Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 12 May 1915
• Docket Number: 69.
• Citation: 94 A. 523,126 Md. 175
• Parties: BROWN et al. v. FIDELITY TRUST CO. et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

94 A. 523

126 Md. 175

BROWN et al. v. FIDELITY TRUST CO. et al.

No. 69.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

May 12, 1915

Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; Walter I. Dawkins Judge.

Suit by John H. Brown and others against the Fidelity Trust Company and others. Decree for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

James W. Denny, of Baltimore, for appellants. Charles F. Stein, of Baltimore, for appellees.

BRISCOE J.

The bill of complaint, in this case was filed on the 20th day of April, 1914, in the circuit court of Baltimore city, by the appellants against the appellees, to vacate and set aside a deed of trust, dated the 18th day of October, 1911, from Martha E. Brown of Baltimore city to the Fidelity Trust Company, a body corporate, as trustee, the grantee in the deed. The grantor died on the 3d of April, 1914, intestate and without children, but leaving one sister and a number of nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters, as her next of kin and heirs at law. She was about 72 years of age, at the time of her death and had been married to John H. Brown, one of the appellants, her surviving husband, about 15 years. The bill is filed by the husband in his own right and as administrator of his wife's estate, by a surviving sister and by certain nephews and nieces of the intestate. The defendants are the Fidelity Trust Company, trustee, the grantee in the deed, and the beneficiaries named in the deed of trust.

The deed is assailed upon several grounds, and it is contended upon the part of the plaintiff that it should be declared void and set aside for the following reasons: First, because the grantor was, at the time of its execution and for several years prior thereto, mentally incapable of executing a valid deed or contract; second, because the deed was revoked in writing on the 2d day of April, 1912, in the lifetime of the grantor; third, because it is a testamentary instrument and inoperative as a deed; fourth, that the deed is void because in fraud of the rights of the husband, and a fraudulent attempt to defeat the legal rights of the husband, under the statute, in her personal estate, to evade the testamentary laws of the state and an attempt to defeat the collateral inheritance tax provided by law.

The property here involved and conveyed by the deed consists of stock and bond securities and cash money, amounting to about $33,550, and was to be held in trust for the uses and purposes and with the powers, set out in the deed. By the deed the property named therein is conveyed and assigned to the Fidelity Trust Company, its successors and assigns, to be held in trust, for certain purposes stated in the deed, and with the following powers, to wit:

"To collect the income or interest arising therefrom and from any other securities or property into which the same may be converted, and after the payment of all the expenses and costs incident to the administration and preservation of said trust estate, to pay over the entire net income to Martha E Brown, for and during the term of her natural life, in such amounts and as she may request from time to time. All undisbursed income in the hands of the trustee at the time of her death shall be added to and become a part of the corpus of the trust estate created. And from and immediately after her death the trustee shall pay out of the corpus of the trust estate, free and discharged from the trust the sum of one hundred dollars ($100) to the executor or administrator of her estate, for her funeral expenses and for the purpose of having her name engraved upon her tombstone immediately after her death, without, however, any responsibility on the part of the trustee of seeing to the application of the money."

Then after providing for several small specific legacies, the deed provides that the trustee shall continue to hold in trust all the rest, residue, and remainder of the trust estate for and during the life of John Hebb Brown, her husband, and shall pay over out of the net income therefrom the sum of $50 a month to him, accounting from the date of her death, for and during the term of his natural life. And from and immediately after his death the trustee shall continue to hold in trust the trust estate for and during the lives of Mrs. Cinderilla Walter, of Baltimore, a sister, and Charles Lynch, of Baltimore, a brother, and of the survivor of them; the trustee shall pay over out of the net income arising from the trust estate the sum of $50 a month to Cinderilla Waiter so long as she shall live, and shall pay over out of the net income arising from the trust estate the sum of $50 a month to Charles Lynch so long as he shall live. And upon and after the death of these the trustee is to pay over, transfer, and assign, clear and discharged from any trust, the corpus of the trust estate and the accrued income thereon, to certain persons and corporations named in the deed, as follows: The sum of $50 to Mrs. Ella Butler, of Baltimore city, a friend; the sum of $100 to Charles Jones, of Baltimore city, a nephew; the sum of $1,000 to the Baltimore Baptist Church Extension Society; the sum of $1,000 to the Baltimore City Missionary & Church Extension Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church; the sum of $1,000 to the Home for the Aged of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Baltimore City and to the Church Home and Infirmary of the City of Baltimore the entire balance and residue of the trust estate and property. It further appears, by the terms of the deed, that the trustee is given full power and authority to sell any of the investments held by it from time to time, without application to or order of any court, and without any responsibility on the part of the purchaser or purchasers to see to the application or reinvestment of the purchase money, and to invest the proceeds of sale as often and whenever in its judgment it is beneficial to the trust estate to do so, and is also given fall power and authority to invest in such stocks, securities, and properties as it may consider safe and proper, without application to or order of any court, to be held by it with all the powers and duties given to it by the deed of trust, with regard to the securities and cash granted and assigned. The grantor by the deed of trust reserved the right to revoke it at any time upon giving the trustee 30 days' written notice of her intention to revoke, and by executing at the office of the trustee in the city of Baltimore, under her hand and seal, attested by an officer of the trustee and acknowledged before a notary public, a written revocation of the deed of trust, and delivering to the trustee a receipt for the trust property returned to her.

We have thus set out somewhat at length the terms and provisions of the deed because, we think, the reasonable character of the provisions of the deed itself will reflect upon a proper conclusion, in the discussion and determination of the questions, in the case.

The first and main contention, on the part of the plaintiffs, who are seeking to vacate and set aside the deed here in controversy, relates to the mental capacity of the grantor, at the time of the execution of the deed, that is, whether she possessed sufficient mental capacity and was competent, at the time, to execute a valid deed or contract. The mental capacity which a testator or a grantor in a deed of this character is required to possess in order to make a valid will or deed has repeatedly been defined and announced by this court.

In Davis v. Denny, 94 Md. 392, 50 A. 1037, it is said the decisions in this court upon this subject have uniformly held, with slightly varying forms of expression, that...