Brown v. Middaugh
| Decision Date | 19 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-CV-1097.,96-CV-1097. |
| Citation | 41 F.Supp.2d 172 |
| Parties | James BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Daniel G. MIDDAUGH, Individually and as Sheriff of Oneida County, New York; M. Peter Paravati, Individually and as Undersheriff of Oneida County, New York; Lt. Roy Meyers, Individually and as an employee of the Sheriff's Department of Oneida County, New York; Lt. William Chappell, Individually and as an employee of the Sheriff's Department of Oneida County, New York; Sgt. Meyers, Individually and as an employee of the Sheriff's Department of Oneida County; Sgt. Gregory Hughes, Individually and as an employee of the Sheriff's Department of Oneida County, New York; Fred Lamado, Individually and as a Deputy Sheriff/Corrections Officer of the County of Oneida, New York; Nick White, Individually and as a Deputy Sheriff/Corrections Officer of the County of Oneida, New York; Joseph Lisi, Individually and as an Investigator for the Sheriff's Department of Oneida County, New York; John Doe, a fictitious name intended to represent the names of several employees of the Sheriff's Department of Oneida County, New York and/or the County of Oneida, New York, whose identities are as yet unknown; County of Oneida, New York, Defendants.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
A.J. Bosman-Moore, Office of A.J. Bosman-Moore, Rome, New York, for plaintiff.
Smith, Sovik, Kendrick & Sugnet, P.C., Syracuse, New York (James A. O'Shea, of Counsel) for defendant Oneida County.
Carl Cochi, Offices of Carl Cochi, Utica, New York, for defendant Paravati.
Gorman, Waszkiewicz, Gorman & Schmitt, Utica, New York (Bartle J. Gorman, of Counsel), for defendant Lisi.
Capecelatro, Del Buono & Compson, P.C., Utica, New York (David R. Diodati, of Counsel), for defendants Middaugh, Meyers, Chapple, Hughes, Lamanto and White.
Currently before the court are defendants' motions for summary judgment, which plaintiff opposes, as well as plaintiff's cross-motion to supplement his complaint, which defendants oppose. Following oral argument on February 12, 1999, the court reserved decision on these motions. Having examined their merits carefully, the court denies plaintiff's motion to supplement his complaint; grants defendants Middaugh, Meyers, Chapple, Hughes, Lamanto, White and Lisi's motions for summary judgment; and grants in part and denies in part defendant Paravati and Oneida County's motions for summary judgment.
Some familiarity with the background of this Memorandum-Decision and Order is assumed. Plaintiff, a black deputy with the Oneida County Sheriff's Department ("OCSD"), has been employed as a corrections officer at the Oneida County Jail since 1990. He currently is suspended from the OCSD, with pay, purportedly pending the outcome of charges filed in May 1998 for driving while intoxicated and endangering the welfare of a minor. Previously, the court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction to lift his suspension. See Brown v. Middaugh, No. 96-CV-1097, 1998 WL 566791 (N.D.N.Y. Sep.3, 1998). His instant action is filed pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Law of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 85-86, New York Executive Law § 296 (the New York Human Rights Law, or "NYHRL") and sundry state common law tort claims. It alleges defendants Oneida County, Sheriff Daniel Middaugh and Undersheriff Peter Paravati, as well OCSD deputies Roy Meyers, William Chapple, Gregory Hughes, Fred Lamanto and Nick White, and OCSD investigator Joseph Lisi, systematically have discriminated, conspired and retaliated against him on the basis of his race.
Specifically, plaintiff submits defendants have not only subjected him to a hostile work environment, but also to various forms of unlawful disparate treatment: retaliation; discriminatory application of OCSD's rules regarding sick time; unfair discipline for tardiness; denial of promotion; discriminatory job task assignments, discipline, and investigation; and unfair job performance evaluations.
