Brown v. Kan. City Freightliner Sales Inc
| Citation | 617 F.3d 995 |
| Decision Date | 19 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-3324.,09-3324. |
| Parties | Donald BROWN, Appellant,v.KANSAS CITY FREIGHTLINER SALES, INC., doing business as Joplin Freightliner Sales; Westfall-O'Dell Motors, Inc., doing business as Westfall-O'Dell Transportation Specialist, Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Daniel K. Wooten, argued, Springfield, MO (Alison Kelly, on the brief), for Appellant.
Patric Shane Lisden, argued, Kansas City, MO (Kevin Dudley Case, Joseph Thomas Welsh, on the brief), for Appellees.
Before MURPHY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
Donald Brown appeals the district court's 1 grant of summary judgment in favor of his employer, Kansas City Freightliner Sales (KCF), in his failure-to-reinstate and wrongful termination claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). We affirm the district court.
Brown worked as a service technician for KCF from April 2000 to October 2007. In both June and August 2007, Brown injured his back at work. After the June incident, Brown completed an injury incident form, visited the occupational doctor, and was released to work that same day with no restrictions. The record indicates that Brown's injury at that time was a lumbar sprain or strain. After the August injury, Brown again submitted a written injury report, and the injury was diagnosed as a lumbar strain. He was prescribed medication and was released back to work immediately, but with certain activity restrictions. He followed up with doctor visits and on September 21, 2007, he was released with no restrictions to “work as tolerated.”
On Wednesday, September 26, Brown verbally reported to his supervisor that he had hurt his back again and that he wanted to go home. He did not submit a written injury report and refused medical treatment. Brown left work for the day after this verbal report and was then absent from work Thursday, Friday, Monday and Tuesday, September 27 through October 2, 2007. On each of these days, either Brown or his wife called him in sick but provided no other information. Brown did not seek medical treatment during this time. Instead, Brown testified that he was able to manage his pain with medications leftover from the previous injury.
Prior to the Wednesday, September 26 incident, Brown had already used up all of his authorized sick and vacation leave. When Brown returned to work on October 3, 2007, his employment was terminated. Subsequently, Brown had several medical appointments in October and November 2007, at which time he was eventually 2 diagnosed with degenerating and protruding cervical discs. The medical evidence from those visits indicates that Brown had an injury to his cervical spine, including numbness and tingling in his upper extremities. On April 25, 2008, he underwent surgery in the C4 through C7 cervical spine region. Brown's medical records from October 12, 2007, though the date of surgery in April 2008 do not reference an injury or accident occurring from September 26 through October 2, nor do they mention a previous lumbar injury, other than in the general patient history section.3
Brown sued KCF for failure to reinstate and wrongful discharge in violation of the FMLA. Upon competing motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of KCF, finding that Brown did not suffer from a “serious health condition” as defined by the FMLA and that he failed to give adequate notice to KCF that he was suffering from a serious health condition. On appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for KCF and also erred in not granting summary judgment in his favor.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, giving Brown the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Reed v. City of St. Charles, 561 F.3d 788, 790 (8th Cir.2009). In order for Brown to be entitled to FMLA 4 leave, he must show that he experienced a “serious health condition” during the absence period at issue. Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.2005). Further, Brown must show that he gave KCF adequate notice that he was seeking FMLA leave during the disputed time period. Id. Absent the required notice, the employer's duty to provide FMLA leave 5 is not triggered. Kobus v. Coll. of St. Scholastica, Inc., 608 F.3d 1034, 1036-37 (8th Cir.2010). Because it is dispositive, we consider the second requirement first.
The district court found that Brown failed to give KCF adequate (or any) notice that he was seeking FMLA leave for the September 27 through October 2 absence, rather than simply taking sick leave. In Scobey v. Nucor Steel-Arkansas, 580 F.3d 781 (8th Cir.2009), we reiterated our rigorous notice standard for employees seeking to use FMLA leave for absences. “ ‘Employees ... have an affirmative duty to indicate both the need and the reason for the leave, and must let employers know when they anticipate returning to their position.’ ” Id. at 786 (quoting Woods, 409 F.3d at 990-91). The Scobey court noted that the adequacy of notice depends upon the facts of each case, and found that the employee's notice was lacking, even though the employee had been in contact with his employer on several occasions during his absence. Id. at 787-88. Indeed, the Scobey employee had called his employer various times during his several-day work absence, but told his employer, while intoxicated, that he was having a nervous breakdown. Id. at 783-84. Although this employee was in contact with his employer, his failure to provide the employer with a reason to differentiate the absence from ordinary sick days, or even possibly malingering, proved fatal to his FMLA claim. Id. at 789-90.
Arguably, the facts in Scobey are more compelling on the notice issue than in this case. Brown apparently became injured on September 26...
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