Brown v. Hines-williams

• Decision Date: 26 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-FM-120.,09-FM-120.
• Citation: 2 A.3d 1077
• Parties: Juan F. BROWN, Appellant, v. Julia HINES-WILLIAMS, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

2 A.3d 1077

Juan F. BROWN, Appellant,

v.Julia HINES-WILLIAMS, Appellee.

No. 09-FM-120.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted April 20, 2010.

Decided Aug. 26, 2010.

Juan F. Brown, pro se.

Julia Hines-Williams, pro se.

Before KRAMER, Associate Judge, and NEBEKER and BELSON, Senior Judges.

BELSON, Senior Judge:

Juan Brown brings this pro se appeal of the trial court's order of retroactive child support, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction and that military housing allowances and meal allowances do not constitute income for purposes of calculating child support owed. We affirm, holding that the trial court had jurisdiction of the matter and that the allowances were properly included as income. ¹

I.

Juan Brown began in 1992 to receive tax-free Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) funds from the U.S. Air Force, his employer. As of 2009, Brown was receiving $2120 per month in BAH funds and an additional $272 per month in Base Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) funds. ² BAH pays the full cost of housing for a typical BAH-receiving service member. BAH amounts paid to service members vary by rank, location, and whether the recipient has at least one dependent. The “with-dependent” amount is the same irrespective of the number of dependents.

In 2000, Brown and Julia Hines had a son, Jalen. In 2001, they agreed that, until Jalen turned eighteen years old, Hines would have custody of Jalen and Brown would pay for Jalen's health care and pay Hines “support for said child in the amount of ... $400.00” per month. Brown consistently paid this amount until he was required to pay a greater amount pursuant to a court order, see infra pp. 1078-79.

In August 2005, Brown filed a complaint for custody and Hines shortly thereafter filed an action for custody and child support. The cases were consolidated. On October 12, 2006, Judge Judith Macaluso awarded Hines sole legal and physical custody of Jalen. Child support was not addressed. On May 11, 2007, at a hearing before Judge Fern Saddler on a contempt motion filed by Brown regarding visitation, child support issues were raised. On June 6, 2007, Hines wrote Brown in an e-mail that she and Jalen were “in the process of moving” to Maryland. On June 26, 2007, Judge Saddler held a second hearing, denied Brown's contempt motion and issued a temporary order of current child support. The order shows that Brown consented to the court's jurisdiction and that Hines still lived in the District. Judge Saddler ordered Brown to pay $900 a month, an amount that was based on application of applicable statutory guidelines to Brown's income, including BAH and BAS. Brown duly paid this amount starting in August 2007. Judge Saddler in her order stated that the amount to be paid by Brown as retroactive support was “to be decided at next court hearing,” initially scheduled for October 2007, but ultimately held in January 2009, see infra.

In September 2007, Brown filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, based on the assertion that neither the parties nor the child still resided in the District. Brown contended that, under D.C.Code § 46-302.05(a) (2001), which provides for “continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a support order” based on residency or consent, “the District ... no longer has ... jurisdiction over the issue of child support and does not have jurisdiction to modify the existing Pendente Lite Order or issue new orders regarding retroactive and permanent child support.” In opposing dismissal, Hines did not dispute that the parties had left the District. She contended, first, that the District retained jurisdiction over permanent current support, because her initial request for permanent, as contrasted with temporary, support had not been ruled upon; and, second, that the District also retained jurisdiction over retroactive support. In November 2007, Judge Saddler denied Brown's motion to dismiss. ³ In May 2008, Brown filed another motion to dismiss, styled “for forum non conveniens,” in which he again argued that the District lacked jurisdiction over the case. This motion was denied. In August 2008, a third motion to dismiss by Brown was denied. ⁴