Plaintiff also maintains various constitutionally-based causes of action. On July 6, 1995 he was arrested on a charge of possession of a forged instrument in violation of § 170.25 of the New York Penal Code. Roughly four months later, on December 7, 1995, a grand jury issued him a "no bill" on the charge. His arrest, he apprises the court, ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment right because it lacked probable cause. He also insists the motive actuating his attempted prosecution was race, making the action violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. On February 9, 1996, plaintiff discovered he was the target of an Article 75 proceeding, a civil service disciplinary mechanism with potentially punitive employment consequences. Given the timing of the proceeding, which followed his January 6, 1996 filing of a notice of claim against Oneida County and the OCSD, he contends it was instigated in retaliation for his decision to pursue legal action. Plaintiff further states his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated upon the institution of the Article 75 proceeding, impairing his interest in his good name, reputation, honor and integrity. Oneida County, he submits, sanctions these actions, as it pursues an unconstitutional de facto policy of punishing, retaliating and discriminating against minority members of the OCSD in the terms, privileges and conditions of their employment.
Finally, in addition to his state common law tort claims, which the court addresses supra, plaintiff asserts defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 and 1985-86 by discriminating and conspiring against him on account of race. Defendants deny these and the other charges plaintiff makes, which the court addresses seriatim.
Rule 56 allows for summary judgment where the evidence demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue of any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A motion for summary judgment may be granted when the moving party carries its burden of showing that no triable issues of fact exist. See Thompson v. Gjivoje, 896 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir.1990). In light of this burden, any inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See id.; United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per curiam). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. When reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence, then summary judgment is proper. See Id. at 250-251, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.
Courts have long recognized problems unique to the issue of whether to grant summary judgment against Title VII claims, such as those plaintiff raises here. "Because direct evidence of ... discriminatory intent will rarely be found, `affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.'" Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994)). "However, even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Id. (citing Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985)).
Plaintiff moves the court to permit him to supplement his complaint, which already has been amended once. Defendants oppose plaintiff's motion, noting: (1) it was filed on January 29, 1999; and (2) Magistrate Judge Hurd's Order dated October 20, 1998 clearly set November 13, 1998 as the date by which all pleadings must be amended, and January 15, 1999 as the date by which all motions must be filed. The court concurs with defendants: plaintiff's motion to supplement — which, in reality, is really a motion to amend his complaint for a second time — is not timely and must be denied.2
The court turns to the merits of the remaining motions.
Plaintiff concedes defendant Lamanto's summary judgment motion should be granted. See Aff. in Opposition to Dfts' Sum. Judgment Mots., ¶ 33. The court obliges and grants Lamanto's motion.
Title VII prohibits "employers" from undertaking certain discriminatory practices. An "employer," as defined by the act, is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of such person[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). Although this language appears to allow individual liability under Title VII, courts have found it does not. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1317 (2d Cir.1995) (); Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1241, n. 2 (2d Cir.1995) (). See also U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir.1995) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Petrosky v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 96-CV-0902 DRH.
...passed on its applicability here, Berry has been followed in the district courts of this circuit. See, e.g., Brown v. Middaugh, 41 F.Supp.2d 172, 181-82 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (Munson, J.) (citing cases); Dodson v. The N.Y. Times Co., No. 97-Civ.-3838, 1998 WL 702277, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1998......
-
Dawson v. County of Westchester
...substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere."); Brown v. Middaugh, 41 F.Supp.2d 172, 190 (N.D.N.Y.1999). In their Complaint plaintiffs allege violations of their First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rights. (Pls.Mem.Opp.......
-
Parsons v. Pond
...42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits private racial discrimination in the sale or rental of real or personal property." Brown v. Middaugh, 41 F.Supp.2d 172, 193 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (citation omitted). It is settled law that a claim under § 1982 must allege "an element of racial animus or discrimination." ......
-
Lumhoo v. Home Depot Usa, Inc.
...a prima facie case is slight, the issue of whether fellow employees are similarly situated is somewhat strict." Brown v. Middaugh, 41 F.Supp.2d 172, 184 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). "To be similarly situated, the individual with whom [a plaintiff] attempts to compare [himself] must be similarly situate......