Brown v. Glover
| Decision Date | 14 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 990373.,990373. |
| Citation | 16 P.3d 540,2000 UT 89 |
| Parties | Catherine BROWN, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. Chris GLOVER dba Chick-Fil-A of Fashion Place, and Hahn Property Management Corporation, a California corporation dba Hahn Company, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
George T. Waddoups, Nancy A. Mismash, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
John R. Lund, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
¶ 1 On writ of certiorari, Catherine Brown seeks review of the Utah Court of Appeals' memorandum decision. Brown argues that the court of appeals erred by denying oral argument and declining to address the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chris Glover dba Chick-Fil-A of Fashion Place ("Chick-Fil-A") and Hahn Property Management Corporation ("Hahn") (jointly known as "defendants"). Brown also argues that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Brown's request to stay the summary judgment decision and in ruling that the trial court did not prematurely grant summary judgment in light of Brown's motions to continue trial and vacate the scheduling order.
¶ 2 Brown alleged that she was injured on January 18, 1994, when she slipped and fell after allegedly stepping on a piece of chicken on a walkway of the Fashion Place mall in Murray, Utah. She claimed that the chicken had been dropped as a result of Chick-Fil-A's alleged negligence in its sample give-away program.
¶ 3 Brown originally filed her complaint on August 17, 1995, against Chick-Fil-A's parent company in Georgia as well as against Hahn, the property manager for Fashion Place. Brown's complaint and first requests for discovery were served on the Utah agents for these companies on October 23, 1995. On February 6, 1996, Brown amended her original complaint to reflect that Chris Glover1 dba Chick-Fil-A had been substituted for the parent company, which had been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.
¶ 4 On April 3, Brown sent a letter to defendants requesting the names of the Chick-Fil-A manager and the Fashion Place manager so she could serve notice for depositions. Brown also served a copy of her first requests for discovery on Chick-Fil-A on August 26, 1996, and served a second copy on Hahn at that time. Among the interrogatories served on Chick-Fil-A was a request for the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of employees working on the date of the accident. Meanwhile, Brown and Glover were each deposed.
¶ 5 Brown's attorneys allege that this case was transferred from the original attorney, Waddoups, to another attorney within their office in June 1996 due to health issues within Waddoups's family. However, the attorney who took the case from Waddoups withdrew on December 4, 1996, and was allegedly later disbarred for unrelated reasons. Accordingly, on December 2, Gray entered his appearance for Brown. In addition, Mismash entered her appearance for Brown on March 27, 1997. The original attorney, Waddoups, allegedly returned to the case in April 1997.
¶ 6 After an October 30 scheduling hearing, the trial court ordered that defendants' witness list be disclosed by February 3, 1997, discovery be completed by March 14, and dispositive motions be filed by March 31. A four-day trial was set for June 3.
¶ 7 On December 3, 1996, Brown sent a letter to defendants requesting responses to her discovery requests served on August 26, 1996. Thereafter, defendants filed their witness list on February 13, 1997. Hahn filed answers to Brown's interrogatories on February 24. Chick-Fil-A filed responses to Brown's request for documents on February 24 and answers to Brown's interrogatories on March 24. Chick-Fil-A's February 24 and March 24 answers both included a list of employees scheduled to work on the date of the accident, but no addresses or phone numbers were supplied.
¶ 8 The parties had previously stipulated to extending discovery until April 14, 1997. However, the dispositive motion cut-off date remained March 31. Accordingly, Chick-Fil-A moved for summary judgment on March 31. Thereafter, on April 14, Brown moved to compel discovery, continue the trial, and vacate the scheduling order. In addition, she served twenty-six notices of deposition for individuals and a notice of rule 30(b)(6)2 deposition for Hahn, all to be deposed the end of May. On April 21, Brown filed her response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment along with a rule 56(f)3 motion to stay decision of the summary judgment. The rule 56(f) motion included an affidavit providing reasons for the continuance and facts anticipated to be discovered.
¶ 9 The trial court scheduled May 5 to hear all the motions before it. At the hearing, the trial court first heard argument on whether more time should be allowed for discovery and whether the trial should therefore be continued. Brown was represented by Waddoups and Mismash. Gray was not present. Brown's arguments were based on her contentions that (1) defendants had not cooperated in discovery, and (2) Waddoups had another trial set for the scheduled date. The trial court, dissatisfied with Brown's arguments and commenting on the lack of diligence shown in pursuing the case, wanted to hear the summary judgment arguments before ruling.
¶ 10 After argument on the merits of the summary judgment motion, the trial court ruled:
The trial court did not address Brown's motion to compel.
¶ 11 Brown appealed,4 claiming the following errors: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion for continuance; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by rendering a decision on defendants' motion for summary judgment in light of plaintiff's pending discovery motions; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff's rule 56(f) motion to continue; and (4) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in a negligence action when plaintiff needed more time for discovery to advance the theory of her case.
¶ 12 Chick-Fil-A responded by arguing that Brown's motions to compel and continue were not properly before the court of appeals for review and further argued that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the rule 56(f) motion. In addition, Chick-Fil-A argued the merits of the summary judgment motion. In her reply brief, Brown responded to Chick-Fil-A's arguments.
¶ 13 The court of appeals declined to hear oral argument and issued a memorandum decision. In its decision, the court stated that because Brown's initial brief did not "substantively examine" the summary judgment issue, the court declined to address the issue. The court then affirmed the trial court's denial of the rule 56(f) motion and the grant of summary judgment in light of the pending discovery motions. Thereafter, Brown petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.
¶ 14 On certiorari to this court, Brown argues that (1) the court of appeals violated the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Utah Constitution by denying oral argument; (2) the court of appeals erred in refusing to address the merits of the summary judgment motion because it had been fully briefed between Chick-Fil-A's response and Brown's reply; (3) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets; (4) summary judgment was prematurely granted in a negligence case that was not clear-cut; (5) the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Brown's rule 56(f) motion; (6) the court of appeals erroneously interpreted and applied the discovery rules; and (7) Brown's exigent circumstances warranted a continuance.
¶ 15 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial court." Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, ¶ 15, 7 P.3d 783. Furthermore, the interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness. See Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, ¶ 5, 989 P.2d 1073
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¶ 16 Brown contends that in order to effectively ensure the right of appeal provided by the Utah Constitution, oral argument should be allowed in all cases. She also argues that because the court of appeals did not specifically state its reason for denying oral argument, its denial was not warranted under the rules of appellate procedure and she was thus denied her right of appeal. Chick-Fil-A counters that neither the Utah Constitution nor the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require oral argument to guarantee the right of appeal.
¶ 17 The Utah Constitution provides that "there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause." Utah Const. art. VIII, § 5. In addition, the rules of appellate...
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