On January 21, 2009, Judge Saddler held a hearing on support. She made findings with respect to the parties' residences, income, and expenses. She identified the issue before her as “the amount [Brown] should have paid [Hines] during the time period at issue”- i.e., September 1, 2005 through July 31, 2007, during which Brown continued to pay Hines $400 a month in child support under their 2001 agreement-if he had been paying “according to the D.C. Child Support Guidelines,” and “[s]pecifically, whether” Brown's BAH and BAS “should be calculated as part of his gross income.” The judge stated that our statutes and case law were silent on the precise issue; that “overwhelmingly, other jurisdictions do include BAH and BAS allowances,” citing, inter alia, Louisiana Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. D.F. v. L.T., Jr., 934 So.2d 687, 690-91 (La.2006); and that she did “not agree with [Brown]'s contention that he allegedly only receives BAH ... allowances because his minor child from another relationship, Jamal Brown, currently resides with [Brown].” Judge Saddler concluded that “Brown's BAS and BAH allowances should be included as income when determining [his] annual gross income for child support calculations.” On this basis, Judge Saddler entered a judgment requiring Brown to pay appellee $9795 in retroactive child support for the period September 2005 through July 2007. She made no ruling, however, on permanent current support.

Brown appeals the January 2009 order. Although both parties were represented by counsel in the trial court, both are proceeding pro se before this court.

II.

“The Superior Court has jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter (at law or in equity) brought in the District.” D.C.Code § 1-204.31(a) (2001); see also §§ 11-921(a), (b), -1101 (2001) (defining jurisdiction of Family Division). Whether a court acquires subject-matter jurisdiction over a case depends on the facts relevant to such jurisdiction as of the time the court's jurisdiction is invoked, e.g., the date on which a suit is filed. 20 Am.Jur. 2d Courts § 98 (2005); see also Arnold v. District of Columbia, 211 F.Supp.2d 144, 146 (D.D.C.2002) (citing Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 392 n. 12 (3d Cir.1991) (“It is a firmly established rule that subject matter jurisdiction is tested as of the time of the filing of the complaint.”)); In re D.H., 666 A.2d 462, 478 n. 26 (D.C.1995) (recognizing that relevant date for determining jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency action is date juvenile is charged). The court's jurisdiction continues until the court has done all it can to determine all issues involved, and events that occur only after jurisdiction is acquired do not affect jurisdiction even if they would have deprived the court of jurisdiction in the first instance. 20 Am.Jur. 2d Courts §§ 100, 101. Where the Family Division lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a custody or child support claim, a party may file a motion asserting such lack under Super. Ct. Dom. Rel. R. 12(b)(1). ⁵

Separately, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), codified in the District and in every state, provides for jurisdiction to modify a child support order where parties have moved away from the issuing jurisdiction. See D.C.Code §§ 46-301.01 to 46-309.01 (2009); see also UIFSA, supra note 3, 9 U.L.A. 159-520; Uniform Law Commissioners, Amendments to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (2001), http:// www. nccusl. org/ Update/ uniformact_ summaries/ uniformacts- s- uifsa. asp. The District's codification of UIFSA provides:

(a) A tribunal of the District that has issued a child-support order ... has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its child-support order if ...:

(1) At the time of the filing of a request for modification, the District is the residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child ... or

(2) ... the parties consent in a record or in open court that the tribunal of the District may continue to exercise jurisdiction to modify its order.

D.C.Code § 46-302.05(a) (emphasis added); see also UIFSA § 205(a), supra note 3, 9 U.L.A. 192. Therefore, if a party seeks modification of an existing District of Columbia support order at a time when the parents and child have moved away from the District, our courts lack jurisdiction of the request unless the parties consent to our jurisdiction. We emphasize that modification of an existing support order involves specific, statutorily created procedures. See D.C.Code § 46-204(a); UIFSA § 204(a), supra note 3, 9 U.L.A. 191-92; see also § 16-916.01( o ). A party's mere pursuit of a permanent support order in the first instance-regardless of whether, as here, a pendente lite order has issued pending the resolution of permanent support-is to be distinguished from any modification request.

Brown asserts that Hines and Jalen moved out of the District before June 26, 2007, when the temporary child support order issued, and that Hines began renting her house in the District as of July 1, 2007. He contends that the trial court therefore had no jurisdiction to issue its June 26, 2007, order and that our courts have no further jurisdiction over temporary current or retroactive child support determinations in this case. Brown's challenge fails in at least two respects. First, as a factual matter, Brown fails to show that Hines and Jalen had left the District by the time the June 2007 temporary order of support issued. Indeed, the order contains findings that Brown consented to the court's jurisdiction and that Hines still lived on Second Street in the Southeast quadrant of the District of Columbia. Second, as a legal matter, Brown argues for a misapplication of UIFSA. We repeat that the jurisdictional limitations on which he relies- i.e.,...