Brown v. Melisa Hammer in Her Capacity Treasurer

• Decision Date: 22 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2-16-0349,2-16-0349
• Citation: 2016 IL App (2d) 160349 -U
• Parties: CRAIG A. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MELISA HAMMER in her capacity as JO DAVIESS COUNTY TREASURER, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2016 IL App (2d) 160349-U

CRAIG A. BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MELISA HAMMER in her capacity as JO DAVIESS COUNTY TREASURER, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2-16-0349

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT

December 22, 2016

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jo Daviess County.

No. 15-MR-17

Honorable William A. Kelly, Judge, Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Hutchinson and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: (1) Plaintiff forfeited review of trial court order dismissing his original complaint by failing to follow procedure to preserve claims therein in his amended complaint; and (2) trial court properly granted summary judgment in defendant's favor as plaintiff failed to establish that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant violated the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law.

¶ 2 Plaintiff, Craig A. Brown, appeals pro se from orders of the circuit court of Jo Daviess County (1) dismissing his initial complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief and (2) granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, Melisa Hammer, in her capacity as Jo Daviess County Treasurer, on his amended complaint for statutory tax objection. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

¶ 3 II. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Both of plaintiff's complaints charged a violation of the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL) (35 ILCS 200/18-185 et seq. (West 2014)). The PTELL limits increases in property tax extensions and amounts levied by taxing districts in non-home-rule counties in which the PTELL is applicable. Board of Education of Auburn Community School District No. 10 v. Department of Revenue, 242 Ill. 2d 272, 275 (2011) (citing 35 ILCS 200/18-195 (West 2006)). This is accomplished through various mechanisms, including an "extension limitation" (35 ILCS 200/18-185, 18-205 (West 2014)) and a "limiting rate" (35 ILCS 200/18-185, 18-195 (West 2014)), both of which are discussed more thoroughly in the analysis section of our decision. As a general rule, a taxing district subject to PTELL may not ordinarily extend taxes at a rate that exceeds the previous year's extension by more than 5%, or the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), whichever is less, without referendum approval. 35 ILCS 200/18-185, 18-205 (West 2014). At all times relevant herein, the PTELL was applicable to Jo Daviess County. See http://tax.illinois.gov/LocalGovernment/PropertyTax/PTELLcounties.pdf (last visited December 12, 2016) (noting that the voters of Jo Daviess County approved a PTELL referendum in November 1997).

¶ 5 On April 1, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief against Melisa Hammer (Hammer or defendant) in her capacity as Jo Daviess County Treasurer and Jean Dimke (Dimke) in her capacity as Jo Daviess County Clerk. Plaintiff's complaint alleged, in pertinent part, as follows. Plaintiff is the co-owner of real property in Galena, Jo Daviess County, Illinois (Subject Property). Plaintiff paid his 2012 property-tax obligation in full.

Midwest Medical Center (Hospital) is also located in Galena, Jo Daviess County, Illinois. Both the Subject Property and the Hospital lie within the boundaries of some of the same taxing districts (Applicable Taxing Districts). In or about 2008, the Hospital applied for a tax exemption. Each year between 2008 and 2011, Jo Daviess County determined the equalized assessed value (EAV) of the Hospital, the applicable tax rate, and the Hospital's property-tax obligation. It then added the Hospital's "EAV and the corresponding property tax to the tax rolls of the county pending a determination of [the Hospital's] exempt or non-exempt status." During this time, the Hospital never paid any property taxes. In 2013, following a four-year appeal process, the Illinois Department of Revenue (Department) declared the Hospital exempt from its obligation to pay property taxes beginning from the Hospital's inception in 2008.

