Brown v. Harry
| Decision Date | 12 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-0115 |
| Parties | DAVID M. BROWN, Petitioner v. LAUREL HARRY, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Petitioner David M. Brown initiated the above-captioned pro se action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Brown challenges his 2013 Pennsylvania convictions for felon in possession of a firearm, receiving stolen property, and drug possession. Because Brown's habeas claims are either procedurally barred or meritless (or both), the Court must deny his Section 2254 petition.
In September 2011, Brown was arrested following a traffic stop and charged with being a person not to possess a firearm,[1]receiving stolen property,[2] and possession of a controlled substance.[3]Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 209 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 6114626, at *1 & n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 30, 2015) (nonprecedential). The Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint against Brown on September 30, 2011, and a preliminary hearing was held on December 19, 2011. See Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 1824 MDA 2019, 2020 WL 2790447, at *4 (nonprecedential). Approximately two years later, on November 20, 2013, Brown underwent a bench trial, after which he was found guilty of all three charges. Id., at *1, 5. Shortly thereafter, he was sentenced to 8 to 16 years' incarceration. Id., at *1.
Brown appealed, raising a single issue for review: whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered during the traffic stop. Brown, No. 209 MDA 2014, 2015 WL 6114626, at *1. The gravamen of Brown's argument was that the officer who initially detained him lacked jurisdiction to do so. Id. In a detailed and thorough opinion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania rejected Brown's claim and affirmed the trial court's denial of his suppression motion. Id., at *1, 5-9. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania subsequently denied Brown's petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v Brown, No. 667 MAL 2017, 128 A.3d 218 (Pa. Dec. 7, 2015) (table).
Brown then filed a pro se petition under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541 et seq., in November 2016. See Brown, No. 1824 MDA 2019, 2020 WL 2790447, at *1. PCRA counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition in March 2017. Id. In his amended PCRA petition, Brown argued that both trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective. Id. The trial court-now acting as the PCRA court-held a hearing on August 24, 2018, and ultimately denied Brown's petition in September 2019. Id.
On collateral appeal, Brown raised two issues: (1) whether trial and appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective in litigating his speedy trial claim under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600; and (2) whether his appointed PCRA counsel provided ineffective assistance in litigating his Rule 600 claim.[4] Id. The Superior Court rejected both claims. See id., at *2-6. The panel denied Brown's ineffectiveness claim related to the conduct of trial and appellate counsel on the merits, see id., but found that his second claim (regarding alleged ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel) could not be raised for the first time on appeal; rather, such a claim had to be presented through a serial PCRA petition, see id., at *6.[5]The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again denied Brown's petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 448 MAL 2020, 266 A.3d 450 (Pa. Nov. 3, 2021) (table).
Brown filed his initial Section 2254 petition in this Court in January 2022. (See generally Doc. No. 1.) He then filed an amended petition two months later. (See generally Doc. No. 7.) Respondent moved to dismiss the amended petition as untimely, which motion this Court denied. (See Doc. No. 13.) Respondent then filed a response to the merits of Brown's amended Section 2254 petition. (See Doc. No. 14.) Brown did not file a reply or “traverse” and the time in which to do so has passed, so his amended habeas petition is ripe for disposition.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254, mandates that petitioners demonstrate that they have “exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking federal habeas relief. Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A). An exhausted claim is one that has been “fairly presented” to the state courts “by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process,” and which has been adjudicated on the merits. Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)); see also Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 302 (2013).
If a state prisoner has not fairly presented a claim to the state courts “but state law clearly forecloses review, exhaustion is excused, but the doctrine of procedural default may come into play.” Carpenter, 296 F.3d at 146 (citations omitted). Generally, if a prisoner has procedurally defaulted on a claim by failing to raise it in state-court proceedings, a federal habeas court will not review the merits of the claim, even one that implicates constitutional concerns. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747-48 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 (1977)).
A few limited exceptions to this rule exist. One exception is that “[a] prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.” Id. at 10 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). “Cause for a procedural default exists where something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him[,] . . . impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.” Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show not merely that there were errors that created a possibility of prejudice, but that they “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Holland v. Horn, 519 F.3d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). If cause and prejudice are established, the federal court reviews the claim de novo “because the state court did not consider the claim on the merits.” Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Gilmore v. Bey, 138 S.Ct. 740 (2018) (mem.) (citation omitted).
Another rare exception that will excuse a procedural default is if the petitioner can show that “failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental ‘miscarriage of justice.'” Carpenter, 296 F.3d at 146 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception, a petitioner typically will have to show actual innocence. Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Brown raises four grounds for relief in his amended Section 2254 petition. (See Doc. No. 7 at 5-10.) However, as Respondent aptly notes, Brown's third and fourth claims are nearly identical Fourth Amendment challenges to the traffic stop that led to his arrest, so those claims will be analyzed together. The Court will take each of Brown's claims in turn.
A continual refrain from Brown's state post-conviction proceedings is that his speedy trial rights under Pennsylvania law were violated. He has repeatedly maintained that he was not brought to trial within the time limits provided by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600,[6]and therefore his criminal case should have been dismissed with prejudice.
Brown, however, never properly asserted this claim in state court and therefore it is procedurally defaulted and unreviewable. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9. He argues that the reason the claim was not presented is that his appellate counsel “failed to raise or argue this issue on direct appeal.”[7]See id. at 5. Thus, although Brown wants to directly assert a speedy trial violation (and it appears that he intends to implicate the federal right to a speedy trial found in the Sixth Amendment, (see Doc. No. 7 at 5); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ()), he cannot do so because he did not present this claim to the state courts.
He may, however, assert a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because he properly exhausted this claim “by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process,” through which the claim was decided on the merits. Carpenter, 296 F.3d at 146 (citation omitted). The Court, therefore, will construe Brown's first ground for relief as a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise a Rule 600 violation on appeal.
A collateral attack based on ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the familiar two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on such a claim, a criminal defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective level of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient representation was prejudicial. Id. at 687-88. The defendant bears the burden of proving both prongs. See id. at 687.
In determining whether counsel has satisfied the objective standard of reasonableness under the first prong, courts must be highly deferential toward counsel's conduct. Id. at 689. There is a strong presumption...
To continue reading
Request your trial