Brown v. Fla. Dept. of Health
| Decision Date | 01 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:13cv462-RH/CAS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
| Parties | KARL ANDREW BROWN, Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA DEPT. OF HEALTH, Defendant. |
Four dispositive motions are pending in this case. The Department of Health filed a motion to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Karl Brown's tort claims for negligence, malfeasance, and perjury. Doc. 58. Mr. Brown was directed to file a response in opposition to that motion, doc. 59,1 and his response was filed on October 31, 2014. Doc. 72. That motion is ready for a ruling and is addressed herein.
Additionally, the Department filed a motion for partial summary judgment, doc. 69. The Department argues that Mr. Brown's employment discrimination claims should be dismissed because he did not first pursue arbitration as required by the IndependentContractor Agreement, id. at 2-5, he is not an employee for purposes of Title VII because of his status as an independent contractor, id. at 5-10, he cannot show a prima facia case of discrimination, Id. at 10-14, and there were legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for removing him as project manager. Id. at 14-16.2 Mr. Brown was advised of his obligation to response to that motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1. Doc. 74. His response in opposition was filed on December 1, 2014. Doc. 80.
Mr. Brown attempted to file his own motion for summary judgment in November 2014. Doc. 73. That motion was submitted after the deadline, was not supported by a statement of material facts, and did not reference any specific evidence with sufficient detail to permit the Court to locate and check the source. As a courtesy, Mr. Brown was given additional time in which to file an amended motion. Doc. 74.
He filed an amended summary judgment motion, doc. 86, on December 10, 2014, which also was not in compliance with the rules of this Court. Another Order was entered advising him of his obligation to comply with Rule 56 and Local Rule 56.1, explaining the deficiencies which had to be corrected, and giving Mr. Brown one final opportunity to submit a second amended motion for summary judgment. Doc. 89. That Order advised Mr. Brown that because a second Order had been issued to advise him to correct the same deficiencies, "no further opportunities [would] be extended" to correct those deficiencies. Id. Thereafter, Mr. Brown filed a second amended motion for summary judgment, doc. 92, with a statement of supporting facts, doc. 93, onJanuary 9, 2015. The Department filed its response in opposition to that motion, doc. 98, and an opposing statement of facts, doc. 97, on January 26, 2015. Both of the motions for summary judgment are ready for a ruling and are considered within this Report and Recommendation.
Finally, Mr. Brown filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on April 16, 2015. Doc. 105. No grounds are submitted to demonstrate that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate under Rule 12(c).3 The Department has argued in response that the pleadings are not closed because an answer has not been filed to the amended complaint.4 Doc. 110.
Mr. Brown's motion essentially seeks judgment in his favor based on the Rule 56 material evidence he submitted. Doc. 105. Indeed, Mr. Brown also filed a document entitled "Memoranda and Evidence to support the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment," doc. 106, on April 17, 2015. These documents reveal the basis for the motion for judgment on the pleadings is Mr. Brown's contention that his summary judgment is meritorious. Thus, because the motion for judgment on the pleadings, doc. 105, is duplicative of the summary judgment motion, it should be denied.
Allegations of the Amended Complaint, doc. 48
Mr. Brown alleged that he was employed by the Florida Department of Health from August 13, 2011, until March 29, 2012. Doc. 48 at 3. He contends he was discriminated against on the basis of his gender and race. Id. Mr. Brown asserted thathe was treated "unequally compared to white female employees of the same position." Id. at 4.
Mr. Brown also included the following allegations in his amended complaint: "Plaintiff amends original complaint to include allegations of Torts-Negligence-Malfeasance, by the Florida Department of Health." Doc. 48 at 5. "These actions were committed by Defendant, during Plaintiffs employment from August 2011-March 2012." Id. "Plaintiff amends original complaint to include allegations of Perjury, committed by the Florida Department of Health when testifying, under oath during investigations by the Florida Commission on Human Relations on or about 26 October 2012." Id.
Mr. Brown asserted that he filed charges with the E.E.O.C. prior to case initiation. Doc. 48 at 3. He attached a copy of the Dismissal and Notice of Rights received from the E.E.O.C. which was dated May 13, 2013. Id. at 7.
The issue on whether a complaint should be dismissed pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is whether the complaint alleges enough plausible facts to support the claim stated. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (retiring the standard from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127S.Ct. 1955).5 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 at 556); see also Speaker v. U.S. Dept. of Health, 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010). "The plausibility standard" is not the same as a "probability requirement," and "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 at 556). A complaint that "pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability," falls "short of the line between possibility and plausibility." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 at 557).
The pleading standard is not heightened, but flexible, in line with Rule 8's command to simply give fair notice to the defendant of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (). Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by an attorney. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). Nevertheless, a complaint must provide sufficient notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests so that a "largely groundless claim" does not proceed through discovery and "take up the time of a number of other people . . . ." Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577(2005) (quoted in Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1966). The requirements of Rule 8 do "not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, but Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' " Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S., at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
The Department of Health's motion to dismiss seeks to dismiss the state law tort claims. Doc. 58. The allegations within the complaint were conclusory only. Mr. Brown's complaint asserted only that he was including "allegations of Torts-Negligence-Malfeasance" and stated the actions were committed during his employment with the Defendant "from August 2011-March 2012." Doc. 48 at 5. There are, however, no supporting factual allegations to support a tort claim for negligence. The claims are bare, unsupported conclusion and are insufficient to state a claim.
Even if Mr. Brown had provided supporting factual allegations, the claims could still not go forward in this case because Mr. Brown did not comply with FLA. STAT. § 768.28. To proceed with a tort claim under § 768.28, Mr. Brown must have complied with the pre-suit requirements. The relevant statute provides:
An action may not be instituted on a claim against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions unless the claimant presents the claim in writing to the appropriate agency, and also, except as to any claim against a municipality or the Florida Space Authority, presents such claim in writing to the Department of Financial Services, within 3 years after such claimaccrues and the Department of Financial Services or the appropriate agency denies the claim in writing . . . .
FLA. STAT. § 768.28(6)(a). "Notice to the agency and written denial of the claim are 'conditions precedent to maintaining an action' against a state agency or subdivision." Smith v. Rainey, 747 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6)(b)). "Florida courts strictly construe this notice requirement and a plaintiff must allege in the complaint that he complied with the notice provisions of Section 768.28(6)." Smith, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 1337 (citing Levine v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 442 So.2d 210, 212-13 (Fla. 1983); see also Rumler v. Dep't of Corr., 546 F.Supp.2d 1334, 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Brown v. City of Miami Beach, 684 F.Supp. 1081, 1084 (S.D. Fla. 1988). Mr. Brown did not allege...
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