Brown v. Manistee County Road Com'n
| Decision Date | 16 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 99566,No. 11,11 |
| Citation | 550 N.W.2d 215,452 Mich. 354 |
| Parties | Billy D. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. MANISTEE COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Keller & Katkowsky, P.C. by Lawrence S. Katkowsky, Southfield, for plaintiff.
Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge by Jon D. VanderPloeg and Craig R. Noland, Grand Rapids, for defendant.
In this case, we granted leave to appeal to consider (1) whether the plaintiff's action is governed by the sixty-day notice provision of M.C.L. § 224.21; M.S.A. § 9.121 or the 120-day notice provision of M.C.L. § 691.1404; M.S.A. § 3.996(104), (2) whether our rule in Hobbs v. State Hwys. Dep't, 398 Mich. 90, 247 N.W.2d 754 (1976), requiring a showing of prejudice, should be overruled, and (3) if we reaffirm Hobbs, whether there has been a showing of prejudice in the instant case. We hold that the 120-day notice provision applies in an action for personal injuries against a county road commission. Further, we reaffirm our decision in Hobbs, wherein this Court held that, absent a showing of actual prejudice to the governmental agency, the notice provision is not a bar to the claim. Because the governmental agency has not shown prejudice from the plaintiff's failure to give notice within this period, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary disposition for the road commission, and remand the case for trial on the merits.
On June 12, 1988, plaintiff Billy D. Brown was riding his motorcycle through Filer City, Michigan, near Manistee when he lost control attempting to avert a pothole. He filed a complaint on June 11, 1990, against defendant Manistee County Road Commission, alleging that he sustained serious injuries.
Brown claimed that the defendant was negligent because it failed to maintain the surface of the road under its control. Sixty-one days after the accident occurred, the road commission resurfaced the road. However, there is no allegation that it knew about the accident when it resurfaced the road.
On September 5, 1991, the defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), claiming that the plaintiff failed to comply with the sixty-day notice requirement of M.C.L. § 224.21; M.S.A. § 9.121. 1 On November 5, 1991, the trial court held that the plaintiff was subject to the sixty-day notice provision, that the defendant was prejudiced by the plaintiff's failure to serve notice, and thus it granted the defendant's motion for summary disposition. The plaintiff appealed in the Court of Appeals, and the defendant cross-appealed the decision of the trial court with respect to which notice provision governed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. 204 Mich.App. 574, 516 N.W.2d 121 (1994). We granted leave to appeal, 2 and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
We begin with the fundamental principle that governmental agencies are statutorily 3 immune from tort liability. 4 The Legislature has, however, provided exceptions to immunity, including liability for failure to properly maintain highways 5 and failure to maintain county roads 6 in reasonable repair. As a condition of this particular waiver of immunity, qualified by Hobbs, the Legislature requires notice of the alleged injury and defect to be served on the appropriate governmental agency. However, the two potentially governing statutes in this case provide different notice periods. M.C.L. § 224.21; M.S.A. § 9.121, addressing county road commission liability, compels the injured party to file a notice of the claim with the clerk and the chairman of the board of county road commissioners within sixty days of the injury. 7 M.C.L. § 691.1404; M.S.A. § 3.996(104), addressing the identical liability for the state, its political subdivisions (including county road commissions), 8 and municipal corporations, 9 requires the injured party to file a notice of the claim with a governmental agency within 120 days of the injury. 10
In the present case, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for summary disposition on the basis of plaintiff's failure to comply with the 120-day notice provision. It held that the county was not prejudiced by repavement of the road before the expiration of the notice provision. 11 However, if the sixty-day notice provision applies, the defendant may have been prejudiced because after the road was repaved, it was unable to photograph, examine or otherwise evaluate plaintiff's claim. We, therefore, must determine with which notice provision the plaintiff was required to comply. In doing so, we remain loyal to this Court's recent commitment "to interpret the current immunity statute and its exceptions in a manner consistent with the intent of the Legislature." Scheurman v. Dep't of Transportation, 434 Mich. 619, 627, 456 N.W.2d 66 (1990).
