Brown v. Heckler
Decision Date | 26 April 1984 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 83-4168. |
Citation | 589 F. Supp. 985 |
Parties | Brian BROWN, et al. v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
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Mark A. Kaufman, Delaware County Legal Assistance Ass'n, Chester, Pa., for plaintiffs.
Wendy B. Kloner, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Joan K. Garner, Serena H. Dobson, Asst. U.S. Attys., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant U.S.
John O. J. Shellenberger, Deputy Atty. Gen., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant State of Pa.
Plaintiffs' complaint challenges as constitutionally infirm a federal welfare provision which requires the state to utilize a formula that includes certain amounts of a stepparent's earned income in computing the allowable aid available to a needy dependent child. The formula applies to stepparents irrespective of whether under state law a stepparent is legally obligated to contribute support to a stepchild. Presently before the court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Both sides agree there is no genuine issue of material fact at issue. For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment will be denied and defendants' motion will be granted.
On August 26, 1983, plaintiffs' filed a class action complaint challenging the constitutionality of section 602(a)(31) of Title 42, United States Code. Section 602(a)(31) is located in that part of the Social Security Act that provides "Aid To Families With Dependent Children." 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615. Subchapter IV of the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610, created the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program.1 The program was originally enacted to assist certain needy dependent children.2 The AFDC program was not intended, however, to assist all needy children. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). It was enacted to provide aid to children of families where there was no one capable of being a "breadwinner":
S.Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1935).
Although the AFDC statute was amended a number of times after the original enactment in 1935, the only relevant change for purposes of this litigation occurred in 1981. Prior to 1981, regulations of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services) mandated that only income and resources in fact available to a child for current use on a regular basis would be taken into consideration in determining need and the amount of payment. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 555, 90 S.Ct. 1282, 1283, 25 L.Ed.2d 561 (1970). The Supreme Court stated that such regulations clearly comported with the AFDC Act. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 319 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2134 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). The Court later held, therefore, that absent proof of actual contributions, the state, in computing AFDC payments, could not consider the dependent child's resources to include either income of a nonadopting stepfather who was not legally obligated to support the child or income of a man assuming the role of a spouse. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. at 559-60, 90 S.Ct. at 1285-86.
The lower state and federal courts also consistently invalidated state laws requiring inclusion of stepparent income for calculation of AFDC benefits, unless under state law stepparents were legally obligated to support their stepchildren. See, e.g., Rosen v. Hursh, 464 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1972); Boucher v. Minter, 349 F.Supp. 1240 (D.Mass.1972); X v. McCorkle, 333 F.Supp. 1109 (D.N.J.1970), aff'd, 404 U.S. 23, 92 S.Ct. 181, 30 L.Ed.2d 143 (1971); Slochowsky v. Lavine, 73 Misc.2d 563, 342 N.Y.S.2d 525 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1973); Kelley v. Iowa Dept. of Social Services, 197 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 813, 93 S.Ct. 170, 34 L.Ed.2d 69 (1972) ( ).
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(31).
Plaintiffs, all children who have had AFDC benefits reduced as a result of the new provision, filed this class action complaint.3 Plaintiffs challenge the stepparent provision on two constitutional grounds. First, plaintiffs contend the Act and regulations discriminate against a class of needy children based upon the marital status of the parent in violation of the equal protection clause. Plaintiffs' second allegation involves a contention that the due process clause has been violated by creating an irrebuttable presumption that the income of the non-legally responsible stepparent is actually available to the class of needy children.
Plaintiffs, in their memorandum of law supporting the motion for summary judgment, contend that "a heightened level of equal protection scrutiny" should be applied in this litigation. Absent such an application, however, plaintiffs assert that the challenged provision also fails to meet the rational basis standard of review. Defendants contend that the only applicable standard is rational basis review and that the challenged provision easily passes constitutional muster. Both sides agree there are no issues of material fact and disposition by summary judgment is appropriate.
It is now generally accepted by both the courts and commentators that in cases involving equal protection challenges the Supreme Court applies three levels of review in ruling on the validity of the challenged statute. Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 91-92 (3d Cir.1983); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 991-1146 (1979); G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 670-971 (1980). See generally, Note, Plyler v. Doe, 28 Vill. L.Rev. 198 (1982).4 The three tiers of review are the rational basis test, intermediate or "middle-tier" scrutiny and strict scrutiny. The term "heightened" scrutiny has come to signify any standard of review above rational basis. Because of the fairly predictable results which the application of each standard of review often engenders, the initial determination of which standard applies has become crucial.
The rational basis standard of review is the least intrusive standard and provides a presumption of constitutionality. The standard requires only that the law have a legitimate purpose and a rational relationship in the fulfillment of that purpose. The Court has stated that the legislature need not articulate the law's purpose if a legitimate purpose can be hypothesized. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955).
Strict scrutiny, on the other hand, carries with it a presumption of unconstitutionality. The challenged legislation must be narrowly tailored to achieving some compelling state interest. Strict scrutiny review has been limited thus far to classifications involving a "suspect" class, or which affect "fundamental rights" or "interests" protected by the Constitution. To date the Court has identified two classes or groups which clearly qualify as "suspect"; namely, racial or ancestral minorities and alienage. The Court has also identified a number of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and a number of fundamental interests implicitly protected by the Constitution that are deserving of strict judicial review.
Intermediate or "middle-tier" scrutiny falls somewhere on the continuum between rational basis and strict scrutiny. The Court's articulated standard requires that the challenged law be "substantially related" to "important governmental objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). This standard of review has been applied in equal protection challenges involving classifications which are sensitive but not suspect.
It is clear that with respect to the three levels of review both the interest that the state or federal government...
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