Brown v. Godbee

• Docket Number: 23-12784
• Decision Date: 05 April 2024
• Parties: ALVIN EARL BROWN, Plaintiff, v. RALPH GODBEE, DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT, DETROIT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, and PAUL STEWART, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

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ALVIN EARL BROWN, Plaintiff, v. RALPH GODBEE, DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT, DETROIT POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, and PAUL STEWART, Defendants.

No. 23-12784

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

April 5, 2024

Linda V. Parker, United States District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (ECF NO. 15) AND MOTION TO

DISMISS (ECF NO. 18)

CURTIS IVY, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I.PROCEDURAL HISTORY

PlaintiffAlvin Earl Brown filed this pro se complaint on November 1, 2023.(ECF No. 1).DefendantsDetroit Police Department(“DPD”) and Ralph Godbee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on December 4, 2023, and Plaintiff responded.(ECF No. 15, 23).DefendantDetroit Police Officers Association(“DPOA”) then filed a motion to dismiss on December 18, 2023.(ECF No. 18).The motion is fully briefed.(ECF Nos. 24, 26, 27).

This matter was referred to the undersigned for all pretrial matters.(ECF No. 5).

For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to dismiss be granted.

II.BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was a patrol officer in the Detroit Police Department for 13 years.(ECF No. 1, PageID.7).He suffered from “one of several believed stress-related injuries/illnesses” while on duty on May 15, 2000.(Id.).He went to Cottage Hospital, the department clinic, for treatment, and was treated for headaches and high blood pressure and was diagnosed with depression and dysthemia.(Id. at PageID.9).He was placed on medical leave for 21 days.(Id. at PageID.7).On June 5, 2000, after 21 days, he returned to work and applied for disability based on depression from his “job-related circumstances.”(Id.).

On June 6, 2000, Plaintiff suffered from a second episode of depression.(Id. at PageID.9).He was assigned a shift as a beat officer even though his department seniority was much higher than other officers on that shift.(Id.).Lieutenant McIsaac told him “I don't like you” and assigned the shift.(Id.).Plaintiff filed a grievance against Lieutenant McIsaac.(Id.).

On September 25, 2000, Plaintiff applied for duty-related disability benefits.(Id. at PageID.10).He received notice of denial of his request on November 5, 2009, and was told he was “not capable of returning to full duty.”(Id.).Plaintiff appealed the decision on November 13, demanding to be removed from disability leave and returned to full duty.(Id.).A panel of department professionals said Plaintiff's “suffering is not such that it relates to his duty as a police officer or makes him incapacitated to work.”(Id. at PageID.7-8).On January 7, 2010, the Police and Fire System Executive Secretary, Walter Stampor, told Plaintiffhe was not disabled to be considered incapacitated from his duties and that he should “contact Police Personnel Immediately to make the necessary arrangement for your re-employment.”(Id. at PageID.10).This letter was also sent to then-current Chief of Police of the City of Detroit, Warren Evans.(Id. at PageID.11).The board of trustees removed Plaintiff from the disability payroll and directed he be returned to work.(Id.).

Ralph Godbee, Jr. replaced Evans as the new chief of Police.(Id.).On August 11, 2010, Plaintiff received a notice from Godbee which stated his request for reappointment had been denied based in part on his “employment and financial histories.”(Id.).The decision could not be appealed.(Id.).

Plaintiff contacted DPOA on February 11, 2011 for “an issuance of a grievance to appeal the unjust termination from the police department.”(Id. at PageID.11-12).At the time, DPOA Vice President Paul Stewart was under criminal indictment and was arrested.(Id.).DPOA president, Marty Bandemer was also referenced in the indictment, though he was not charged.(ECF No. 1, PageID.12).The union did not represent Plaintiff or file an appeal.(Id.).

On the final page of his civil cover sheet, Plaintiff selected Americans with Disabilities Act42 U.S.C. § 12112-12117(“ADA”) as the basis for jurisdiction.(Id. at PageID.3).He also brings an apparent breach of duty of fair representation claim against the DPOA.

In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, DPD and Ralph Godbee argue Plaintiff did not exhaust his exhaustive administrative remedies before the lawsuit, that his claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and that he failed to state a claim.(ECF No. 15).In its motion to dismiss, DPOA argues Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief because the complaint lacks allegations that the DPOA helped decide the alleged adverse employment actions or that it did not satisfy its statutory duty of fair representation, that Plaintiff's claim is time-barred and that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.(ECF No. 18).

III.ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Because many of the parties' arguments are substantially the same, both motions will be considered together.

A.Governing Standards

The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is substantially the same as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b).SeeKottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 689(6th Cir.2006)(citations omitted).

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.”Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608(6th Cir.2012).“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009)(internal quotation omitted);see alsoBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555(2007)(concluding that a plausible claim need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”).Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.“The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct.”16630 Southfield Ltd., P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503(6th Cir.2013).

A complaint must contain “‘either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'”Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436(6th Cir.1998)(internal citations omitted).To state a prima facie claim under the ADA, Plaintiff must show that “(1)[he] has a disability; (2)[he] is otherwise qualified; and (3)[he] was being excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination under the program because of [his] disability.”Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 357(6th Cir.2015).

B.Administrative Remedies and Statute of Limitations

All Defendants argue Plaintiff's ADA claims are time barred and that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.(ECF Nos. 15, 18).DPOA also argues Plaintiff's fair representation claims are time barred.(ECF No. 18).

“[A]claimant who wishes to bring a lawsuit claiming a violation of the ADA must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.”Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 309(6th Cir.2000).“Under Title VII and thus under the ADA, a plaintiff must commence his civil action within ninety days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.”Clark v. Nissan Motor Mfg. Corp. U.S.A., 1998 WL 786892, at *3(6th Cir.1998);McGhee v. Disney Stores, 53 Fed.Appx. 751, 752(6th Cir.2002).“An employee may not file a suit under the ADA if he or she does not possess a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC because he or she has not exhausted his or her remedies.”Parry, 236 F.3d at 309.“[T]he failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional defect; rather the right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent.”Id.(citations omitted).

Plaintiff was aware of his responsibilities to obtain a Notice of Right to Sue letter and to file a charge of discrimination.(ECF No. 1, PageID.3).On his pro se complaint, he conveyed the EEOC “has not issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter,” and that he“[n]ever [f]iled [c]harges within time alloted [sic] time requirement.”(Id. at PageID.5).He did not exhaust the necessary administrative remedies.

Additionally, Plaintiff's ADA claim is now time barred.Plaintiff's alleged conduct began on May 15, 2000, when he experienced a stress-related injury or illness while on duty.(Id. at PageID.7).The alleged act of discrimination, his termination, occurred on August 11, 2010.(Id. at PageID.12).Given his complaint was filed on December 4, 2023, his claim was filed outside the statutory period.As Defendant DPD and Godbee argue, Plaintiff needed to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC by June 6, 2011 in order to be within the statute of limitations.

And Plaintiff is required to commence his suit within ninety days of receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC.Clark, 1998 WL 786892, at *3.Plaintiff did not obtain a letter from the EEOC.His failure to act within the statute of limitations bars his ADA claims.

In his responses to both motions, Plaintiff adds that he was evaluated by the City of Detroit up until December 19, 2009.(ECF No. 23, PageID.259), (ECF No. 22, PageID.188).Even if the last discriminatory act were in 2009, Plaintiff is still barred...