Brown v. General Motors Corp.
Decision Date | 25 March 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-C-0862-S.,92-C-0862-S. |
Parties | Richard A. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
Kristen E. Falk, Hart and Falk, Edgerton, WI, for plaintiff.
Susan R. Maisa, Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, WI, for defendant.
Plaintiff Richard A. Brown commenced this action for monetary and declaratory relief in Circuit Court for Rock County, Wisconsin, for a determination that defendant General Motors Corporation is barred by plaintiff's bankruptcy discharge from recovering past benefit overpayments from his future pension benefits. The case was removed to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1331 based upon questions of bankruptcy and ERISA law.
The matter is presently before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Because the parties agree there are no genuine issues of material fact resolution on summary judgment is appropriate.
The following is a summary of the relevant undisputed facts.
The plaintiff is a former employee of defendant and a participant in the General Motors Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan. The Pension Plan is administered by a Board of Administration, which Board is authorized to create rules and procedures for administering the plan.
On November 1, 1989, plaintiff retired and became entitled to receive a monthly "basic" benefit and a monthly "temporary" benefit. The basic benefit was payable to the plaintiff for the remainder of his life. The temporary benefit was payable until plaintiff reached the age of 62 or until plaintiff became
The Plan further provides as follows:
If an employe is eligible for a Federal Social Security benefit for disability or an unreduced Federal Social Security benefit for age at the time of retirement or thereafter, such employe shall provide the corporation with evidence of the effective date of the entitlement to such benefit.
On August 1, 1990, plaintiff became entitled to a social security disability benefit and has been receiving the benefit ever since. Plaintiff did not advise the defendant or the Plan of his receipt of social security disability benefits. Plaintiff received both the social security disability benefits and the temporary benefit under the Pension Plan through May, 1992.
Pursuant to authority under the Plan, the Plan's Board of Administration adopted rules and regulations including the following:
This provision has been applied to overpayments which result from a failure to advise the Plan of a social security disability insurance benefit.
Prior to his retirement, plaintiff executed form HRP-11A which provided in relevant part:
In March of 1992 the Plan learned that plaintiff was receiving social security disability benefits. On June 1, 1992 the Plan discontinued payment of the temporary benefits and reduced by 50 percent the basic benefit to recover the previous overpayment. In April of 1992 plaintiff filed a bankruptcy petition listing the defendant as a creditor and the overpayment as a claim. On July 23, 1992 plaintiff received a Chapter 7 discharge.
MEMORANDUMPlaintiff now seeks to recover those benefits which were withheld from his basic benefit and to prohibit the defendant from reducing his benefits in the future on the grounds that such actions are precluded by the bankruptcy discharge. Defendant pursues two principle arguments in defense. First, defendant asserts that the notice in bankruptcy was ineffective because the plaintiff improperly gave notice to it rather than the GM Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan, which was the proper party. Second, defendant argues that recovery of overpaid pension funds is being accomplished under the doctrine of recoupment which is unaffected by the bankruptcy discharge. Because the court agrees with the second argument advanced by the defendant, it does not address the sufficiency of the notice.
Recoupment is an equitable defense which enables a defendant to reduce liability on a plaintiff's claim by asserting an obligation of the plaintiff which arose out of the same transaction. In re Holford, 896 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.1990). Recoupment is only a challenge to the validity and extent of the plaintiff's claim, and no affirmative recovery is permitted. In re Rooster, Inc., 127 B.R. 560, 569 (Bankr. E.D.Pa.1991), 20 Am.Jur.2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff, § 11 (1965).
Because of its unique nature as a limited equitable defense the right of recoupment does not constitute a claim within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) which defines a claim as follows:
Since the right of recoupment carries with it no right to payment, it is not a claim. See Mullen v. United States, 696 F.2d 470, 472 (6th Cir.1983). It naturally follows that the potential assertion of recoupment against a claim by the debtor does not...
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