Brown v. Freeman
| Decision Date | 28 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:15-cv-0712,3:15-cv-0712 |
| Parties | CYNTOIA DENISE BROWN Petitioner, v. VICKI FREEMAN, Warden Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
The petitioner is an inmate at the Tennessee Prison for Women in Nashville. Through counsel, she brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 against Vicki Freeman, Warden of the facility, seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
On August 25, 2006, a jury in Davidson County found the petitioner guilty of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Docket Entry No. 14-16 at pg. 97. Because the murder convictions involved a single killing, the trial court merged the murder convictions. Id. at pg. 99. For her crimes, the petitioner received a life sentence for murder along with a concurrent sentence of twenty (20) years for especially aggravated robbery. Docket Entry No. 2 at pgs. 39-44.
On direct appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the murder conviction and sentence. However, the petitioner had been charged with aggravated robbery rather than especially aggravated robbery. As a result, the case was remanded back to the trial court "for entry of a judgment of conviction for aggravated robbery and a sentencing hearing as to that offense." Docket Entry No. 14-23.
On remand, the petitioner received a sentence of eight years in prison for aggravated robbery. Docket Entry No. 14-26 at pg. 57. The Tennessee Supreme Court later denied the petitioner's Rule 11 application for further review. Docket Entry No. 14-25.
In August, 2010, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for state post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. Docket Entry No. 14-26 at pgs. 58-78. Following the appointment of counsel, an amendment of the petition and an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petitioner post-conviction relief. Docket Entry No. 1-1. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Docket Entry No. 14-35. Once again, the Tennessee Supreme Court denied petitioner's Rule 11 application for additional review. Docket Entry No. 14-39.
On June 26, 2015, the petitioner initiated this action with the filing of a petition (Docket Entry No. 1) for writ of habeas corpus. Upon its receipt, the Court reviewed the petition and determined that the petitioner had stated a colorable claim for relief. Rule 4, Rules - - - § 2254 Cases. Accordingly, the respondent was directed to file an answer, plead or otherwise respond to the petition. Docket Entry No. 10.
Before the respondent could file an answer, counsel for petitioner filed an amended habeas corpus petition. Docket Entry No. 13. The petition, as amended, contains twelve (12) claims for relief. These claims include :
Presently before the Court is the respondent's Answer (Docket Entry No. 15) to the amended petition, to which the petitioner has offered no reply.
Having carefully considered the amended petition, respondent's Answer and the expanded record, it appears that an evidentiary hearing is not needed in this matter. See Schriro v. Landrigan,550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). Therefore, the Court shall dispose of the petition as the law and justice require. Rule 8(a), Rules - - - § 2254 Cases.
The petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred when it failed to consider her claim for coram nobis relief (Claim No. 7).
A state is not constitutionally required to provide convicted felons with a means by which they can collaterally attack their convictions. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1994 (1987). Thus, a federal writ of habeas corpus will not issue when the petitioner is merely challenging errors or deficiencies related to a state post-conviction proceeding. Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986).
In this instance, any alleged error that occurred during petitioner's post-conviction proceedings does not implicate a constitutional violation that led to her convictions. Therefore, this claim is not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action.
The petitioner alleges as a free-standing claim that she is actually innocent of the crimes (Claim No. 3) despite the fact that she has never denied shooting the victim. Docket Entry No. 13 at pg. 9.
In order to sustain a claim for federal habeas corpus relief, the petitioner must set forth factual allegations suggesting that the fact or duration of her incarceration is in some way constitutionally defective. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Koontz v. Glossa, 731 F.2d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1984).
"A claim of actual innocence is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gatewaythrough which a habeas petitioner must pass to have an otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,404 (1993). Thus, a free-standing claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Id. at 506 U.S. 400; Cress v. Palmer, 484 F.3d 844,854-55 (6th Cir.2007).
C.) Procedurally Defaulted Claims
A federal district court will not entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has first exhausted all available state court remedies for each claim in her petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
While exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement, it is a strictly enforced doctrine which promotes comity between the states and federal government by giving the state an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Consequently, as a condition precedent to seeking federal habeas corpus relief, the petitioner is required to fairly present her federal claims to every available level of the state court system. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-20 (1982); Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 331 (6th Cir.1999). The petitioner must offer the state courts both the factual and legal bases for her claims. Hicks v. Straub, 377 F.3d 538, 552 (6th Cir.2004). In other words, the petitioner must present "the same claim under the same theory" to the state courts. Id. It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support a federal claim were before the court or that the petitioner made a somewhat similar state law claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982).
Once petitioner's federal claims have been raised in the highest state court available, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied, even if that court refused to consider the claims. Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d 878, 883 (6th Cir. 1990). In Tennessee, a petitioner need only take her claimsto the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in order to fully exhaust available state court remedies. Rule 39, Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rules; see also Adams v. Holland, 324 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 2003).
Five of the petitioner's claims have never been raised in the state courts for consideration during either direct appeal (Docket Entry No. 14-21) or during post-conviction proceedings (Docket Entry No. 14-32). These claims include the ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failure to present evidence of petitioner's sexual, emotional and physical abuse (Claim No. 1c); counsels' failure to retain a mental health expert qualified to conduct an adequate forensic evaluation (Claim No. 1e); counsels' failure to include all relevant issues for appellate review (Claim No. 1f); the legality of the reasonable doubt instruction to the jury (Claim No. 5); and appellate counsel's failure to challenge the reasonable doubt instruction (Claim No. 4).
Unfortunately, at this late date, it appears that the petitioner is no longer able to raise these claims in the state courts. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a) and (c). Therefore, by way of procedural default, the petitioner has technically met the exhaustion requirement with respect to these particular claims. Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 2002)(if an unexhausted claim would be procedurally barred under state law, that claim is procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas corpus review).
The exhaustion of a claim via procedural default does not, however, automatically entitle a habeas petitioner to federal review of that claim. To prevent a federal habeas petitioner from circumventing the exhaustion requirement in such a manner, the Supreme Court has held that a petitioner who fails to comply with state rules of procedure governing...
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