Brown v. Fluellen

• Decision Date: 29 September 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-00010-SDG
• Citation: 564 F.Supp.3d 1308
• Parties: Marlon BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Patrick David FLUELLEN, in his individual capacity; and Sheriff Victor Hill, in his official capacity as sheriff for Clayton County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

564 F.Supp.3d 1308

Marlon BROWN, Plaintiff,

v.Patrick David FLUELLEN, in his individual capacity; and Sheriff Victor Hill, in his official capacity as sheriff for Clayton County, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-00010-SDG

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Signed September 29, 2021

Harry Martina Daniels, Khalil Corey Eaddy, Daniels and James Law Office, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Arash A. Sabzevari, Jack Reynolds Hancock, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Forest Park, GA, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Steven D. Grimberg, United States District Court Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Patrick David Fluellen and Sheriff Victor Hill's motion to dismiss [ECF 5]. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is DENIED with respect to the claims against Defendant Fluellen and GRANTED with respect to the claims against Sheriff Hill.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

The following facts are accepted as true for purposes of this Order.¹ On June 16, 2017, the Clayton County Sheriff's Office (CCSO) transported Plaintiff Marlon Brown from the county jail to the county courthouse for a scheduled hearing.² After several hours at the courthouse, Brown was notified that a judge would not see him that day.³ Fluellen instructed Brown to walk toward the elevators so that he could return to the jail.⁴ As Brown began to enter the elevator with his hands cuffed and shackles around his ankles, Fluellen lifted Brown from behind and threw him into the steel elevator.⁵ Brown's face hit the back wall of the elevator and he fell to the floor.⁶ Brown was later transported to the medical unit of the courthouse for treatment.⁷ Brown sustained injuries to his face, lips, ankles, wrists, and complained of back and neck pain; he also chipped or cracked several teeth.⁸

Fluellen later completed an incident report.⁹ The report stated that Brown fell because he tripped over the elevator threshold.¹⁰ Subsequently, Sheriff Hill concluded that Fluellen's conduct did not violate CCSO policy or procedure.¹¹ Sometime later, however, video surveillance of the incident "went viral" on social media and Sheriff Hill placed Fluellen on administrative leave.¹² Fluellen was eventually charged with two felonies for the incident: Aggravated Battery and Violation of Oath of Office.¹³

B. Procedural History

On October 2, 2020, Brown initiated this action in the State Court of Clayton County.¹⁴ Brown filed a First Amended Complaint (the Complaint) on December 5.¹⁵ On January 4, 2021, Defendants timely removed.¹⁶ Sheriff Hill is sued in his official capacity and Fluellen is sued in his individual capacity.¹⁷ Brown asserts a claim against Fluellen under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the alleged use of excessive force.¹⁸ Brown also asserts multiple causes of action under Georgia law against Fluellen: battery,¹⁹ assault,²⁰ intentional infliction of emotional distress,²¹ and cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Georgia Constitution.²² Brown seeks to hold Sheriff Hill liable for each of these state-law claims under a theory of respondeat superior.²³ Brown also asserts that Sheriff Hill is liable for negligent retention.²⁴ Brown seeks damages, as well as attorneys’ fees and interest.²⁵

On January 11, 2021, Defendants moved to dismiss.²⁶ Fluellen argues that Brown's Section 1983 claim is barred by qualified immunity and the state law claims are barred by official immunity.²⁷ Sheriff Hill argues that the claims against him are barred by sovereign immunity.²⁸ Defendants also assert that certain of Brown's state-law causes of action fail to state a claim.²⁹

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While this standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," the Supreme Court has held that "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must [ ] contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp. , 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A complaint is plausible on its face when a plaintiff pleads sufficient factual content for the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Am. Dental Ass'n , 605 F.3d at 1289 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

At the motion to dismiss stage, "all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."

FindWhat Inv'r Grp. v. FindWhat.com , 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp. , 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) ). The Court does not, however, accept legal conclusions as true. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Brown's Section 1983 Claim

The Complaint alleges that Fluellen violated Brown's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.³⁰ The statute itself creates no substantive rights. Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 140, 144 n.3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). Rather, it provides a "method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes." Id. Brown alleges Fluellen's conduct constituted excessive force in violation of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.³¹

1. Video Evidence

Before assessing whether the Complaint states a plausible Section 1983 claim, the Court must determine whether it can properly consider surveillance video of the incident. The Complaint refers to the video, and the video was included as an exhibit to the Complaint when it was filed in state court.³² Defendants object to the Court's consideration of this evidence, asserting (incorrectly) that it was not actually attached to the Complaint and falls outside the pleadings.³³ Although the video was not included in the record when Defendants removed the action, the video is referenced in the Complaint and cited as an exhibit therein.³⁴ Brown also manually filed a copy of the video with his opposition to the motion to dismiss in this Court.³⁵

This Court has discretion to consider the video on a motion to dismiss. Hi-Tech Pharm., Inc. v. HBS Int'l Corp. , 910 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 2018) ("[W]e may also consider documents attached to the motion to dismiss if they are referred to in the complaint, central to the plaintiff's claim, and of undisputed authenticity.") (citations omitted); Adamson v. Poorter , No. 06-15941, 2007 WL 2900576, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 4, 2007) ("[A] document attached to the pleadings as an exhibit may be considered if it is central to the plaintiff's claim and the authenticity of the document is not challenged.") (citations omitted).

This case is similar to Cantrell v. McClure , in which another judge from this district considered allegations of excessive force on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. No. 2:17-cv-141-RWS, 2018 WL 11170098, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2018). Dash camera videos captured the incident between the plaintiff and the defendant officer. Id. The court held that it was proper to consider the videos "in deciding the motion because [they] are referenced in Plaintiff's Complaint, their content is undisputed, and [they] are a matter of public record." Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, the court explained that, if "the record includes a video which the parties concede is authentic and accurate ... the court views ‘allegations of the complaint as true only to the extent that they are not contradicted by video evidence.’ " Id. (quoting Kass v. City of New York , 864 F.3d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 2017) ).

The record here is devoid of any indication that Defendants question the authenticity or accuracy of the video.³⁶ Even if the video was not physically attached to the Complaint, it was referred to therein and is central to Brown's claim. Moreover, the video appears to qualify as a public record since it is from a surveillance camera in the Clayton County Courthouse elevator.³⁷ O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(b)(2) ("Public record means ... tapes ... prepared and maintained ... on behalf of an agency...."). The Court therefore concludes that the video can appropriately be considered in ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Regardless, the Court concludes that the survival of Brown's claims does not depend on consideration of the video.

2. Pretrial Detention

Defendants argue that Brown cannot state a claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because he did not allege that he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident. Since, according to Defendants, Brown was an inmate and only the Eighth Amendment can apply to excessive force claims by inmates, Brown's Section 1983 cause of action as alleged must fail.³⁸ This Circuit recognizes that

[c]laims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which applies to such claims by convicted prisoners. However, the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison inmates applies equally to cases involving arrestees or pretrial detainees .

Cottrell v. Caldwell , 85 F.3d 1480, 1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (concerning application of qualified immunity and necessity of establishing violation of a constitutional right in the first instance). See also Brown v. Acting Dir....