Brown v. Major

• Decision Date: 30 October 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 4:14-cv-4191-TMC-TER
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: DEMETRIUS ALEXANDER BROWN, Plaintiff, v. DIR. SIMON MAJOR, MAJ. McGHANEY, CAPT. THERESA RAY-LEE, CAPT. GILLIARD, LT. C. KELLY, LT. McMILLAN, SGT. SWEAT, SGT. REDDICK, SGT. CUSANDRA WILSON, CPL. T. MOORE, OFC. L. McFADDEN, OFC. B. PATTON, OFC. G. DILLARD, OFC. MEREWEATHER, OFC. OAKS, OFC. STREETER and OFC. VAUGHN, Defendants.

DEMETRIUS ALEXANDER BROWN, Plaintiff, v. DIR. SIMON MAJOR, MAJ. McGHANEY, CAPT. THERESA RAY-LEE, CAPT.GILLIARD, LT. C. KELLY, LT. McMILLAN, SGT. SWEAT, SGT.REDDICK, SGT. CUSANDRA WILSON, CPL. T. MOORE, OFC. L. McFADDEN,OFC. B. PATTON, OFC. G. DILLARD, OFC. MEREWEATHER, OFC. OAKS,OFC. STREETER and OFC. VAUGHN, Defendants.

Civil Action No.: 4:14-cv-4191-TMC-TER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA FLORENCE DIVISION

October 30, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various constitutional rights violations. Presently before the court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Document # 70). Because he is proceeding pro se, Plaintiff was warned pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment could result in the motion being granted, resulting in dismissal of his claims. Plaintiff has not filed a response to Defendants' motion. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC. This Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.

II. RULE 41(B)

"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them, and this authority includes the power to order dismissal of an action for failure to comply with court orders. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)." Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir.1989). "Federal courts possess an inherent authority to dismiss cases with prejudice sua sponte." Gantt v. Maryland Division of Correction, 894 F.Supp. 226, 229 (D.Md. 1995) (citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); White v. Raymark Industs., Inc., 783 F.2d 1175 (4th Cir.1986); Zaczek v. Fauquier County, Va., 764 F.Supp. 1071, 1074 (E.D.Va.1991)).

The Fourth Circuit, in Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir. 1978), recognizing that dismissal with prejudice is a harsh sanction which should not be invoked lightly, set forth four considerations in determining whether Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate: (1) the degree of personal responsibility on the part of the plaintiff; (2) the amount of prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay; (3) the presence or absence of a drawn out history of deliberately proceeding in a dilatory fashion; and (4) the effectiveness of sanctions less drastic than dismissal. Id. at 70.

Subsequently, however, the Fourth Circuit noted that "the four factors ... are not a rigid four-pronged test." Ballard, 882 F.2d at 95. "Here, we think the Magistrate's explicit warning that a recommendation of dismissal would result from failure to obey his order is a critical fact that distinguishes this case from those cited by appellant. . . . In view of the warning, the district court had little alternative to dismissal. Any other course would have placed the credibility of the court in doubt and invited abuse." Id. at 95-96.

In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and, thus, is entirely responsible for his actions. It is solely through Plaintiff's neglect, and not that of an attorney, that no response has been filed. Plaintiff was specifically warned that a failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment could result in the motion being granted, thereby ending his case. In addition to failing to respondto the motion for summary judgment, on June 30, 2015, the undersigned entered an order granting Plaintiff's motion for issuance of subpoena, directed the clerk's office to provide Plaintiff with a blank subpoena form and directed Plaintiff to complete the form and return it to the court within ten days for review. The Plaintiff has not returned the subpoena form. Because Plaintiff failed to complete and return the subpoena form he initially requested and failed to file a response to the motion for summary judgment, the undersigned concludes Plaintiff has abandoned his claim. No other reasonable sanctions are available. Accordingly, it is recommended that this case be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).

III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Plaintiff's Allegations

In the alternative, summary judgment is proper on the merits of Defendants' motion. Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center (SLRDC) beginning May 22, 2014, until his release on April 9, 2015. Lee Aff. ¶ 26 (Ex. to Defendants' Motion). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by (1) not allowing him a Kosher diet, the opportunity to pray in common areas, or a Quran as necessary for his religious beliefs, although inmates of other faiths were allowed to pray in common areas and copies of their holy texts, (2) not allowing him access to adequate legal books or sufficient legal materials, (3) Officer Patton making sexually inappropriate comments to him in front of other inmates, (4) moving him to the Special Management Unit (SMU) after he complained about Officer Patton's comments, (5) allowing him only thirty minutes of recreational time instead of one hour like the other inmates in SMU, (6) forbidding him access to his prescribed glasses because they had metal frames, although other inmates had reading glasses with metal frames, and (7) serving him apples, applesauce or cheese even though he informed the medical staff during intake that he was allergic to dairy products and apples. Plaintiff alleges violations of his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

B. Standard of Review

The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4^th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4^th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet "the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits." Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4^th Cir. 1993).

To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v.Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4^th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4^th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.

C. Discussion

1. First Amendment

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). It provides that "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. U.S. Const. Amend. I. It is well established that inmates retain their federal constitutional right to religious freedom pursuant to their First Amendment rights. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (1987). While noting the Supreme Court's recognition in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979), that pretrial detainees retain constitutional protections despite their confinement, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[a] detainee's First Amendment rights may be restricted in the interest of prison security." Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1082 (4^th Cir. 1993). Although Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987), involved prisoners and not pretrial detainees, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Turner provided the appropriate "standard to determine the constitutionality of the Detention Center's restrictions" on a pre-trial detainee. Hause, 993 F.2d at 1082. In Turner, the Supreme Court applied what amounts to a four-part test. First, a court must determine if there is a valid rational connection between the complained-of regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forth to justify it. When a regulation restricts an inmate's First Amendment rights it must be neutral, meaning that the regulation furthers an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 415. If the court determines that a valid rational connection exists, then it must consider three other factors in determining whether the regulation is reasonable. These three factors are: (1) whether inmates retain alternative means of exercising their First...