Brown v. Heinen
| Decision Date | 06 July 1945 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 437. |
| Citation | 61 F. Supp. 563 |
| Parties | BROWN v. HEINEN et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Harriet McKinley Brown, of Milwaukee, Wis., pro se.
Kelly & Le Vander, of South St. Paul, Minn., for defendant National Surety Corporation.
Plaintiff, a resident of Wisconsin, commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against the named defendants because one of the defendants, Joseph J. Heinen, sheriff of Dakota County, Minnesota, allegedly detains from her, after proper demand by her, certain personalty to which she claims absolute title and the right to possession. She claims damages because of the detention of part of the personalty and as to the remainder she seeks damages or, in the alternative, the personalty itself. The National Surety Corporation was surety on the sheriff's bond which Heinen furnished pursuant to Minnesota statute, but the relation of Elizabeth Schutt and the Schutt Realty Company to the action is not stated in the complaint. Service in Wisconsin was made on the National Surety Corporation. No service has apparently been made on the other defendants.
On November 22, 1941, defendant National Surety Corporation moved the Wisconsin court to transfer the case to this Court, and on January 15, 1942, such an order was made. Various delays have occurred, and the case has now come before this Court on the motion of the plaintiff, appearing specially, to remand to the Wisconsin court. But on June 18, 1945, plaintiff, appearing pro se, informed the Court that she wished to dismiss this motion without prejudice because her attorney could not be present to argue it. Messrs. Kelly and Le Vander, of South St. Paul, Minnesota, appeared in behalf of the defendant National Surety Corporation.
Presumably, the plaintiff is entitled to dismiss her motion if she desires, but the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the case arises and for the first time has been called to its attention. Obviously, if this Court lacks jurisdiction over the proceedings, it cannot proceed to try the case on the merits or otherwise, even if the motion to remand is dismissed. The Court is required to raise the jurisdictional question of its own motion if the parties do not.
There seems no doubt that, if this case had been brought originally in this Court, this Court would possess jurisdiction over it. Diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and all defendants confers jurisdiction upon this Court, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1), and that diversity and the necessary statutory amount in controversy exist here. Moreover, since all the defendants are residents of this State or subject to service here and are not objecting to being sued here, the action might properly be laid in this District as an original action. 28 U.S.C.A. § 112. But the case is not here by virtue of this Court's original jurisdiction in the sense that the case was originally begun here. The case was transferred to this District from another District by order of the court of that other District. Therefore, the question is, can the order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin confer jurisdiction on this Court? No pleadings or other papers pertaining to the case are here except in conformance to that order. The plaintiff has not consented to the transfer. So if this Court cannot base its jurisdiction upon the Wisconsin court's order, it is without power to act further in this case.
The jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Wisconsin, like that of all other United States District Courts, depends strictly upon statute. If Congress does not confer the power, the court does not possess it. 36 C.J.S., Federal Courts, § 308, p. 512. This Court is not aware of any statute which provides for the transfer of a case from one District to a District in another State under the circumstances herein. Consequently, there seems little doubt that, as many courts have held, the United States District Courts do not possess either the power or the right to order a transfer of the case from one District to a District in another State. United States v. 74 Cases, etc., D.C.S.C., 1944, 55 F. Supp. 745; Billings Utility Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, D.C.Mont., 1941, 40 F. Supp. 309; Spies v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., C.C.N.Y., 1887, 32 F. 713; see, also, In re Assoc. Gas & Elec. Co., 2 Cir., 1936, 83 F.2d 734; compare Duval v. Bathrick, D.C.Minn., 1940, 31 F.Supp. 510, at 511; Walsh & Wells, Inc., v. City of Memphis, D.C.Tenn., 1940, 32 F.Supp. 448, at 449; and Lavietes v. Ferro Stamping & Mfg. Co., D.C.Mich., 1937, 19 F.Supp. 561, at page 563, which hold that a United States District Court cannot order a change of venue from one division to another division in the same District unless a statute authorizes such action. They recognize a lack of power. Contra: Sanders v. Royal Ind. Co., D.C. La., 1929, 33 F.2d 512. The proposition is stated concisely in United States v. 74 Cases, etc., supra. The court sai...
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