Brown v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
| Decision Date | 05 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: DLB-19-3301 |
| Parties | NA'SHAE BROWN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiffs Na'Shae Brown, Kya Holmes, and the Estate of John Lee Brown, II claim that defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase" or the "Bank") should be held liable for injuries that Na'Shae Brown, Kya Holmes, and John Lee Brown, II suffered from lead-based paint exposure when they lived at or visited 2915 Mosher Street in Baltimore, Maryland. Second Am. Compl., ECF 27. The Bank has filed a motion to dismiss, ECF 33, which the parties fully briefed, ECF 33-1, 36 & 37. A hearing is not necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. Because plaintiffs cannot state a claim in negligence against the Bank and do not oppose dismissal of their Maryland Consumer Protection Act claim, see Pls.' Resp. 2 n.1, I will grant defendant's motion. I will allow plaintiffs to amend their negligence claim, if they have a good faith basis for doing so, before I dismiss this case.
Na'Shae Brown, now 21, was born January 21, 1999; John Lee Brown, II, now deceased, was born April 9, 1999; and Kya Holmes, 20, was born November 16, 2000. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 1. They "resided [in] and/or visited as infants and children a residence located at 2915 Mosher Street" in Baltimore, Maryland (the "Property") from 2001 to 2004. Id. Chase "owned, controlled, and managed" the Property. Id. ¶ 2. While at the Property, the minors ingested lead-based paint and dust, from which they suffered injuries. Id. ¶ 4.
On October 4, 2019, Na'Shae Brown and Kya Holmes filed suit against Chase and Bank One, N.A. in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, bringing a two-count complaint for negligence (Count I) and violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (Count II). Compl., ECF 4; see Am. Compl., ECF 7 (). Chase removed the case to this Court. ECF 1. Plaintiffs amended their complaint again to remove defendant Bank One, N.A., to name Chase "individually and as successor by merger to Bank One, N.A.," and to add plaintiff Estate of John Lee Brown, II. ECF 27.
Plaintiffs allege that Chase visited the Property where flaking paint was visible and received complaints about flaking lead-based paint on the Property. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 6. They also allege generally that Chase "was aware of the dangers of lead paint and that older houses often contain lead paint and that the instant premises was an older house," and that Chase "knew or had reason to know that the paint was lead based paint." Id. ¶ 5(e), 6. They claim that, despitethis knowledge, Chase "either caused or allowed the continued existence of paint containing lead pigment on their interior and exterior walls, doors, floors, ceilings and woodwork and knowingly allowed said paint to chip and flake." Id. ¶ 3; see id. ¶ 5(c)-(g), (i), (k). Plaintiffs assert that Chase "fail[ed] to adequately and properly inspect the premises for chipping, peeling, and flaking paint," id. ¶ 5(j), and failed to warn the minors of the hazard, id. ¶ 5(b). Plaintiffs also claim that Chase was negligent in its lead abatement efforts, which it performed while the minors were at the Property, without warning them of the hazard. Id. ¶ 5(g)-(h).
Chase filed a motion to dismiss both counts of the second amended complaint. ECF 33. The Bank argues that plaintiffs cannot state a negligence claim because the Bank did not owe them a duty, and the allegations are insufficient to state a claim under the Consumer Protection Act. Def.'s Mot. ¶¶ 3-5; Def.'s Mem. 6-8. Plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of the Consumer Protection Act claim. Pls.' Resp. 2 n.1.
