Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before this Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Alfon Brown ("Petitioner") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner challenges his judgment of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, entered on April 18, 2008, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, imposed after he was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder. For the following reasons, Petitioner's application for federal habeas corpus relief will be denied.
The pertinent factual and procedural history of this case, as summarized by the trial court in its Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion dated December 11, 2008, are as follows:
The information alleged that on February 20, 2005, the defendant was involved in a shooting/burglary that resulted in the death of T.C. Lyerly and Chaoe Davis, and caused serious injuries to Kevilin Middleton. The trial proceeded non-jury before this court. The trial commenced on June 18, 2007, and continued on numerous dates, until February 8, 2008, when this court adjudicated the defendant guilty of two counts of second-degree homicide at CC200506494, and burglary and conspiracy at CC200506950. On April 18, 2008, this court sentenced the defendant to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment without parole for the homicide convictions, plus a consecutive term of imprisonment of 8-16 years imprisonment for the remaining charges.
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The following evidence was adduced at trial. Kevilin Middleton hosted a party at his residence located at 8610 Westwood Road, in Penn Hills, Pennsylvania (hereinafter referred to as the "residence"), and arranged for exotic dancers to perform during the party for the payment of $200.00. Three females arrived to perform exotic dancing after midnight on February 20, 2005: Helen McCorkle, (whose working name was "Odyssey"), Geneva Burrell, (whose working name was "Black Cherry"), and Angel Potter, (whose working name was "Spice").
Kevilin Middleton, T.C. Lyerly and Chaoe Davis were the only people remaining at the residence when the dancers arrived. Mc. McCorkle and Ms. Potter intended on performing the exotic dance. Mr. Middleton did not like Ms. Potter's appearance, and insulted her and refused to pay her to dance. Ms. Burrell was unwilling to dance despite Mr. Middleton's insistence that she dance instead of Ms. Potter. Mr. Middleton, Ms. Potter, and Ms. Burrell argued over the payment and the dancers; and then both Ms. Potter and Ms. Burrell made cell phone calls to some of the co-defendants. The defendant is the father of Ms. Potter's child and she called him in distress after the argument.
Ms. McCorkle went outside after the argument. As she waited for the other women to leave the residence, she saw a vehicle drive up to the residence and saw four men exit the vehicle and approach the residence. Ms. McCorkle recognized the defendant as the first man to enter the residence, and Mr. Middleton (a victim) testified that the first man to enter the house asked for money then shot Chaoe Davis.
McCorkle also recognized Ramone Coto and Erik Surratt as they entered the residence. The remaining man was wearing a ski mask, and Ms. McCorkle did not recognize him. However, Geneva Burrell identified Richard Cunningham as the man who entered the house wearing a ski mask. Additionally, Richard Cunningham's fingerprints were found on the interior storm door.
Ms. McCorkle testified that Ramone Coto and Erik Surratt entered the residence with firearms. Ms. Potter and Ms. Burrell saw Erik Surratt in the residence with a large firearm. T.C. Lyerly and Chaoe Davis were killed during the shooting/burglary and Kevilin Middleton was severely injured.
(Resp't Ex. 6, ECF No. 16-2 at pp.5-8.)
After exhausting his state appeals, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on July 11, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) The Petition raises the following three claims:
1. Insufficiency of evidence to support convictions for Second Degree Murder, Burglary, and Conspiracy to commit Burglary.
2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately research Petitioner's "Notice of Joinder" and file a motion to sever cases that were not properly joined.
3. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a meritorious Speedy Trial claim.
Respondents filed their Answer to the Petition on February 6, 2015. (ECF No. 16.)
B. Federal habeas standard of review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996 ("AEDPA"), habeas relief is only available on the grounds that Petitioner's judgment of sentence was obtained in violation of his federal constitutional rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
As codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,1or involved an unreasonable application of,2clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.3
(Emphasis added). Importantly, regardless of whether a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits so as to invoke review under the standard set forth in § 2254(d), under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) a federal habeas court must presume that all of the state court's factual findings are correct unless the presumption is rebutted by "clear and convincing evidence." See, e.g., Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). See also Weeks v. Snyder, 219 F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Marshall v. Longberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983), for the proposition that habeas review does not permit a federal court to redetermine the credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state court); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339-41 (2003).
C. Ineffective assistance of counsel standard of review Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are "governed by the familiar two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)." Shelton v. Carroll, 464 F.3d 423, 438 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)). For AEDPA purposes, the Strickland test qualifies as "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000). Under Strickland, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result would have been different. 466 U.S. at 687. For the deficient performance prong, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688. To establish prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.
With respect to the sequence of the two prongs, the Strickland Court held that "a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed." 466 U.S. at 697. In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding . . . . In every case the court should be concerned with whether . . . the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results." Id. at 696.
1. Claim one: The evidence was insufficient to support convictions for Second Degree Murder, Burglary, and Conspiracy to commit Burglary. Petitioner first claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for second degree murder, burglary, and conspiracy to commit burglary. Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal and it was addressed by Judge Nauhaus in his Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion as follows:
[T]he defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the burglary and murder convictions, that the defendant was [ ] licensed or privileged to enter the victim's residence, having been invited there by the guests Ms. Burrell and/or Ms. Potter. The defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence [to] establish that the killing was committed in furtherance of the underlying burglary felony. Bother Ms. Burrell and Ms. Potter lacked the authority to grant any of the defendants the privilege to enter the residence. It is [u]ndisputed that the defendant and co-defendants were not privileged to enter the residence brandishing loaded firearms. The first man to enter the house asked for money then shot Chaoe Lyerly. The evidence proved unauthorized entry into the residence to commit burglary and second-degree murder.
Next the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction. The evidence showed a conspiracy where the four co-defendants exited their vehicle
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