Brown v. International Paper Co.
| Decision Date | 22 September 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 38,892-WCA.,38,892-WCA. |
| Citation | 882 So.2d 1228 |
| Parties | Uluas BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant v. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Sam L. Jenkins, Jr., Shreveport, for Appellant.
Van Hoof Law Firm, by Kathryn Fowler Van Hoof, for Appellee.
Before CARAWAY, DREW and MOORE, JJ.
The claimant, Uluas D. Brown, appeals a summary judgment finding that he willfully made false statements in a deposition for the purpose of obtaining compensation benefits and thereby forfeited those benefits under La. R.S. 23:1208 A. For the reasons expressed, we affirm.
Brown was employed as a bin tender in the dry veneer division at the International Paper ("IP") plant in Springhill, Louisiana, earning an average weekly wage of $458.38. He alleged that on May 1, 2001,1 he was "straightening vanier [sic] as it came off machine and taking away damaged material when he felt pain in his groin and back." In deposition, he testified it was "like I hit a funny bone," causing immediate severe pain in his groin and lower back. He attempted to work in pain for a few days; he went to the emergency room at Wadley Regional Medical Center in Texarkana on May 10 and again on May 31, where he was diagnosed with acute lumbar pain. Brown has not worked since May 31, 2001. On July 24, 2001, he visited Dr. Brad Harbin in Stamps, Arkansas, complaining of "continuous" back pain since the incident at IP.
On August 16, 2001, Brown was involved in a rear-end collision on Benton Road in Bossier City. The following day he returned to the Wadley emergency room, where he told nurses he was "already under the care of a physician for a back injury and pain was nearly gone until involved in 2 vehicle MVC yesterday" (emphasis added). On August 22, Brown saw a chiropractor, Dr. James Raker, and reported that he felt "good" prior to the auto accident; Dr. Raker later interpreted this as meaning he had "mild" symptoms before August 16, but severe symptoms after. Brown began therapy with Dr. Raker. On August 24, Brown returned to Dr. Harbin, who noted, "worsening due to motor vehicle accident." On October 1, Brown went to Dr. Sharma, a physical medicine specialist in Texarkana. Dr. Sharma's report mentions only the August 16 auto accident, making no reference whatsoever to any prior, work-related condition.
On January 9, 2002, Brown filed the instant disputed claim, alleging that IP had paid no compensation benefits. By amended claim, he demanded indemnity and medical benefits, authorization for medical treatment by a pain care consultant, plus penalties and attorney fees.
In June 2002, IP propounded interrogatories that asked, inter alia, whether Brown had suffered any injuries "subsequent to the accident that is the subject of the compensation claim, and if so, whether he had received medical treatment for it." By unsigned answers, Brown stated he "has not suffered any physical injuries subsequent to the accident which occurred that is the subject of this lawsuit." Through further discovery, however, IP learned of Brown's August 16, 2001 auto accident.
In October 2002, represented by new counsel, Brown prepared supplemental answers to interrogatories, admitting the rear-end collision but stating that "no claim was filed because the attorney he retained to represent him allowed the case to prescribe."
IP took Brown's deposition in December 2002. In the presence of his counsel, Brown admitted he was in the auto accident, "but I didn't claim no injuries." He denied seeing any doctor with complaints of injuries from the auto accident; he advised Dr. Harbin that he had been rear-ended, but insisted he told the doctor, "I feel the same." Brown further testified, He admitted receiving a settlement for property damage from the other driver's insurer, but made no claim for personal injuries. IP pleaded the affirmative defense of fraud and, in August 2003, filed the instant motion for summary judgment. This alleged that Brown forfeited his right to benefits by willfully making a false statement for the purpose of obtaining any benefit or payment. La. R.S. 23:1208 A; Resweber v. Haroil Const. Co., 94-2708 (La.9/5/04), 660 So.2d 7. IP argued that Brown was seeking to recover damages for an injury caused by a non-work-related auto accident which he did not pursue. IP also argued that Brown's false statements under oath at deposition foreclosed any genuine issue of material fact, thus making summary judgment proper. Western Sizzlin Steakhouse v. McDuffie, 02-0935 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/28/03), 844 So.2d 355,writ denied, XXXX-XXXX (La.6/20/03), 847 So.2d 1236. IP also demanded sanctions under La. R.S. 23:1208 D.
