Brown v. Kauffman

• Decision Date: 03 December 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-cv-2236
• Citation: 425 F.Supp.3d 395
• Parties: Knowledge BROWN, Petitioner, v. Superintendent Kevin KAUFFMAN, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

425 F.Supp.3d 395

Knowledge BROWN, Petitioner,

v.Superintendent Kevin KAUFFMAN, et al., Respondents.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-cv-2236

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed December 3, 2019

Filed December 4, 2019

ORDER

JOEL H. SLOMSKY, J.

AND NOW, this 3rd day of December, 2019, upon careful and independent consideration of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and after review of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Lynne A. Sitarski, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED.

2. The petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is GRANTED as to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for failing to object to the reasonable doubt jury instruction. The Commonwealth shall retry Petitioner or release him from all custody within one-hundred and eighty (180) days of the Order.

3. Claim Two is DEFERRED, as the writ is being granted on other grounds.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

LYNNE A. SITARSKI, United States Magistrate Judge

Before the Court is a counseled Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Knowledge Brown ("Petitioner"), an individual currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution—Huntingdon. This matter has been referred to me for a Report and Recommendation. For the following reasons, I respectfully recommend that the petition for habeas corpus be GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹

On May 8, 2009, Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder, possession of an instrument of crime (PIC), and related firearm offenses. (Crim. Docket at 4-5). In its decision affirming Petitioner's judgment of sentence, the Pennsylvania Superior Court provided the following factual and procedural summary:

On February 15, 2007, Jamal Richardson ("the victim") was shot twice and killed while inside of a grocery store located at 2630 Dickenson Street in Philadelphia. Shortly after the shooting occurred, the police receive several anonymous tips indicating, "Knowledge did it."

Renea Moore ("Moore") was present in the store at the time of the shooting and gave a statement to police. She told police that she observed [Petitioner] and the victim engaged in an argument, and saw the victim push [Petitioner] away and say, "go ahead." Moore then saw [Petitioner] shoot the victim twice and run out of the store. Moore stated that she had known [Petitioner] for two-to-three years prior to the shooting from seeing him every day in the neighborhood heading to the basketball courts. Furthermore, she indicated [Petitioner] had attempted to rob the father of one of her children approximately six-to-seven months prior to the shooting. The police presented her with a single photograph of [Petitioner], and she readily identified him by name.

Acquil Raheem ("Raheem") was also present in the grocery store when the victim was shot. When speaking to police, Raheem indicated that he had seen [Petitioner], whom he knew as "Na" around the neighborhood, and that he was the one who shot the victim. The police presented Raheem with a photo array, and he selected [Petitioner] as the shooter.

The police recovered a discarded gun from an area near the grocery store. Testing revealed that it was the gun that was used to shoot the victim. Police conducted DNA and fingerprint analysis on the weapon, but this proved to be unsuccessful.

A warrant for [Petitioner's] arrest was issued on February 16, 2007. [Petitioner] turned himself into police on May 31, 2007. On August 1, 2008, [Petitioner] filed a pro se motion to suppress identification evidence, arguing that the single-photo identification procedure utilized with Moore was unduly suggestive. A hearing on the motion was held on April 30, 2009, at which time Detective Joseph Centeno testified that he did not provide Moore with a photo array because she knew [Petitioner] prior to and independent of the shooting. Moore also testified at the suppression hearing, and provided the same information contained in the statement she provided to police. She further testified that prior to being shown the single picture of [Petitioner], she viewed a photo array on a computer screen, which consisted of rows of men's faces, and that she selected [Petitioner] from that group. The trial court denied the motion, finding that "Moore clearly had an independent basis for identifying [Petitioner]."

A jury trial took place from May 5 through May 8, 2009. At trial, Moore once again testified in line with her statement to police and with her prior testimony at the suppression hearing. Raheem, on the other hand, recanted entirely, denying even that his signature appeared on his police statement. The Commonwealth impeached Raheem's testimony using his statement to police and his prior testimony at the preliminary hearing.

[Petitioner] presented several witnesses in his defense. The first was his sister, Ameena Ruff ("[Petitioner's] sister"), who testified that [Petitioner] was with her at her home on the day in question. On cross-examination, however, it became clear that [Petitioner's] sister did not know on what day the shooting occurred. Furthermore, she had given a statement to police indicating that she could not be sure [Petitioner] was with her on the day of the shooting. She testified that she is very ill, and takes medication that adversely affects her memory.

