18, p. 7).
As for the remaining motions, the Report orders that they are denied as moot in light of the prior recommendations that the case be dismissed. (Doc. 18, p. 7).
When objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation are received on a dispositive matter, the assigned district judge "must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After review, the district judge "may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Although the precise bases for Mr. Brown's objections are not clear, the Court construes them broadly. See Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 705 (6th Cir. 1993). In doing so, it infers that Mr. Brown intends to object to the Report on four separate grounds relating to the dismissal of this action. (See Doc. 19; Doc. 22). Each of his objections is addressed separately below.
Mr. Brown's first objection appears to be that the Magistrate Judge dismissed his case entirely on the basis that claims for relief against the EEOC under Title VII and the ADEA cannot stand, instead of recognizing that he filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus pursuant to Section 1361 and not a Title VII or ADEA complaint against theEEOC. (Doc. 19, pp. 1-2). This Court finds that Mr. Brown is incorrect as to his interpretation of the Report, as the Report specifically analyzed his Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and recommended dismissal of the same, and alternatively, recommended dismissal of any claims for relief under Title VII or the ADEA that Mr. Brown intended to assert. (Doc. 18). Accordingly, Mr. Brown's first objection is overruled.
This Court recognizes, however, that Mr. Brown contends that he is not asserting claims for relief against the EEOC under Title VII and the ADEA and therefore does not believe that the Report's recommendation as to those claims for relief is applicable to his action. While the Court acknowledges that the analysis may be inapplicable if Mr. Brown is not asserting such claims, it finds that to the extent such claims for relief are being asserted, the Report's analysis is correct. Therefore, the Court adopts the Report's recommendation that those ostensible claims be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
Mr. Brown's second objection appears to be that the Magistrate Judge should not have recommended dismissal of his Petition for a Writ of Mandamus pursuant to Section 1361 because the EEOC's motion to dismiss sought to dismiss only substantive claims for violation of Title VII and the ADEA, which Mr. Brown claims he did not bring. (Doc. 19, pp. 1-2; Doc. 22, pp. 1-2). Mr. Brown alleges that the EEOC tried to amend its motion to dismiss after he responded to it by claiming that the case should be dismissed under Section 1361 as well. (Doc. 22, p. 1).
The Court is not persuaded by Mr. Brown's argument. Mr. Brown is correct that the EEOC originally sought to dismiss the Complaint (Doc. 3) for lack of subject matterjurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as to his purported claims for relief under Title VII and the ADEA. (Doc. 8). However, once Mr. Brown indicated in his opposition that he was seeking a writ of mandamus, the EEOC appropriately responded by explaining why the case should be dismissed in that regard as well. (Doc. 12). Therefore, the issue of whether Mr. Brown's Petition for a Writ of Mandamus pursuant to Section 1361 should be denied was properly before the Magistrate Judge. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge could sue sponte consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction even absent a proper motion.1 Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) ();2 Budrow v. Leffler, 86 Fed. App'x 899 (6th Cir. Jan. 30, 2004) (affirming the district court's sua sponte dismissal of the plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff did not assert a clear right to any nondiscretionary duty to act). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge did not err in considering the dismissal of Mr. Brown's Petition for a Writ of Mandamus in her Report. Mr. Brown's second objection is overruled.
Mr. Brown's third objection appears to be that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly concluded that he failed to demonstrate that the EEOC owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty. (Doc. 19, pp. 2-5). First, he complains that the EEOC did not comply with the requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14 by sending his employer a notice of his charge and did not investigate as it suggested it would in a letter dated September 26, 2011; instead, it dismissed his entire case and issued a right-to-sue letter on September 27, 2011. (Doc. 19, pp. 1-3). Mr. Brown alleges that evidence demonstrates he was deprived of any administrative remedy and that the EEOC failed to properly investigate claims of employment discrimination. (Doc. 19, p. 3). Second, he also appears to allege that the EEOC has a clear nondiscretionary duty to issue a subpoena under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) even after the employee has been issued a right-to-sue letter and has filed a private action against his employer. (Doc. 22, p. 3) (citing EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 558 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Mr. Brown's objections do not refute the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that he has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to mandamus relief. As the Report correctly states (Doc. 18, p. 2), the "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The Sixth Circuit has held that "[a] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy" and is "intended to provide a remedy only if the plaintiff has exhausted all other avenues of relief and the defendant owes the plaintiff a clear nondiscretionary duty." Willis v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 395 (6th...
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