We have previously discerned the legislative intent "to provide uniform liability and immunity to both state and local government agencies." Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 614, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). We, therefore, note that the distinct notice periods in the two statutes are suspect because it is clear that M.C.L. § 691.1404; M.S.A. § 3.996(104) and M.C.L. § 224.21; M.S.A. § 9.121 govern identical causes of action for defective road and highway maintenance. By providing different notice periods, the legislation divides injured persons into two classes: those injured on a defective road controlled by a county road commission and those injured on a defective road controlled by other governmental agencies. Accordingly, we must determine whether this distinction implicates the Equal Protection Clause. 12
Unless the legislation creates a "classification scheme," or "impinges upon the exercise of a fundamental right," it is "accorded a presumption of constitutionality, and is reviewed by applying a rational basis standard." 13 Doe v. Dep't of Social Services, 439 Mich. 650, 662, 487 N.W.2d 166 (1992). This presumption requires the court to inquire whether " 'any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support' " for the distinction between the notice provisions. Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 613-614, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978). 14
The only purpose that this Court has been able to posit for a notice requirement is to prevent prejudice to the governmental agency:
[A]ctual prejudice to the state due to lack of notice within 120 days is the only legitimate purpose we can posit for this notice provision.... [Hobbs, supra at 96, 247 N.W.2d 754.]
Notice provisions, therefore, permit a governmental agency to gather evidence quickly in order to evaluate a claim. In contravention of the stated purpose of the notice provision in Hobbs, defendant claims that another purpose for the notice provision is to enable the county to remedy any road defects and prevent future injury. A county cannot be prejudiced with respect to the injured party's claim, as required by Hobbs, to enforce the notice provision because of the possibility of a future injury. A future injury does not affect a governmental agency's ability to defend itself against the original claim.
The notice provision has the same purpose, therefore, irrespective of whether the action is brought against the state, a city, township, or county road commission. However, an injured person with a negligent highway cause of action against a "political subdivision" must comply with the 120-day notice provision in M.C.L. § 691.1404; M.S.A. § 3.996(104), whereas a person with an identical cause of action against a county road commission must comply with the sixty-day notice provision in M.C.L. § 224.21; M.S.A. § 9.121. Thus, a person injured in a county in which there is no county road commission would be required to file notice of the claim within 120 days, whereas an identical person injured in a county that has a county road commission would be required to provide notice within sixty days to the county road commissioner.
Therefore, despite a presumption of constitutionality, we are unable to perceive a rational basis for the county road commission statute to mandate notice of a claim within sixty days. During oral argument, attorney for defendant asserted that one could only "surmise" that the distinction is justified by the county road commission's responsibility for "many miles of rural road." However, we believe that there are no "facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed" that indicate a road commission requires a shorter notice period merely because it is responsible for rural roads. 15 Shavers, supra at 613-614, 267 N.W.2d 72. This fact bears no relationship to the stated purpose of the notice provision. There may be no dispute that the governmental agencies under M.C.L. § 691.1401(e); M.S.A. § 3.996(101)(e) are likewise responsible for many miles of rural roads, highways, and streets. Accordingly, the distinct sixty-day notice provision required for claims against a county road commission is unconstitutional.
We must now determine whether the 120-day notice provision is reasonable. Carver v. McKernan, 390 Mich. 96, 211 N.W.2d 24 (1973). In Carver, the Court held that a notice provision with a legitimate purpose "does not necessarily violate the constitution." Id. at 100, 211 N.W.2d 24. The Court held, however, that "even though some notice requirement may be permitted, a particular provision may still be constitutionally deficient." Id. Upholding the six-month notice requirement of the accident claims act, M.C.L. § 257.1118; M.S.A. § 9.2818, 16 the Court also noted that a particular notice provision may be unreasonable if "the time specified in the notice [provision is] for an extremely short period...." Id.
We do not believe that a 120-day notice provision is unreasonably...
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