Brown v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 10 July 1937 |
| Docket Number | 33425. |
| Citation | 146 Kan. 300,69 P.2d 1110 |
| Parties | BROWN v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
In action on life policy which had been reinstated on written application limiting liability of insurer to return of premiums if statements in application for reinstatement were false, question of liability of insurer for face amount of policy was insufficient for jury under documentary and undisputed evidence that between lapse of policy and reinstatement, insured had claimed disability benefits for pulmonary congestion and tuberculosis for which he had consulted physicians and that such facts were concealed in answers made by insured in application for reinstatement (Gen.St. 1935, 40-420, subd. (9).
Statute providing that no misrepresentation shall be deemed material or render policy void unless matter misrepresented actually contributed to death refers to original issue of policy and not application for reinstatement (Gen.St.1935, 40-418).
In action on life policy wherein insurer tendered amount of premiums and interest into court and contended liability was limited thereto, judgment could be rendered against insurer only for amount of premiums and interest and costs accrued to time of tender on sustaining of insurer's motion for directed verdict (Gen.St.1935, 60-2936).
1. In an action to recover on a life insurance policy issued April 8, 1935, which had been reinstated upon written application of the insured dated September 16, 1935, and where the company denied liability on the ground that insured made false representations as to his good health and as to whether he had any illness or consulted any physician since the date of the policy, where the proof conclusively showed by written documents and uncontradicted evidence the representations were false and that insured concealed the fact he had been ill and had consulted physicians, and that the representations with respect thereto were material to the risk, the question of existence of fraud was a matter of law for the court and not an issue of fact for the jury.
2. In a situation as above described, the company's motion for a directed verdict should be allowed and plaintiff permitted to recover only the amount of premiums paid as provided in the application for reinstatement of the insurance policy.
Appeal from District Court, Sedgwick County, Division No. 4; Isaac N. Williams, Judge.
Action by Savannah Brown against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, wherein the defendant filed a cross-petition. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with instructions.
Earle W. Evans, Jos. G. Carey, W. F. Lilleston, George C Spradling, Henry V. Cott, and George Stallwitz, all of Wichita (Harry Cole Bates, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Joe T Rogers and Jas. A. Conly, both of Wichita, for appellee.
This was an action to recover on a policy of life insurance. From an adverse judgment the defendant company appeals, assigning eight claims of error, only one of which will be noticed, i e., that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. For brevity, plaintiff will hereafter be referred to as plaintiff, the insured, Frank Brown, as Brown, and the defendant as the company.
Briefly stated, the defense was that Brown had made false and fraudulent answers to questions in the application for the policy; that he had permitted the policy to be lapsed for nonpayment of premiums; that in a written application for reinstatement of the policy Brown willfully and knowingly misrepresented the condition of his health and concealed illnesses suffered by him prior thereto and at that time and failed to disclose the names of physicians whom he had consulted; that such representations were material to the risk and had the application for reinstatement contained truthful answers, the policy would not have been reinstated. Tender was made of the premiums paid by Brown. By cross-petition, the company alleged facts concerning the execution and delivery of the policy; that it lapsed for nonpayment of quarterly premium, and that it was reinstated. Without detailing the allegations, in substance it was alleged that Brown procured the policy to be issued and delivered to him, and after lapse, to be reinstated, by making false and fraudulent written answers to questions propounded as to his health and as to whether he had consulted a physician. Attached to the pleading was a copy of the application for reinstatement which will be referred to in more detail later. It was alleged that Brown's answers to questions therein as to his sound health and as to whether he had consulted a physician were false, the falsity being unknown to the company, and were made to deceive the company which relied thereon and reinstated the policy; that all of the false and fraudulent statements were material to the risk and that Brown was then suffering from the disease that later resulted in his death, viz., tuberculosis. Other allegations on this phase need not be noted. It was also alleged that after the death of Brown, the company learned of the fraud and tendered to plaintiff the amount of all premiums received by it, the tender being refused. Tender into court was made. The prayer was for cancellation of the policy. Plaintiff's reply to the answer was a general denial and her answer to the cross-petition was a general denial and an allegation that if the policy was not valid she was entitled to collect premiums paid amounting to $90.16. When the case came on for trial, the company paid into court for the benefit of plaintiff the sum of $94.66 being the premiums paid and interest thereon.
Plaintiff's case in chief was brief. She identified the policy of insurance which was admitted in evidence, and testified to the death of her husband, the insured.
The company offered evidence tending to prove that Brown's answers to the application for insurance were false, and that the answers made by him in a statement to procure delivery of the policy were false. We deem it unnecessary to detail this evidence or to discuss it. We shall confine our statement to the following, all of which is in writing and undisputed Application for the policy was made March 17, 1935, and the policy was later issued under date of April 8, 1935; the policy lapsed for nonpayment of the quarterly payment due July 8, 1935, and on September 16, 1935, Brown made a written application for reinstatement of the policy in which he agreed that if the company grant reinstatement, the same shall be deemed to be based exclusively upon the representations contained in the application, and upon the express condition that if the statements be in any respect untrue the company, for a period of two years from reinstatement, should be under no liability except to return all premiums paid since date of reinstatement. Questions 4 and 6 of the application for reinstatement,with the answers made by insured, were as follows:
It was also shown that Brown had a health and accident policy in the National Life & Accident Insurance Company of Nashville, Tenn., and under date of June 19, 1935, he made a claim for compensation, in which his physician answered questions as follows:
On this claim he was paid and receipted for the sum of $5 on June 26, 1935. He made a similar claim against the same company under date of June 26, 1935. In that claim, his physician answered question 5 above thus: "Pulmonary congestion, Bilious and Anemia," and question 9 as above. On this claim he was paid and receipted for $5 on July 3, 1935. Another claim against this same company was rejected. Its contents are not shown and it will not be referred to further. Brown also had an accident and health policy in the Washington National Insurance Company of Chicago, and under date of June 19, 1935, he made claim thereunder in an application which he personally signed and in which he answered questions to the effect he was not able to leave the house and that he was confined continuously to his bed. Accompanying this application was his physician's certificate containing these questions and answers:
On this claim Brown was paid $24. Each of the above medical certificates was made...
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