[Petitioner] testified on his own behalf, corroborating his sister's testimony that he was at her home on the day in question taking care of her. He denied being present at the grocery store at the time of the shooting, denied that he knew the victim, and denied that he ever attempted to rob the father of one of Moore's children.

[Petitioner] also called his mother, Joyce Ruff ("[Petitioner's] mother"), who testified regarding his reputation in the community as a peaceful citizen. On cross-examination, over defense counsel's objection, the Commonwealth questioned her about [Petitioner's] prior conviction for disorderly conduct. Although she testified she was unaware he was convicted of the crime, she stated it did not change her opinion about [Petitioner's] reputation for "not being a disruptive person in the neighborhood."

Commonwealth v. Brown , No. 2424 EDA 2009, SCR No. D22, slip op., at 1-4; see also (Resp., Ex. A, ECF No. 13-1).

On May 8, 2009, after the three-day jury trial, the jury convicted Petitioner of first-degree murder, PIC, and other firearm related offenses. (N.T., Trial, 5/8/09, at 6:21-7:21; Crim. Docket at 4-5). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibly of parole, with concurrent sentences for the firearm offenses. (N.T., Trial, 5/8/09, at 21:6-14). Petitioner filed post-sentence motions, which were denied on July 20, 2009. (Mot., SCR No. D6; Order, SCR No. D11; Crim. Docket at 10-11).

Petitioner timely appealed. (Notice of Appeal, SCR No. D12; Crim. Docket at 12). On August 9, 2010, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Concise Statement of Errors raising four claims² : (1) insufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) trial court error for denying his motion to suppress; (3) trial court error for allowing the Commonwealth to cross-examine his mother about his conviction for disorderly conduct; and (4) trial court error for denying a jury instruction that the Commonwealth's witness Moore was on probation. (Suppl. Statement of Errors, SCR No. D19, ¶¶ 1-4; see also Brown , slip op. at 5 (quoting Appellant's Br.)). The Superior Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on July 8, 2011. Brown , SCR No. D22, slip op. at 14. He filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal on July 28, 2011, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on January 4, 2012. (Order, SCR No. D23; Crim. Docket at 15).

On February 17, 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541, et seq . (PCRA Pet., SCR No. D23; Crim. Docket at 15). PCRA Counsel entered his appearance on September 17, 2014, and subsequently filed an Amended PCRA Petition and Supplemental Amended PCRA Petition. (Entry of Appearance, SCR No. D26; Am. PCRA Pet., SCR No. D27; Suppl. Am. PCRA Pet., SCR No. D29). The PCRA Court held a hearing on August 24, 2015. (N.T., PCRA Hr'g, 8/24/15; Crim. Docket at 17). On October 19, 2015, the PCRA Court denied the Petition. (PCRA Ct. Op., SCR No. D32).

Petitioner timely appealed. (Notice of Appeal, SCR No. D33). He raised two claims: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Commonwealth witness Moore and request a cautionary jury instruction; and (2) he was entitled to relief under a cumulative error standard. Commonwealth v. Brown , No. 3338 EDA 2015, 2016 WL 5420504, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (quoting Appellant's Br.). The Superior Court affirmed the PCRA Court's denial on September 27, 2016. Id. at *2. Petitioner filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal, which was denied on January 24, 2017. (Crim. Docket at 19).

On May 15, 2017, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 1). The Honorable Joel H. Slomsky referred this matter to me for a Report and Recommendation. (Order, ECF No. 2). In his pro se Petition, he raised one ineffectiveness claim, that trial counsel "fail[ed] to challenge the eyewitness evidence" by impeaching the eyewitness with her prior statement to police. (Id. at ¶ 12). Petitioner also filed a pro se Memorandum of Law, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's reasonable doubt jury instruction. (Mem. Law, ECF No. 8, at ¶¶ 1-5). On February 16, 2018, counsel entered his appearance on Petitioner's behalf, and subsequently filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of the Petition. (Mem. Law Supp. Hab. Pet., ECF No. 20). Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law on August 1, 2018. (Suppl. Mem. Law, ECF No. 33). The Commonwealth filed its initial...