¶ 6 Plaintiff further alleged that as a result of the Hospital's tax-exempt status, the Hospital's 2012 property-tax obligation, billable in 2013, was not assessed against the Hospital. At that time, Dimke "eliminated the EAV caused by the Hospital from the tax rolls of the county," but she "never eliminated the corresponding property tax" from the tax rolls. Thus, "the Hospital's property tax obligation, remaining as part of the total property tax revenue levied by the county in each of the previous four years, even though never collected, was effectively distributed to the remaining non-exempt property owners in the Applicable Taxing Districts." As a result, plaintiff alleged that Jo Daviess County "illegally billed" "the non-exempt property owners in the Applicable Taxing Districts *** pro rata for the Hospital's exempt property tax obligation in 2013 for the Hospital's 2012 tax," thereby "exceed[ing] the legally permissible property tax extension limitation in 2013 for the 2012 property tax year." Plaintiff made a similar allegation with respect to the Hospital's property-tax obligation billed in 2014 for the 2013 tax year. Further, he alleged that the non-exempt property owners will be "illegally billed pro rata for theHospital's exempt property tax obligation in 2015 for the Hospital's 2014 exempt property tax obligation." Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction enjoining Hammer from "levying the property tax attributable to the Hospital to the other non-exempt property owners in the Applicable Taxing Districts in 2015 with respect to 2014 property taxes" and a permanent injunction enjoining Dimke and Hammer from "levying or collecting any property tax which arises from the exempt property tax amount attributable to the Hospital." In addition, plaintiff asked that the excess taxes be refunded to the non-exempt property owners for the 2012 and 2013 tax years.

¶ 7 On April 29, 2015, Hammer and Dimke filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2014)). They argued that the statutory tax-objection procedure set forth in the Property Tax Code (Code) (see 35 ILCS 200/23-5 et seq. (West 2014)) was the exclusive remedy available to claimant and that, because plaintiff failed to pursue that remedy, he lost his right to proceed. Hammer and Dimke also alleged that the voluntary-payment doctrine barred plaintiff's claims. See Leafblad v. Skidmore, 343 Ill. App. 3d 640, 643 (2003) (noting that a taxpayer may not recover taxes that have been paid voluntarily—even if the taxing body lacked the authority to impose the tax in question—unless a statute allows such recovery). Finally, Hammer and Dimke contended that plaintiff improperly sought class-wide relief. See 35 ILCS 200/23-15 (West 2012) (providing that no tax-objection complaint shall be filed as a class action). Plaintiff filed a "Resistance" to Hammer's and Dimke's motion to dismiss in which he disputed their positions. On October 14, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. Following arguments by the parties, the trial court granted the motion. However, the court allowed plaintiff's request for leave to amend his complaint.

¶ 8 On November 12 2015, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, labeled as a "Statutory Tax Objection" pursuant to section 23-10 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/23-10 (West 2014)). The sole defendant named in the amended complaint was Hammer in her capacity as Jo Daviess County Treasurer. In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleged in relevant part as follows. The Subject Property and the Hospital lie within the boundaries of various taxing districts, including the "Affected Taxing Districts," Galena Unit School District No. 120 (School District) and Highland Community College District No. 519 (College District). In 2013, the Department declared the Hospital exempt from the payment of property taxes from its inception after a four-year appeal process. Plaintiff paid his entire 2014 property-tax obligation on the Subject Property. Plaintiff asserted that the Hospital's "property tax obligation, remaining as part of the total property tax revenue charged by the county Treasurer in each of the previous six years, even though never collected from the Hospital, was effectively distributed to the remaining non-exempt property owners in the [Affected] Taxing Districts for tax years 2012, 2013 and 2014." Plaintiff further asserted that the exempt property-tax obligation of the Hospital "should have been removed by the County Clerk for the purposes of calculating the statutory limitation beginning in tax year 2012," but that "[t]he exempt property tax continues to be charged to the remaining non-exempt properties in the [Affected] Taxing Districts." Plaintiff therefore contended that Jo Daviess County "exceeded the legally permissible property tax extension limitation in 2013 for the 2012 property tax year, in 2014 for the 2013 property tax year and in 2015 for the 2014 property tax year." Plaintiff claimed that the portion of his property-tax obligation related to the Hospital constitutes "an illegal tax charged to the Subject Property." In his prayer for relief, plaintiff requested: (1) an order declaring that a portion of plaintiff's 2014 property-tax obligation to Jo Daviess County regarding the Subject Property "is an illegal amount as proven at trial" and (2)an order directing the Jo Daviess County Treasurer to refund to plaintiff any illegal property tax attributable to the Subject Property paid by him.

¶ 9 On January 4, 2016, in response to the amended complaint, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was accompanied by an affidavit from Dimke. Initially, defendant asserted that the College District is not subject to the PTELL because it is a multi-county...