Brown v. Harris

• Decision Date: 01 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 00-1127,00-1127
• Citation: 240 F.3d 383
• Parties: (4th Cir. 2001) JAMES BROWN, Administrator of the Estate of Robert Brown, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G. W. HARRIS; NANCY SVEC; J. O. OGDEN, Defendants-Appellees, and N. E. BISHOP; A. E. SMITH; R. G. FIELDS, Defendants. . Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 383

240 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2001)

JAMES BROWN, Administrator of the Estate of Robert Brown, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. G. W. HARRIS; NANCY SVEC; J. O. OGDEN, Defendants-Appellees and N. E. BISHOP; A. E. SMITH; R. G. FIELDS, Defendants.

No. 00-1127.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

Argued: November 1, 2000.

Decided: February 16, 2001.

Appeal from the United States Magistrate Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

William T. Prince, Magistrate Judge. (CA-99-187-2) COUNSEL: ARGUED: Robert John Haddad, SHUTTLEWORTH, RULOFF, GIORDANO & SWAIN, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Matthew P. Dullaghan, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee Svec; Samuel Lawrence Dumville, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellees Harris and Ogden. ON BRIEF: Mark L. Earley, Attorney General of Virginia, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee Svec.

Before LUTTIG and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and Alexander WILLIAMS, Jr., United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Luttig wrote the opinion, in which Judge Traxler and Judge Williams joined.

OPINION

LUTTIG, Circuit Judge:

Decedent Robert Brown took his own life while detained by county officials on a probation violation. Appellant James Brown, the decedent's father and the administrator of his estate, brought state tort claims and federal constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983 against several officials who allegedly had custody of decedent either prior to or at the time of Brown's suicide. The magistrate judge granted judgment as a matter of law to the officials. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

Decedent Robert Brown was taken into custody pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by Nancy Svec, an employee of the Virginia Beach Probation and Parole Department and Brown's probation officer. J.A. 117. The warrant was issued because Brown had failed a random urinalysis drug test, J.A. 123, and had admitted during a telephone conversation with Svec that he was taking 8-10 pills a day and had attempted suicide the week prior by overdosing on unspecified pills. J.A. 126. This information led Svec to conclude that Brown posed a danger to his parents and others. J.A. 128.

Svec accompanied Virginia Beach Police Officer Switzer to Brown's parents' home to effectuate the arrest. J.A. 52-53. Pursuant to a search, Svec and Switzer found pills on Brown's person, in his bedroom, and in his car. J.A. 129-30. They then transported Brown to the Virginia Beach General Jail for processing on a probation violation. J.A. 130.

When they arrived at the jail, Svec had a short conversation with James Ogden, the supervisor of Central Processing for the jail. J.A. 46, 143. Svec testified at trial that she informed Ogden that Brown "was suicidal, psychotic, [and subject to] volatile withdrawal" and had attempted suicide the week before. J.A. 120, 144, 146, 158. Svec also conveyed to Ogden that her primary concern was that Brown could become "volatile" and possibly "attack people" as he withdrew from drugs. J.A. 118, 135-36, 141-46, 158-59, 166. Specifically, Svec testified during her deposition -portions of which were read verbatim at trial (including this passage) -that she believed she had also told Ogden that Brown had "previously attacked a staff member while in detox." J.A. 144. Ogden testified, by contrast, that Svec never informed him that Brown was suicidal, only that he"has violent episodes while coming off of prescription drugs." J.A. 166. Ogden subsequently placed Brown on "medical watch," which consisted of continuous video surveillance of his cell. J.A. 164-65, 167-68.¹

Three days following his arrival at Virginia Beach General Jail, Brown hung himself in his cell by his shoe laces. J.A. 45-46. Although Brown's cell was under video surveillance, Gwen Harris -the officer responsible that day for monitoring Brown's cell as well as 27 others by way of small video screens -did not notice that Brown had hung himself until after the "code" was called by someone else. J.A. 45, 169-72. The undisputed medical testimony at trial established that Brown had been deprived of oxygen for at least four minutes. J.A. 103. As a result, Brown was hospitalized and placed on a ventilator. J.A. 133. He died seven days later. J.A. 46.

