Brown v. Flowe, 110PA98.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
Citation507 S.E.2d 894
Docket NumberNo. 110PA98.,110PA98.
PartiesVickie Ann BROWN, Administratrix of the Estate for Mary Louise Brown v. Kenneth Michael FLOWE, M.D.
Decision Date31 December 1998

Faison & Gillespie by O. William Faison and John W. Jensen, Durham, for plaintiff-appellant.

Walker, Barwick, Clark & Allen, L.L.P. by Thomas E. Barwick, Goldsboro, for defendant-appellee.

WHICHARD, Justice.

This appeal arises from a medical malpractice action brought by Vickie Ann Brown, administratrix of the estate of Mary Louise Brown, against defendant Dr. Kenneth Flowe, a Pitt County Memorial Hospital emergency-room physician. Defendant and a medical resident performed surgery on the decedent, Mary Louise Brown, at Pitt County Memorial Hospital. Brown died while undergoing the surgery. Prior to filing suit, plaintiff entered a settlement agreement with the medical resident and the hospital, releasing them from liability in consideration of the payment of $178,486.76. On 15 July 1994 plaintiff filed the present action against defendant. The matter was tried before a jury at the 12 August 1996 Civil Session of Superior Court, Pitt County, and the jury returned a verdict finding defendant negligent and awarding compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 24-5(b), the trial court applied prejudgment interest at the legal rate of eight percent to the jury's verdict, resulting in a compensatory damages award of $293,013.70. A portion of the award, $71,513.24, was to bear post-judgment interest as well. The trial court allowed plaintiff's motion to tax costs to defendant in the amount of $42,104.44. Aggregating these numbers, the court entered a judgment in the amount of $335,115.14, to which it credited the settlement amount of $178,486.76. The trial court then ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $156,628.38.

Defendant appealed, assigning error, inter alia, to this method of calculating prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and held that "the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff prejudgment interest on the full amount of the verdict, and we remand the case for prejudgment interest to be assessed after applying a credit in the amount of the $178,486.76 settlement to the verdict." Brown v. Flowe, 128 N.C.App. 668, 674, 496 S.E.2d 830, 834 (1998). On 8 July 1998 this Court allowed plaintiff's petition for discretionary review. The question presented is how to reduce a claim against a nonsettling tort-feasor under N.C.G.S. § 1B-4 when prejudgment interest under N.C.G.S. § 24-5(b) applies.

Two statutes interact in this situation. First, N.C.G.S. § 24-5(b) provides:

(b) Other Actions.—In an action other than contract, the portion of money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest from the date the action is instituted until the judgment is satisfied. Interest on an award in an action other than contract shall be at the legal rate.

N.C.G.S. § 24-5(b) (1991) (emphasis added). Second, N.C.G.S. § 1B-4 provides, in pertinent part:

[A] release or a covenant not to sue ... given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
(1) ... reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and,
(2) It discharges the tort-feasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tort-feasor.

N.C.G.S. § 1B-4 (1983) (emphasis added).

"Legislative intent controls the meaning of a statute." Shelton v. Morehead Mem'l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 81, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986). To determine legislative intent, a court must analyze the statute as a whole, considering the chosen words themselves, the spirit of the act, and the objectives the statute seeks to accomplish. See id. at 81-82, 347 S.E.2d at 828. First among these considerations, however, is the plain meaning of the words chosen by the legislature; if they are clear and unambiguous within the context of the statute, they are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings. Hyler v. GTE Prods. Co., 333 N.C. 258, 262, 425 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1993). The Court's analysis therefore properly begins with the words themselves. Correll v. Division of Soc. Servs., 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992).

This Court previously has determined "judgment" to be unambiguous and has given that word its plain meaning when interpreting N.C.G.S. § 97-10.2 and Rule 68 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. We held that "judgment" indicates the final amount of money due to the plaintiff, consisting of the verdict, costs, fees, and interest. See Hieb v. Lowery, 344 N.C. 403, 410, 474 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1996)

; Poole v. Miller, 342 N.C. 349, 352-53, 464 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1995). A judgment is rendered by the court and is therefore a judicial act, in contrast to a verdict that is rendered by a jury. Hieb, 344 N.C. at 410,

474 S.E.2d at 327; Poole, 342 N.C. at 352,

464 S.E.2d at 411. Therefore, the judgment was the final verdict, $250,000, plus costs, fees, and interest, for a total of $335,115.14.

