Brown v. Lukhard
| Decision Date | 26 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 821058,821058 |
| Citation | 229 Va. 316,330 S.E.2d 84 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Mary BROWN, et al. v. William L. LUKHARD, etc., et al. Record |
Jill A. Hanken, Richmond (Gregory E. Lucyk, Henry W. McLaughlin, III, Virginia Poverty Law Center, Richmond, on briefs), for appellants.
John A. Rupp, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen. (Gerald L. Baliles, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellees.
Present: All the Justices.
In this declaratory judgment proceeding in equity, recipients of Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) benefits seek adjudication that a State departmental regulation was invalid because it violated legislative enactments. The basic question is whether certain statutory provisions, when read with portions of a biennial appropriations act, are clear and unambiguous, thus precluding use of unpublished legislative history to construe the enactments.
The ADC program is a joint federal-state effort established under the Social Security Act to provide funds to children of indigent families. In Virginia, the program is administered by the Department of Welfare under the Virginia Public Welfare and Assistance Law. Code §§ 63.1-86 to -133.1.
The bill of complaint in this proceeding was filed June 30, 1981. At that time, Code § 63.1-105 provided, in part: "A person shall be eligible for aid to dependent children if he: (a) Has not attained the age of eighteen years, or, if regularly attending school, has not attained the age of twenty-one years; ...." 1
The 1981 General Assembly appropriated over $171 million to the Department of Welfare for the ADC program. 1981 Acts, ch. 601 at 1101. The entry for ADC appears in the following portion of the Appropriations Act under Item 498:
Information References($) Appropriations($)
First Year Second Year First Year Second
Year
498.... Temporary Income Supplement $194,588,800 $197,531,920
Services (4520000)
Aid to Dependent Children $169,364,000 $171,656,120
(4520100)
General Relief (4520300) $7,319,800 $7,685,800
Resettlement Assistance $11,905,000 $12,190,000
(4520400)
Emergency Assistance $6,000,000 $6,000,000
(4520600)
The Act contains no language restricting the expenditures of ADC funds.
On May 21, 1981, after enactment of the Appropriations Act and before it became effective on July 1, the State Board of Welfare adopted a statewide ADC policy change which it felt implemented action of the General Assembly. The Board believed that the legislature demonstrated in the Appropriations Act an intent to "defund" ADC coverage for students between the ages of 18 and 21. Thus, the new policy terminated such benefits for that category of recipients effective July 1, 1981.
Upon being notified of the new regulation, six recipients of such benefits joined as plaintiffs in this suit against the Director of the Department of Welfare and the members of the State Board of Welfare (hereinafter collectively, the Department). The plaintiffs alleged they qualified for receipt of continued ADC payments under the statutory provision retaining ADC eligibility in those persons 18 to 21 years of age "regularly attending school." Asserting the Department's action terminating their entitlement to ADC violated Code § 63.1-105, the plaintiffs sought a temporary and permanent injunction suspending the Department's regulation and sought an adjudication that they were entitled to continued payments of ADC.
After a hearing on June 30, the trial court denied the request for a temporary injunction. Subsequently, motions for summary judgment were filed in 1981 by the opposing parties. 2 The trial court, relying on legislative history introduced over the plaintiffs' objections, found in favor of the Department in a February 1982 letter opinion.
Reviewing the legislative budgeting process, and noting its "complexity," the chancellor ruled "that the figures in the budget are not clear and unambiguous and therefore other evidence can be considered to determine the will of the General Assembly...." The trial court placed special emphasis on one of the Department's exhibits, a legislative document which was part of the 1981 budgeting process and which dealt with a senator's proposed amendment, ultimately adopted, to Item 498 of the budget. The proposal reduced the original, second-year ADC appropriation contained in the 1980 biennial budget. Noted at the foot of the preprinted legislative form under "Justification For Request," was the following:
The trial court determined from the testimonial and documentary evidence that all members of the House and Senate were aware of the foregoing explanatory note to the Senate amendment at the time the Budget Bill was adopted by the General Assembly. The trial court aptly stated: "The problem in this case arises because the explanatory note contained in the Senate amendment was not carried forward into the [Appropriations] Act and voted upon finally by both the House and Senate." Relying on the extrinsic evidence to interpret the ambiguous item in the Appropriations Act, the court below decided it was "apparent that the General Assembly did not appropriate any funds that would benefit the plaintiffs in this case." Accordingly, the court ruled that "no money can be paid to the Welfare Department to fund the program that would benefit the plaintiffs." The plaintiffs appeal from the March 1982 final order sustaining the Department's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that Code § 63.1-105(a) mandates ADC eligibility for 18 to 21-year-old students who are otherwise qualified. According to the plaintiffs, use of the word "shall" in § 63.1-105(a) imposes an obligation on the Department to pay ADC benefits to the plaintiffs when eligibility is proven. Plaintiffs point to the following provisions of Code § 63.1-109: "Upon completion of the investigation the local board shall determine whether the applicant is eligible for assistance under this law, and, if eligible, the amount of such assistance and the date upon which such assistance shall begin." Plaintiffs say that use of the word "eligible" in this section directly relates to those persons defined as "eligible" under § 63.1-105. Thus, plaintiffs contend, because they were "eligible" for ADC on July 1, 1981 under § 63.1-105, they were entitled to the payment of benefits at that time under § 63.1- 109. In sum, plaintiffs argue: "Once eligibility is established, ADC benefits must be paid."
The Department contends that § 63.1-105(a) does not mandate payment for 18 to 21-year-old students but that payment of benefits depends upon the Appropriations Act. Thus, according to the argument, § 63.1-105 and § 63.1-109 merely enable the Department to pay such benefits if the General Assembly in fact provides an appropriation to the Department for those individuals who are eligible. We will agree with the Department and assume, without deciding, that the foregoing statutes are mere enabling statutes rather than mandatory.
Continuing, the Department does not contend that § 63.1-105, standing alone, is ambiguous. It argues, however, that the pertinent portions of the Appropriations Act affecting the provisions of the statute are unclear and ambiguous. While recognizing that the appropriation plainly indicates the legislature intended a reduction in "some" ADC program benefits, the Department says "it is unclear as to which benefits were to be eliminated." The Department notes that "Item 498 contains a subject heading, 'Aid to Dependent Children,' and two figures under the 'Second Year' column, with one figure lined out, indicating a total cut of slightly less than $3 million." The Department says the appropriation "contains the number '4520100' which, on its face, is not explained." Thus, the argument continues, the trial court properly relied on extrinsic legislative history to cure the ambiguity, "particularly in view of the fact that the number '4520100' in Item 498 is a cross-reference to the Senate amendment which explains the reduction in the ADC appropriation." We reject the contention that the appropriation is ambiguous.
Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in more than one way or refers to two or more things simultaneously. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Corrugated Container Corp., 229 Va. 132, ---, 327 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1985). An ambiguity exists when the language is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks clearness and definiteness. Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co., 172 Va. 383, 393, 2 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1939). If language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction by the court; the plain meaning and intent of the enactment will be given it. School Board of Chesterfield County v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 219 Va. 244, 250, 247 S.E.2d 380, 384 (1978). When an enactment is clear and unequivocal, general rules for construction of statutes of doubtful meaning do not apply. Id. at 250-51, 247 S.E.2d at 384....
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