Appellant James Brown, decedent's father and the administrator of his estate, filed a lawsuit against Svec, Ogden, and Harris (collectively the "appellees") in the Eastern District of Virginia.² The first count of the amended complaint asserted a section 1983 action against each of the appellees, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to Brown's serious medical needs in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. J.A. 35-36. In count II, appellant alleged that the appellees were grossly negligent under state law "in failing to supervise the decedent's condition . . . and in generally completely abdicating their responsibilities to the decedent." J.A. 36.

The parties consented to have the case tried before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. S 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. Following a full trial on the merits, the appellees filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The magistrate judge granted the motion, and entered judgment for the appellees on all claims. J.A. 273. The magistrate judge subsequently denied appellant's motion for reconsideration and for a new trial. J.A. 366.

II.

The first issue on appeal is whether Brown's suicide barred the representative of his estate from recovering on any derivative state claims. Appellant brought wrongful death actions against Svec and Ogden, and a separate gross negligence claim against Harris. Reviewing the grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo, see Brice v. Nkaru, 220 F.3d 233, 237 (4th Cir. 2000), we agree with the magistrate judge that, as a matter of law, appellant's evidence failed to establish that Brown was of unsound mind when he took his own life.

In granting judgment as a matter of law on those claims, the magistrate judge held that Brown's actions constituted common law suicide, and that any cause of action resulting from the suicide, an immoral and illegal act under Virginia law, was barred. J.A. 270-71. Under Virginia law, "[i]t is well settled that, as a general rule, `a party who consents to and participates in an immoral or illegal act cannot recover damages from other participants for the consequence of that act.'" Wackwitz v. Roy, 418 S.E.2d 861, 864 (Va. 1992). As a result, the Virginia Supreme Court held in Wackwitz that, because suicide is a common law crime, it "precludes recovery for injuries sustained as a result of that act." Id. at 864.

Appellant's state claims seek damages for injuries resulting from Brown's taking of his own life and consequentially are barred under Wackwitz if Brown committed common law suicide. To commit suicide at common law, a person must: (1) take his own life; (2) be "of years of discretion"; and (3) be of "sound mind." See id. at 864-65. A person is of "sound mind" if competent and sane. See Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying Virginia law). It is undisputed that Brown was not a minor when he took his own life; therefore, unless Brown was incompetent or insane at the time, appellant's state claims are barred.

Appellant does not dispute that suicide constitutes a per se bar to recovery, but rather argues that there was sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to conclude that Brown was of unsound mind. Appellant relied exclusively on the testimony of Dr. Benjamin Carey to establish that fact at trial. While Carey testified that Brown suffered from bipolar disorder, we agree with the magistrate judge that his testimony was insufficient to create a jury question regarding Brown's competency or sanity for two reasons.

First, Carey assessed Brown's mental condition at a discrete point in time, more than three months prior to Brown's death. J.A. 302, 306. Carey expressed no view about whether Brown was insane or incompetent at the time he took his own life. Indeed, appellant failed to proffer any contemporaneous assessment of Brown's mental condition. At best, therefore, Carey's testimony, and by extension appellant's evidence, establishes only that Brown may have been insane or incompetent at a given point in time more than three months prior to his death. Wackwitz and Hill suggest, however, that a decedent's mental soundness must be measured at the time of the self-destructive act. See Hill, 979 F.2d at 990 (noting that insanity is measured "at a given time"); Wackwitz, 418 S.E.2d at 865 (holding that a wrongful death claim arising out of a suicide survived a motion to dismiss because "the plaintiff alleged that her decedent was of unsound mind when he killed himself"). As a result, Carey's testimony, standing alone, is simply insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that Brown was sane when he took his own life. See Hill, 979 F.2d at 990 (stating that there is a presumption that a person is sane under Virginia law).

Second, Carey's testimony does not even prove that Brown was incompetent or insane at the time Carey evaluated him. Under Virginia law, "[t]he term `insane' refers to one who is, at a given time, an `idiot, lunatic, non compos mentis or deranged.'" Hill, 979 F.2d at 990 (citing Nelms v. Nelms, 374 S.E.2d 4, 8 (Va. 1988)). Even reading Carey's testimony in a light most favorable to appellant, Brown's bipolar disorder simply did not render him legally insane. Specifically, Carey testified that:

[T]here was no evidence that [Brown] was psychotic or had a thought disorder. That he did not appear to have suicidal thinking, any suicidal intent or suicide plan. I thought his memory was grossly intact. He had limited insight, and his judgment was considered fair. So that was the mental status...