The Bank filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Def.'s Mot. 1. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges "the legal sufficiency of a complaint" on the grounds that, "even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law 'to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.'" Thomas-Lawson v. Koons Ford of Balt., Inc., No. SAG-19-3031, 2020 WL 1675990, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 6, 2020) (citing In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the "complaint need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))). Stated differently, "a complaint must contain 'a short and plain statement of the claim showingthat the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Cooke v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 18-3701-PWG, 2020 WL 1434105, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 24, 2020) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rather, the "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
To prevail on their negligence claim, plaintiffs must prove "1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, 2) that the defendant breached that duty, 3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and 4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of duty." Steamfitters Local Union No. 602 v. Erie Ins. Exch., 209 A.3d 158, 169 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2019) (quoting Rowhouses, Inc. v. Smith, 133 A.3d 1054, 1066 (Md. 2016)), aff'd, --- A.3d ----, 2020 WL 4282308 (Md. July 27, 2020).2 A duty is "an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another." Id. at 170 (quoting Landaverde v. Navarro, 189 A.3d 849, 863 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018)). The Court determines whether a duty exists as a matter of law. Id. at 169 (citing Todd v. Mass Transit Admin., 816 A.2d 930, 933 (Md. 2003)). That determination "depend[s] on the specific facts and circumstances presented." Id. at 170.
The issue here is whether plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Chase owed a duty to Na'Shae Brown, Kya Holmes, and John Lee Brown, II, who suffered injuries from lead-based paint exposure while they lived at or visited the Property. Traditionally, "[i]n the lead-paint cases, the lessor's duty is owed . . . to the lessee or the lessee's immediate household." Joseph v. BozzutoMgmt. Co., 918 A.2d 1230, 1238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007). In addition, the Baltimore City Housing Code ("Housing Code") imposes a duty on property owners and operators with regard to their tenants. See Stedman v. Turk for Estate of Wartzman, No. 1108, Sept. Term, 2016, 2018 WL 5881751, at *2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Nov. 9, 2018).3 That is, "the Housing Code, Baltimore City Code Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 835 A.2d 616, 622 (Md. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md., Inc. v. Gasper, 17 A.3d 676 (Md. 2011).
Plaintiffs allege that the Bank "owned, controlled, and managed" the Property. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 2. The Bank contends that plaintiffs make "only conclusory and unsupported legal conclusions" without the necessary "factual allegations showing that the defendant 'own[ed], h[e]ld[], or control[led]' the Property during the relevant time period," and therefore they fail to "adequately allege that Chase owed a duty to Plaintiffs that could plausibly give rise to Plaintiffs' lead-based paint claim." Def.'s Mem. 6. I agree with the Bank. Plaintiffs have not alleged in their Second Amended Complaint how Chase, a financial institution, "owned, controlled, and managed" the Property. See id. Nor do they allege that the Bank rented the Property or otherwise qualified as a landlord. See id. Their allegations about Chase's role vis-à-vis the Property are mere conclusory statements.
In response to these deficiencies in their complaint, plaintiffs argue that, "[i]n lead paint cases, such as this case, a plaintiff may prove a defendant's negligence by proving a violation ofthe Baltimore City Housing Code because a violation of a statute or ordinance is evidence of negligence." See Pls.' Resp. ¶¶ 9, 10, 12. It is true that in Maryland, "the violation of a statute or regulation may sometimes be evidence of negligence." Joseph, 918 A.2d at 1239. But to establish a violation of the Housing Code, plaintiffs must prove that the Bank was an owner or operator under the Housing Code at the time of the alleged violation. See Brooks, 835 A.2d at 622 (citing Housing Code, Art. 13, §§ 101 et seq.); Stedman, 2018 WL 5881751, at *4; Allen v. Dackman, 991 A.2d 1216, 1223-24 (Md. 2010) ().
With regard to the requirement that only an owner or operator may be held liable under the Housing Code, Stedman, 2018 WL 5881751, is informative. In that case, Markeys Stedman filed suit against Paul Wartzman, a "co-personal representative of the Property" where Stedman allegedly was exposed to lead paint that caused brain damage. Id. at *1-2. The owner of the property had died before Stedman filed suit. Plaintiff claimed that the property's personal representative Wartzman "owned and/or controlled and/or managed [the Property], either individually or by the use of agents, servants and/or employees," and should be held liable in negligence and for violating the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. Id. Wartzman moved for summary judgment on the ground...
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