Brown opposed the motion, admitting the August 2001 auto accident but arguing that the medical records would show that his current disability resulted from the accident at IP, not from the gentle rear-end collision on Benton Road. He also urged that his original answers to interrogatories, denying the auto accident, had been prepared by his first attorney, and that Brown himself had never read or signed them. Further opposing the motion for summary judgment, Brown attached copies of his original and amended answers to interrogatories, a copy of his deposition, records and bills from the various physicians he has seen since May 1, 2001, and a copy of the police report from the auto accident.
The parties submitted the matter on briefs. By oral ruling of December 23, 2003, the WCJ found that Brown falsely stated in deposition that he told doctors about the auto accident shortly after it occurred and that he felt the same before and after the wreck. The WCJ cited the Wadley emergency room report, Dr. Harbin's reports and Dr. Sharma's letter as contradicting this position. The WCJ found these statements were willful because his counsel was present and yet "Mr. Brown repeatedly stated that he had not sought treatment and that he had never claimed to be injured in the accident." The WCJ concluded the only reason Brown had to deny he was injured in the auto accident "was so it would not interfere with his workers' compensation claim." The court therefore granted summary judgment, finding a forfeiture of benefits. The WCJ stated, however, that it would not base its judgment on the false statements made in Brown's answers to interrogatories because Brown did not sign them. Finally, the WCJ denied IP's claim for reimbursement.
Represented by new counsel, Brown has appealed.
By one assignment of error, Brown urges that IP did not carry its burden of proof under R.S. 23:1208 A on the motion for summary judgment. He contends that the three items of evidence cited by the WCJ should be construed more favorably to him. He further contends that his "first opportunity to provide a full explanation about his symptoms was his deposition," which leaves open the genuine issue of material fact whether the auto accident did or did not aggravate his genuine, work-related injury.
IP reiterates its arguments in support of the motion for summary judgment. It contends that lying in a deposition justified a summary judgment of forfeiture of benefits in Western Sizzlin Steakhouse v. McDuffie, supra. It also urges that Brown's repeated false statements in deposition are similar to those that warranted forfeiture of benefits in Jim Walter Homes Inc. v. Prine, 01-0116 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/15/02), 808 So.2d 818, and a reversal of benefits in Allen v. Housing Auth. of New Orleans, 01-0370 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/9/02), 806 So.2d 889,writ granted, XXXX-XXXX (La.6/7/02), 818 So.2d 764. IP concludes with an argument for penalties and sanctions under R.S. 23:1208 C and D.
The motion for summary judgment is a procedural device to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Kay v. Carter, 243 La. 1095, 150 So.2d 27 (1963); Jones v. Airport Systems Int'l, 28,278 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/3/96), 671 So.2d 1176. Summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action, except certain domestic actions; the procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. La. C.C.P. art. 966 A(2); Racine v. Moon's Towing, 2001-2837 (La.5/14/02), 817 So.2d 21. The motion should be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966 B. Since the 1996 and 1997 amendments to Art. 966, the courts are to assess the proof submitted by the parties equally, without any presumption in favor of trial on the merits. Jones v. Estate of Santiago, XXXX-XXXX (La.4/14/04), 870 So.2d 1002; Hardy v. Bowie, 98-2821 (La.9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606. Appellate review of a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Jones v. Estate of Santiago, supra. Summary judgment is seldom appropriate for determinations based on subjective facts of motive, intent, good faith, knowledge or malice, yet it may be granted on a subjective issue when no issue of material fact exists concerning that issue. Id.; Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., 93-2512 (La.9/5/94), 639 So.2d 730.
The Workers' Compensation Act imposes penalties for willfully making a false representation in connection with a compensation claim. La. R.S. 23:1208 provides, in pertinent part:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Stonetrust Commercial Ins. Co. & GREG Williams Logging, LLC v. George
...that issue. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 1993-2512 (La. 07/05/94), 639 So. 2d 730; Brown v. International Paper Co., 38,892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 09/22/04), 882 So. 2d 1228. The questions presented here are twofold: (1) whether the summary judgment evidence presented is sufficient......
- Brown v. International Paper Co.