Under section 24-5, the "portion of money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest." N.C.G.S. § 24-5(b). The jury found $250,000 to be "damages ... the estate of Mary Louise Brown, Vickie Brown, Administratrix, [was] entitled to recover by reason of the injury to and death of Mary Louise Brown." Therefore, the trial court properly calculated interest, from the date the action was instituted, on $250,000, the portion of the judgment which the jury found to be compensatory damages. There is no indication in the statute that the compensatory portion minus settlements bears interest; rather, the statute says simply that the "compensatory damages" portion of the judgment bears interest. Id. The statutory language is clear, and this Court therefore must not engage in judicial construction. Poole, 342 N.C. at 351, 464 S.E.2d at 410.

We must, though, determine the application of section 1B-4 to section 24-5. The release at issue was executed before this suit was filed. The hospital and the surgical resident paid $178,486.76 to plaintiff in return for being released from liability for plaintiff's decedent's injury and death. This release "reduces the claim against the others" by the amount of the payment. N.C.G.S. § 1B-4.

While "judgment" as used in section 24-5 has a plain meaning under the decisions of this Court, "claim" as used in section 1B-4 does not. The section itself is silent as to when or how to reduce the "claim" against the remaining tort-feasors, and this Court has not previously decided when or how to reduce a claim under section 1B-4 when prejudgment interest under section 24-5 applies.

"[W]here a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction must be used to ascertain the legislative will. The primary rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest extent." Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (1990) (citation omitted). A question of statutory interpretation is ultimately a question of law for the courts. See Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 642, 256 S.E.2d 692, 696 (1979)

. Although sections 1B-4 and 24-5 both apply in tort actions, they neither refer to each other nor use the same terminology. When multiple statutes address a single subject, this Court construes them in pari materia to determine and effectuate the legislative intent. See Board of Adjust. v. Town of Swansboro, 334 N.C. 421, 427, 432 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1993). Our task is to give effect, if possible, to all sections of each statute and to harmonize them into one law on the subject. See Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180-81, 261 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1980). We have held that the probable intent of the prejudgment interest statute, section 24-5, is threefold: (1) to compensate plaintiffs for loss of the use of their money, (2) to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant by having money he should not have, and (3) to promote settlement. See Powe v. Odell, 312 N.C. 410, 413, 322 S.E.2d 762, 764 (1984) (interpreting the 1983 version of section 24-5). We now must decide what method of calculation best implements the provisions of each statute as well as effectuates the legislative intent.

Both parties cite case law assertedly consistent with their respective positions. In support of her contention that the settlement sum should be subtracted after the prejudgment interest is calculated, plaintiff notes two cases from this Court decided before the prejudgment-interest statute was enacted. First, this Court has said that the amount paid for a covenant not to sue is "a credit to be entered on the total recovery." Slade v. Sherrod, 175 N.C. 346, 348, 95 S.E. 557, 558 (1918). Later, the Court stated that "the weight of both authority and reason is ... that any amount paid by anybody, whether they be joint tort-feasors or otherwise, for and on account of any injury or damage[,] should be held for a credit on the total recovery in any action for the same injury or damage." Holland v. Southern Pub. Utils. Co., 208 N.C. 289, 292, 180 S.E. 592, 593-94 (1935). Plaintiff also cites a decision in which the Court of Appeals held that a defendant "was entitled to a credit against the judgment in the amount of $2,000, the sum paid by the `joint-tort-feasor.'" Ryder v. Benfield, 43 N.C.App. 278, 287, 258 S.E.2d 849, 855 (1979). None of these cases, however, deal with the issue of prejudgment interest and the interaction between sections 24-5(b) and 1B-4.

One case plaintiff cites seems to use "total recovery" and "verdict" interchangeably. See Ryals v. Hall-Lane Moving & Storage Co., 122 N.C.App. 134, 468 S.E.2d 69 (1996)

. In Ryals the trial court reduced a $25,000 jury verdict to $15,000 because of a...

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